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The book presents observations concerning automated decision-making from a general point of view at the same time as it analyses the manner in which praxis in some jurisdictions has evolved as concerns automated decision-making and how the requirements that are placed by the legal orders on it are formulated. The principle of the rule of law should apply in the context of automated decision-making of public authorities just as much as when the decision-makers are physical persons. In sync with increasing automatization of decision-making in public authorities, problematizing questions about the appropriate legal basis for algorithmic decision-making have started emerge. How should the principle of the rule of law apply within the area of automated decision-making, how should automated decision-making be regulated so that it satisfies the requirements created by the principle of the rule of law, and how should the principle of the rule of law be made concrete in decision-making that is based on algorithms? The proposal for an AI Act launched by the European Commission in April 2021, including an identification of high-risk uses of algorithmic techniques, raises further questions concerning practices and interpretations related to automated decision-making. The state based on the rule of law proceeds from the maxim that public powers are exercised within a legal frame that makes the exercise of public powers foreseeable in light of legal norms. Also, a state based on the rule of law requires that the contents of the exercise of public powers is regulated by legal norms, which means that the citizens must be able to know everything that is relevant about how the powers will be exercised, not only who it is that will exercise the powers. Because of rules and principles of this kind, including non-discrimination and proportionality, the exercise of powers will not become arbitrary

This book analyses a middle position between single enumerations in a regular federal-like and a regular autonomy-like distribution of legislative powers by examining constitutional legislation in three countries (Canada, Denmark and Finland) that have established separate enumerations for the national level and the sub-state level. The sub-state level consists of provinces in Canada, the Faroe Islands in Denmark and the Åland Islands in Finland. The book provides interpretations of the competence line based on double enumeration between the national parliament and the sub-state entities, where relevant, on the basis of the travaux preparatoires of the fundamental norms on which the arrangements are based, judicial or quasi-judicial resolutions of competence problems, and relevant doctrine and literature.

"This study focuses on territorial autonomy, which is often used in different conflict-resolution and minority situations. Four typical elements are identified on the basis of the historical example of the Memel Territory and the so-called Memel case of the PCIJ; distribution of powers, participation through elections and referendums, executive power of territorial autonomy, and international relations. These elements are used for a comparative analysis of the constitutional law that regulates the position of six currently existing special jurisdictions, the Åland Islands in Finland, Scotland in the United Kingdom, Puerto Rico in the United States of America, Hong Kong in China, Aceh in Indonesia and Zanzibar in Tanzania. The current sub-state entities examined can be arranged in relation to Memel in a manner that indicates that Hong Kong and the Åland conform to the typical territorial autonomy, while Puerto Rico and Aceh should probably not be understood as territorial autonomies proper. At the same time, the territorial autonomies can be distinguished from federally organized sub-state entities"--Provided by publisher

Abstract
New Caledonia is a colonial territory of France. Since the adoption of the Nouméa Accord in 1998, a period of transition towards the exercise of self-determination has been going on. New Caledonia is currently a strong autonomy, well entrenched in the legal order of France from 1999 on. The legislative powers have been distributed between the Congress of New Caledonia and the Parliament of France on the basis of a double enumeration of legislative powers, an arrangement that has given New Caledonia control over many material fields of self-determination. At the same time as this autonomy has been well embedded in the constitutional fabric of France. The Nouméa Accord was constitutionalized in the provisions of the Constitution of France and also in an Institutional Act. This normative framework created a multi-layered electorate that has presented several challenges to the autonomy arrangement and the procedure of self-determination, but the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee have resolved the issues regarding the right to vote in manners that take into account the local circumstances and the fact that the aim of the legislation is to facilitate the self-determination of the colonized people, the indigenous Kanak people. The self-determination process consists potentially of a series of referendums, the first of which was held in 2018 and the second one in 2020. In both referendums, those entitled to vote returned a No-vote to the question of 'Do you want New Caledonia to attain full sovereignty and become independent?' A third referendum is to be expected before October 2022, and if that one also results in a no to independence, a further process of negotiations starts, with the potential of a fourth referendum that will decide the mode of self-determination New Caledonia will opt for, independence or autonomy.

Abstract
It is fully legitimate and permissible under international human rights law to limit the right to vote to the citizens of the State. The relationship between sovereignty, citizenship and the right to vote is to some extent self-evident and undramatic. However, the triangular relationship between the three concepts is an important background factor summarizing much of what States are and do, and therefore, it is necessary to make visible the self-sustaining nature of the triangle and explicate the three corners of the triangle by means of drafting history of the human rights conventions and case law from international and national court instances as well as by means of examples from national law, in this case drawn from the Nordic space. The point here is that although the various human rights conventions formulate a right to participation through elections, the normative powers exercised in relation to sovereignty, citizenship and the right to vote are held by the national law-maker, and they are not influenced much by international human rights law.