This book, first published in 1978, analyses the development, uses and effects of conventional anti-personnel weapons such as rifles and machine guns, grenades, bombs, shells and mines. It provides the historical, military, technical and clinical background to the international legal discussions as part of the ongoing efforts to prohibit or restrict the uses of some of the more inhumane and indiscriminate of these weapons, the most successful being the 1997 Ottawa Treaty that banned the use of anti-personnel mines.
This book, first published in 1978, examines the military use of space - around 60 per cent of US and Soviet satellites were military ones. The satellites were for military communications, weather prediction, navigation, photographic and electronic reconnaissance, targeting, early warning, and satellites capable of destroying enemy satellites. This book analyses the capabilities of military satellites as part of the debate around the encroachment of military technology and purposes into space.
In the 1970s tactical nuclear warfare was a topical issue. The introduction of the new generation of tactical nuclear weapons into Europe could have had disastrous consequences. These new weapons had already been developed by nuclear-weapon laboratories and pressures were growing for their deployment. On first sight, smaller and more accurate nuclear weapons may seem more humane and militarily preferable to the relatively high-yield tactical nuclear weapons currently deployed. But some of these new types of weapons would blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons and their use would make escalation to strategic nuclear war extremely likely. Indeed, the argument for these new weapons is that their use in wartime is more credible (and therefore acceptable') than current types of tactical nuclear weapons. This perception could easily lead to the exceedingly dangerous idea that some types of tactical nuclear war were winnable'. The fact has to be faced that any use of nuclear weapons is almost certain to escalate until all available weapons are used. To believe otherwise is to believe that one side will surrender before it has used all the weapons in its arsenal. History shows that this is most unlikely to happen. Because of its importance, SIPRI organized a meeting to discuss the whole question. Originally published in 1978, this book is the outcome of that meeting.
This book, first published in 1980, presents the findings of the SIPRI-organized 1979 international symposium on the destruction and conversion of chemical weapons. Thirty experts from 14 countries discussed the destruction and conversion of present stockpiles of chemical warfare agents and munitions; the destruction and conversion of CW research and development facilities; verification of compliance, and confidence-building measures facilitating verification; and the environmental and occupational health hazards involved in maintaining and in disposing of stockpiles of CW agents and munitions.
This book, first published in 1980, examines the extent to which warfare and other military activities contribute to environmental degradation. The military capability to damage the environment has escalated. The military use and abuse of each of the several major global habitats - temperate, tropical, desert, arctic, insular and oceanic - are evaluated separately in the light of the civil use and abuse of that habitat.
For the third year running, this book, originally published in 1984, provided those actively concerned with the dangers of war at the time, with well-researched and up-to-date information on military developments of every kind. Based on material published in the SIPRI Yearbook 1984, this book contains the essential data on nuclear issues, on military expenditure and the arms trade, and examines the breakdown of the arms control talks in 1983.
Originally published in 1977, the purpose of this book was to analyse the relationship between the security of two states mutually undergoing strategic disarmament at the time and the need for safeguarding their security by means of a verification system. The book thus studies some of the basic problems in the disarmament debate, issues that had been the subject of great political controversy. Previous studies had been mainly descriptive or historical, lacking in objective political analysis, and tending to political bias, depending on the political school of the author. There was thus some justification for the statement made by some outstanding authorities in the field that 'to date, no systematic analysis has been attempted to determine what disarmament measures would optimally require of verification methods...' Our ambition is to respond to this criticism, at least so far as the strategic context of disarmament is concerned. Chapter 1 introduces us to the enormous range of repercussions caused by a disarmament agreement. Chapter 2 examines the concept of verification, analysing the meaning of the term, presenting various definitions of what verification is and attempting to systematize the concept. It has been noted on many occasions that the verification set up in a disarmament treaty is only one of a number of factors working towards compliance with a treaty. In fact the role of verification in presenting the treaty, and therefore the security of its participants, is to a large extent limited. However, without many other conditions being satisfied verification on its own can do little to preserve the treaty regime. Chapter 3 discusses these conditions. Chapter 4 gives a brief analysis of the concept of national interests in general, and the concept of national security in particular. Among all the elements of 'security', it is military security that plays by far the largest role. Because of this. Chapter 5 considers a specific case of strategic military security, in which security, defined as stable strategic deterrence between two states, is analysed. Finally, Chapter 6 analyses the question of what happens to security based on strategic deterrence when states enter into the disarmament process. More specifically, the role of verification in preserving security in such circumstances is analysed, thereby answering the main problem of the book. The supporting data for Chapter 6 is given in the Appendix.
To constrain nuclear proliferation, one must, in addition to designing a proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycle, identify a set of long-term arms limitation and security policies for the major states. These policies should be capable of satisfying various security and political objectives of non-nuclear weapon states, thereby minimizing their incentives to acquire independent nuclear weapon capabilities, and thus collectively minimizing future nuclear proliferation. Originally published in 1979, this book attempts to identify such a comprehensive arms limitation and security regime. It reviews negotiations concerning the NPT through the end of the Review Conference of the NPT in mid-1975 and the subsequent strategic debate concerning nuclear proliferation.
In mid-1980 a second conference for the review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would take place in Geneva. Given the importance of preventing, or at least slowing down, nuclear weapon proliferation, this conference would be a crucial event in the field of arms control and disarmament. For many countries the technical and economic barriers to proliferation had disappeared, and the only remaining barriers were political. In an attempt to contribute to the discussions at the NPT Review Conference, SIPRI assembled a group of experts from a number of countries to discuss the technical aspects of the control of fissionable materials in non-military applications. The meeting took place in Stockholm, 12-16 October 1978. Originally published in 1979, this book on nuclear energy and nuclear weapon proliferation contains the papers presented at the symposium and reflects the discussions at the meeting.
The effects of weapons of mass destruction cannot be contained, either spatially or temporally, are unpredictable, discriminate poorly between combatants and civilians, and are highly disruptive of ecosystems. This book, first published in 1977, examines several WMD and analyses the extent and duration of environmental damage to be expected from them. Chapters are devoted to the ecological impacts of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and geophysical and environmental weapons.
The basic idea of common security is not complex. It is that no country can obtain security, in the long run, simply by taking unilateral decisions about its own military forces. This is because security depends also on the actions and reactions of potential adversaries. Security has to be found in common with those adversaries. These ideas were considered in a SIPRI conference held in 1983. The conference had two main objectives. The first was to undertake a critical examination of the concept. The second was to consider the implications of the idea for policy in general, and for disarmament and arms control policy in particular. Originally published in 1985, this book contains revised versions of some of the papers presented at the conference.
First published in 1980, the original blurb read: In August - September 1980 the second Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will take place in Geneva. As this Treaty is the most important barrier to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the results of the Conference will obviously have major effects in the field of arms control and disarmament. The implications of the recent International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) are that the technological capabilities of many countries are such that there is no technical solution to the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not now have them. Thus, it appears that if there is a solution at all, it must be political in nature. A possible element in such a political solution is the internationalization of the sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle; that is, those parts that have the potential of producing fissile materials to make nuclear weapons. Although the intricacies of a system of internationalization are still unresolved, the concept, if realized, would provide another powerful political barrier to nuclear weapon proliferation - a reinforcement for the aims of the NPT itself. Against this background, and as a follow-up to its first symposium and the resultant book, Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation, SIPRI convened a second international group of experts to continue its discussions of issues pertinent to the forthcoming NPT Review Conference. The meeting took place at SIPRI in Stockholm, 31 October - 2 November 1979, when the feasibility of internationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle was examined. SIPRI's views on this complex approach are expressed in Part 1 of this book - Internationalization to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. Part 2 contains the papers that were presented at the symposium.
Originally published in 1982, this is the most comprehensive handbook on arms control ever published. It contains an analysis of the bilateral and multilateral agreements reached since World War II. An assessment is made of the extent to which each agreement has affected the arms race, reduced the likelihood of war or otherwise contributed to the overall goal of disarmament. Ongoing arms control negotiations are also analyzed. The complex problem of verification of compliance with arms control obligations is critically examined, and the shortcomings of the existing arrangements are pointed out. The critique is searching, objective and free of the usual biases of official government reports. The analysis of the arms control agreements is preceded by an historical overview, beginning with the Hague Peace Conferences, held at the turn of this century, through the League of Nations' attempts to bring about a universal reduction of armaments, to the activities of the United Nations in the field of arms regulation and general disarmament. The present arms control negotiating machinery is described. The texts of the relevant documents are reproduced for handy reference and the status of the implementation of the most important multilateral arms control agreements is presented in tabular form. Tables and figures facilitate the reading.
Originally published in 1985, this book is the result of an exploration of the state papers of the United Kingdom undertaken with the aim of discovering information about the past use of chemical warfare. This information may serve as a point of historical reference in speculation upon the possible nature and consequences of large-scale chemical warfare recurring in Europe. Part I of the monograph concentrates primarily on material documenting the use of chemical weapons in the First and Second World Wars, the impact of this use on the civilian populations of France and Belgium, casualties incurred in the production, research, development, training and deployment of chemical warfare agents, and the attempts made to incorporate chemical weapons into military doctrine and war-preparedness. Part II supplements the citation of documents in Part I. It comprises an ordered bibliography listing not only the location of the records found to be of primary concern to this study, but also the location of other records not cited in Part I which appear to form much of the remainder of the official record of the British CW effort. A list of some of the papers which have not been released comprises the concluding section.
