Search results

Im März 2024 fand in Russland die achte Präsidentschaftswahl seit 1991 statt, aus der zum fünften Mal seit dem Jahr 2000 – und mit einem neuen Rekordergebnis – Wladimir Putin als Sieger hervorging. Dieses Ereignis stellte jedoch keine Wahl im üblichen Sinne des Wortes dar. Es ging dabei nicht um die Auswahl einer geeigneten Person für das konstitutionell wichtigste Staatsamt, sondern um die plebiszitäre Zustimmung der Bevölkerung zum »nationalen Führer«, dem von ihm vorangetriebenen Entwicklungspfad Russlands im Allgemeinen sowie zum Krieg gegen die Ukraine im Besonderen. Das Regime stellte damit ein weiteres Mal seine Fähigkeit unter Beweis, den Wahlprozess und seine Ergebnisse zu kontrollieren, um die von ihm beanspruchte Legitimität zu inszenieren.

AbstractDrawing on three theoretical perspectives—"protest-democracy," "authoritarian/patronal regime dynamics," and "contentious politics"—developed in the study of popular protests in post-Soviet electoral autocracies, this article argues, first, that the 2020 postelection mobilization in Belarus was not to be expected for both structural and agency-related reasons. Second, by the summer of 2020, the political opportunity structure had opened up because of contingent choices by individual actors, with Alyaksandr Lukashenka committing several major mistakes, particularly on pandemic (non)control and the administration of the upcoming presidential election, and political newcomers taking on the role of challenging him. After the election, mass mobilization unfolded in two waves triggered by two additional regime mistakes: blatant electoral fraud and excessive repression. These mistakes served as focal points for spontaneous coordination, substituting for the deliberate "engineering" of protest by an organized opposition typical of the post-Soviet color revolutions. Third, Lukashenka survived in office because popular protests did not lead to elite defection. Instead, he was able to secure the loyalty of elites because he avoided gross blunders against both regime insiders and Russia. The case of Belarus indicates that hegemonic-authoritarian regimes are more vulnerable to mistakes by incumbents than to challenges from below and outside the regime.

"Eurasian representative assemblies are not democratic legislatures but neither are they merely imitating them. A comparative analysis of their constitutionally granted competencies, performance and internal organization suggests the emergence of three different types of assemblies over the last decade: In hybrid regimes, parliaments have evolved by way of political crises and subsequent constitutional agreements between rivaling elites. These parliaments have acquired government-related functions and distinct institutional identities while still falling short of performing in an efficient, professionalized and rule-driven way. On the other hand, two types of legislatures have developed in post-Soviet authoritarian regimes, mirroring and fostering the consolidation of presidential power. The first variety consists of constitutionally and politically weak bodies reduced to ceremonial activities. The second variety, however, comprises institutionalized, rationalized and well-organized legislatures controlled by a strong presidential 'party of power'." (author's abstract)