Search results

Abstract
As the United States experiences a relative decline in its share of global GDP and China increases its relative share, there is growing concern about the consequences of intensifying competition between the two great powers. This article takes a wider angled view, warns against a single narrative and provides a collection of plausible stories. First, the story of the rise of China and the decline of the United States that relies heavily on 'hard' measures like GDP and relative military capability overlooks other relevant indicators such as normative and network power. I argue that the United States enjoys considerable advantages as measured by both these indicators and will continue to do so for some time. Second, the status of a great power in the international system is a product not only of systemic and structural forces but also of economic and political capacity that enables governments to make strategic choices. The future is contingent, not determined, because the strategies leaders choose matter. I build a matrix of nine possible worlds that result from the choices that the leaders of China and the United States could make over the next twenty years. Finally, I argue that the biggest threat to international peace may come not from rising powers, but when the leaders of the challenger as well as the defender fear that their power may have peaked and that they are beginning to decline.

AbstractAlmost forty years ago, a small group of scholars drew on cognitive psychology to explain anomalous patterns of behavior by leaders on issues of international security. Although it made significant contributions to theory and research, that scholarship did not diffuse broadly into the field. Drawing on concepts in psychology and behavioral economics, research that uses new methods is now producing a wave of scholarship in international relations exemplified by the work in this special issue. Analysis of the use of prospect theory over the last three decades identifies the scope conditions that enable the predictions of rational choice and psychological theories. These scope conditions motivate the focus on the heterogeneity of decision makers that is at the core of current contributions. Future research will move beyond the now-sterile debate between rational choice and psychology.

Part of a roundtable discussion held in San Francisco in 2008 at International Studies Association Annual Conference that identifies the gap between policymakers and academics via autobiographical notes from several distinguished scholars. In this section, Janice Gross Stein targets the unavoidable risks involved when social scientists attempt to advance policy. Her argument that corruption is unavoidable and scholars who are cavalier enough to attempt what she terms 'evolutionary hubris' must consider the option of abandoning their position if they admit that their ultimate policymaking decisions opposes or violates their moral principles. T. Cabrera

Alexander George made a seminal contribution to theories of preventive diplomacy, crisis management, deterrence, and coercive diplomacy. Although he made his contribution in the highly structured environment of the Cold War, his analysis of the close connections between positive and negative inducements, the importance of interests in shaping outcomes, and the dangers of threat‐based strategies as substitutes for policy speaks to the central challenges of contemporary global politics.

A security regime is an uneasy compromise where the relationship among the parties is generally undefined, limited in scope, & transitional. The relationship is undefined, because the parties are usually former adversaries who, for the moment, do not think of war as a feasible or practical, or, under some conditions, even a possible instrument. Yet they are far from being allies. A security regime differs in important ways from an alliance or a security community. A security regime is also limited. What happens inside the regime is only a part of what happens in the larger relationship. Participation in a regime does not imply clear behavioral expectations outside the security arena. Finally, the parties to a security regime are usually in a transitional relationship; although the parties have moved away from a full-scale adversarial relationship, where they are going is less clear. Security regimes do not develop in a linear sequence to become 'security communities'. Adapted from the source document.

Analyzes the movement from conflict management, 1948-73, to conflict resolution, 1974-99, and linkages among the enduring rivalries between the PLO and Israel, Egypt and Israel, and Syria and Israel.