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The aim of this paper is to identify, on the basis of an analysis of the causes, the course and effects of strikes in Serbia over the last three decades, the mechanisms by which society and trade unions have moved from self-management mythology to the defense of whatever wages and "decent, dignified work" as the maximum goal. The drama of the decay of labor and trade unions, as well as the crisis of society, is presented in three chronologically related acts. The first one describes the process of decay concealed behind the call for patriotism, a kind of socialist-patriotic deception. The second one is the democratic introduction of capitalism through "predatory privatization". The current, third act, illustrates how neoliberal populism seeks to pacify any resistance of employees and autonomous unions by creating their surrogates through political clientelism and party employment.

The aim of this article is to identify, on the basis of an analysis of the causes, course and effects of strikes in Serbia over the last three decades, the mechanisms by which society and trade unions have moved from self-management mythology to the defence of inadequate wages and 'decent, dignified work' as the height of their ambitions. The drama of the decay of labour and trade unions, as well as the crisis of society, is presented in three chronologically-related acts. The first describes the process of decay concealed behind the call for patriotism; the second is the democratic introduction of capitalism through 'predatory privatisation'; and the current, third, act illustrates how neoliberal populism seeks to pacify any resistance among employees and autonomous unions by creating surrogates through political clientelism and party employment. The result has been heroic, but futile, protest actions rooted in despair and located somewhat away from the logic of collective action. The author concludes that change and re-collectivisation remains possible but there has to be a developed strategy and a unity between the actors.

In this paper, I am offering hypothesis that radial social and political changes are needed for the step from a state of 'defective' democracy toward consolidated democracy and the rule of law. Those changes may take place if they are aimed at strengthening mechanisms for determination of responsibility of the political elite. To establish full accountability of public officials entrusted with the most import public and political positions, again is necessary radical break with the populistic matrix of political and cultural behavior. ; U ovom radu polazim od ocene da se iskorak iz stanja 'defektne' demokratije i šanse za konsolidovanje demokratije i uspostavljanje vladavine prava nalaze u korenitim društvenim, političkim promenama koje se mogu održati samo sa jačanjem pretpostavki i mehanizama za utvrđivanje odgovornosti političke elite. Za uspostavljanje pune odgovornosti onih kojima su poverene najviše javne i političke funkcije najurgentniji je opet radikalan raskid sa populističkom političkokulturnom matricom i modelom ponašanja.

The author starts from the hypothesis that it is essential for the countries of the region to critically assess the synergy established between systemic, political corruption and a selectively weak, 'devious' nature of the state. Moreover, the key dilemma is whether the expanded practice of political rent seeking supports the conclusion that the root of all corruption is in the very existence of the state - particularly in excessive, selective and deforming state interventions and benefits that create a fertile ground for corruption? The author argues that the destructive combination of weak government and rampant political corruption is based on scattered state intervention, while also rule the parties cartel in the executive branch subordinate to parliament, the judiciary and the police. Corrupt exchange takes place with the absence of strong institutional framework and the precise rules of the political and electoral games, control of public finances and effective political and anti-monopoly legislation and practice included. Exit from the current situation can be seen in the realization of effective anti­corruption strategy that integrates preventive and repressive measures and activities and lead to the establishment of principles of good governance. ; Autor u radu polazi od teze da je za Srbiju i zemlje regiona od ključnog značaja kritičko preispitivanje sinergije uspostavljene između sistemske, političke korupcije i selektivno - slabe, 'lukave' prirode države. Pri tom, ključna dilema je da li se iz raširene prakse traganja za političkom rentom može izvući zaključak da je koren korupcije u samom postojanju države - posebno u prekomernim, selektivnim i deformišućim državnim intervencijama i davanjima koja stvaraju plodno tlo za korupciju. Autor zastupa tezu da se razorna kombinacija slabe države i raširene političke korupcije bazira na razuđenoj državnoj intervenciji, uz istovremenu partokratsku vladavinu, kao i na pluripartijskom kartelu u izvršnoj vlasti podređenom parlamentu, pravosuđu i policiji. Koruptivna razmena odvija se uz odsustvo čvrstog institucionalnog okvira i preciznih pravila političke i izborne igre, uključujući kontrolu javnih finansija i efektivno antimonopolsko zakonodavstvo i praksu. Izlaz iz postojećeg stanja vidi se u realizovanju efektivne antikoruptivne strategije koja objedinjuje preventivne i represivne mere i aktivnosti i vodi uspostavljanju principa dobre vladavine.

In this paper, the author intends to establish the relation between the changes of the social context and the evolution of the dominant political and cultural patterns and political ideologies. The focus of this analysis is the question of correspondence of the political field in Serbia and its key actors - the relevant political parties on the one hand with the divisions in the European political field and its evolution, on the other. The most important conclusion is that, although the Serbian political fieldis openly mimicking, receiving and spreading the European mainstream models, it is still trapped by the traditional and inherited lines of social and political divisions. ; Autor u ovom tekstu nastoji da utvrdi relaciju između promena socijalnog konteksta I evolucije dominantnih političko-kulturnih obrazaca I političkih ideologija. U središtu analize je pitanje koliko u aktuelnom kriznom kontekstu političko polje u Srbiji i njegovi ključni akteri - relevantne političke stranke, korespondiraju sa podelama u evropskom političkom prostoru i njegovom evolucijom. Osnovni zaključak je da je, i pored otvorenog (i zakasnelog) procesa imitacije, recepcije i širenja evropskih main stream uzoraka, političko polje u Srbiji još uvek zarobljeno tradicionalnim,nasleđenim linijama socijalnih i političkih podela.

The author of this paper attempts to establish sufficient theoretical and methodological bases and guidelines for a comprehensive and coherent research of social capital of citizens of Serbia. The analysis focuses on complex and multidimensional relation between social capital of citizens - their different, frequently confronted dimensions and levels, specific constellation of interest and powers in society and efficiency of institutions and chances for consolidation of democracy. In current ambivalence of possible outcomes, chances for 'democracy to get enrooted in Serbia' increase with the growth of generalized, bridging and overarching 'civil' social capital of citizens, with their simultaneous participation and 'exercising' of democracy and the accompanying growth of credibility of civil and political actors and institutions. ; U radu autor nastoji da postavi dovoljne teorijske i metodske osnove i upute za jedno celovito i koherentno istraživanje socijalnog kapitala građana Srbije. U fokusu analize je složen i višedimenzionalan odnos između socijalnog kapitala građana - njegovih različitih, neretko i uzajamno suprotstavljenih dimenzija i nivoa, specifične konstelacije interesa i moći u društvu i delotvornosti institucija i šansi za konsolidovanje demokratije. U prisutnoj ambivalenciji mogućih ishoda, šanse da se 'demokratija primi u Srbiji' rastu sa rastom generalizovanog, premošćujućeg i spajajućeg - 'civilnog' socijalnog kapitala građana, uz istovremenu njihovu participaciju i 'praktikovanje' demokratije i prateći rast kredibiliteta civilnih i političkih aktera i institucija.

Transition from mono-organizational, single-party, ideological and authoritarian regimes to plural, competitive and democratic orders proved to be far more complex and uncertain process with much higher social price than analysts, and particularly citizens of the transition countries, expected and wished. The attitude of citizens of Serbia towards democracy which, in heavily burdened social environment, is not perceived as the key and urgent goal and value, ranks between dissatisfaction, doubts and distrust and a conditional and term support. Moreover, it is impossible to speak about citizens - their image and social portrait - in singular. Serbia is still deeply divided - it has at least four faces. One of them (liberal-democratic) is decisively turned toward future. Another one (authoritarian and social-national) is looking at the past. The third one (national-democratic) is indecisive - it would go to the future but, however, permanently contemplating and sometimes turning backwards, believing that thus it would also arrive where intended. The fourth, mute one, long ago stopped putting question marks above everything that was happening to us. All mutual arrangements, changes in balance of power and political divorces and marriages are still in the game, so in Serbia, at least in a short term, all stories are still possible. . ; Tranzicija se, iz monoorganizacionih, jednopartijskih, ideoloških i autoritarnih režima u pluralne, kompetitivne i demokratske poretke, pokazala daleko složenijim i neizvesnijim procesom, sa daleko većom socijalnom cenom nego što su to analitičari i, posebno građani, zemalja u tranziciji očekivali i želeli. Odnos građana Srbije prema demokratiji koja se, u tegobnom socijalnom okruženju, ne vidi kao ključni i urgentni cilj i vrednost, kreće se između nezadovoljstva, sumnji, nepoverenja i uslovne i oročene podrške. Pritom je nemoguće govoriti o građanima - njihovom licu i socijalnom portretu u jednini. Srbija je još uvek duboko podeljena - ona ima bar četiri svoja lica. Jedno (liberalnodemokratsko) je odlučno okrenuto ka budućnosti. Drugo (autoritarno i socijal-nacionalno) je zagledano u prošlost. Treće (nacional-demokratsko) je neodlučno - ono bi u budućnost stalno se, međutim, propitujući i povremeno se okrećući unazad, verujući da će i tako stići gde je naumilo. Četvrto, nemušto, odavno je prestalo da postavlja pitanja nad svim što nam se dešava. Svi međusobni aranžmani, promene odnosa snaga i politički 'razvodi i brakovi' još su u igri, pa je u Srbiji, bar kratkoročno, svaka priča još uvek moguća. .

In theoretical analysis and political debates about the "destiny of the EU experiment" there is a sort of general stance or political mantra about the democratic deficit of the EU institutions including the European Parliament, which is considered just a surrogate of a parliament with few competencies. Consequently, the elections for the EP were treated, for decades now, as SEC-ond class "test" elections for the national elections which are considered as the only relevant. in the paper we advocate that parallel processes of widen-ing the competencies of the EP and re-politicization as well as re-ideologiza-tion of political agenda that includes key issues of technological and climate change, economic crisis and deep inequalities as well as national (migrant) identities -the issues too wide for national political arena, even according to Europhobes -caused emergence of specific and significant European po-litical space. all this, combined with the raising of the right-wing populism and open question about the destiny of European political architecture after Brexit, led to the increased interest of voters for the European elections. ; U teorijskim analizama i političkim raspravama o "sudbini EU eksperimenta" neka vrsta opšteg mesta ili političke mantre je stav o demokratskom deficitu EU institucija, uključiv i Evropski parlament za koji je važila ocena da se radi tek o surogatu parlamenta sa tek prigodnim ovlašćenjima. Posledično, izbori za EP su decenijama tretirani kao drugorazredni "test" izbori za jedino relevantne, nacionalne izbore. U ovom radu zagovaramo tezu da su paralelni procesi širenja ovlašćenja EP i repolitizacije čak i reideologizacije političke agende na kojoj su se našla ključna pitanja tehnoloških i klimatskih promena, ekonomske i duboke krize nejednakosti i nacionalnih (i migrantskih) identiteta, za koja su i po evrofobima nacionalne političke arene preuzak okvir, uslovile nastanak specifičnog i važnog evropskog političkog prostora. Uz konjunkturne faktore, poput rasta desnog populizma i otvorenog pitanja preispitivanja same sudbine evropske političke arhitekture nakon Bregzita, sve je to za posledicu imalo i obnovu interesa birača za evropske izbore.

In this paper we analyze the influence of populist ideas on the emergence and organization of new political parties in Serbia after the elections in 2007 and 2008. These elections represent the turning point in the development of the party system because only after the pro-European consensus among Democrats and Socialists was formed, the division within Serbian Radical Party occurred and the ideological space occupied by the relevant parties has narrowed. On the other hand, high level of distrust in politics among the citizens and lowering of the state of democracy facilitate the emergence of new actors who are, almost by rule, under the influence of the growing wave of populism in the world. In this paper, we apply the ideational approach to populism and, using the new actors as example, we aim to identify ideological and organizational variations which can develop under the influence of populism, as well as differences which emerge from the interpretation of populism in Serbia compared to some other countries.