Search results

Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) took part in the World Summit 2005 and agreed to adopt the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). However, there has not been any significant effort to discuss how the R2P might be applicable to the region and the issue remains a marginal one to ASEAN. However, the adoption of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) by ASEAN could provide a logical start for the maintraiming of R2P in ASEAN's discourse and practice. Some elements of the APSC appear to have characteristics in common with the R2P principle. While the APSC may provide broad and indirect support for building the capacity of States to recognise, prevent and respond to the situations of conflict, its immediate utility for preventing the four crimes of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity nonetheless remains to be seen. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

Abstract:
Throughout the 1990s, resisting international pressures to democratize was one of the dominant features of Indonesia's foreign policy. Together with Singapore, Malaysia, and China, Indonesia strongly resisted the democracy-promotion agenda present in the foreign policies of Western countries, arguing that democracy was unsuitable for Asian societies. That position came to an end with the collapse of authoritarian rule in 1998. As the dust of domestic turmoil resulting from transition began to settle, Indonesia began to incorporate its democratic identity into foreign policy. Indonesia's desire to establish its credential as a regional proponent of democracy in Southeast Asia, however, is still sought within the limits imposed by the precarious nature of Indonesia's own democracy and the reality of regional politics. It also still registers a gap between its progressive outlook at regional level and conservative attitude in the international arena. Consequently, democracy can hardly function beyond an instrument to construct a new international identity for post-authoritarian Indonesia. In that context, the inclusion of democracy agenda in Indonesia's foreign policy is still best described as an exercise in democracy-projection rather than democracy-promotion.

Throughout the 1990s, resisting international pressures to democratize was one of the dominant features of Indonesia's foreign policy. Together with Singapore, Malaysia, and China, Indonesia strongly resisted the democracy-promotion agenda present in the foreign policies of Western countries, arguing that democracy was unsuitable for Asian societies. That position came to an end with the collapse of authoritarian rule in 1998. As the dust of domestic turmoil resulting from transition began to settle, Indonesia began to incorporate its democratic identity into foreign policy. Indonesia's desire to establish its credential as a regional proponent of democracy in Southeast Asia, however, is still sought within the limits imposed by the precarious nature of Indonesia's own democracy and the reality of regional politics. It also still registers a gap between its progressive outlook at regional level and conservative attitude in the international arena. Consequently, democracy can hardly function beyond an instrument to construct a new international identity for post-authoritarian Indonesia. In that context, the inclusion of democracy agenda in Indonesia's foreign policy is still best described as an exercise in democracy-projection rather than democracy-promotion. Adapted from the source document.

Indonesia's relations with China began to improve in 1998. This paper argues that recent improvements in bilateral relations have been primarily the function of changes in Indonesia's domestic politics and China's policy toward Southeast Asia, which contributed to the creation of an atmosphere of trust and comfort in Jakarta's re-engagement with China.

As Indonesia democratises, a key feature of the country's political life has been a mixture of turmoil, hope and uncertainty. When Suharto's authoritarian regime collapsed in May 1998, Indonesia was experiencing the worst political and economic crises in more than three decades. On the political front, Suharto's collapse was preceded by communal violence, political turmoil, and state terrorism. Economically, the financial crisis, which came to Indonesia in December 1997, brought down the foundations of growth and pushed the country on to the brink of economic collapse. All these problems, which found their roots in the absence of democracy and good governance, worsened after the fall of Suharto. As the country moved towards democratic transition, however, society was imbued with a sense of hope for a better future, and that hope continues to exist until today. In that context, resolving current uncertainty constitutes the biggest challenge facing Indonesia in fulfilling the people's hope for a democratic future.