Search results

Abstract
All governments in Poland formed after the introduction of the European Semester were coalitional ones. All these governments contained junior coalition partners representing all party families. Irrespective of their affiliation, all these junior parties adopted policies that appeared to comply with the European Semester. Hence, junior coalition parties might be recognised as very diligent European students, even if two out of three represented quite extreme views and were undeniably more Eurosceptic than their respective senior partners. However, it can be argued that their strategy was mixed: even if these two more Eurosceptic parties might be regarded as being so in their rhetoric, they accepted all recommendations from the European Semester, except for the farmers' insurance privileges reduction. The salience of their approach to this latter issue was seen even after a few years in government, making these parties clearly different from their senior coalition partners.

Elections are an irrefutable achievement in the development of modern democracies. However, elections are not only held in order to form accountable governments. They are perceived by political parties as a means of promoting political ideas and treated as an equivalent of public opinion polls. A good case in point is the process of electing deputies to the European Parliament. Poland is not an exception in this context - the notion of "second order election" reflects the stance of both Polish political actors and citizens on this kind of election. Nonetheless, political parties also tend to consider the European elections as a testing ground before national elections, which they recognize as more significant. Last but not least, the lower interest given to European elections by mainstream parties may also create an opportunity for smaller parties, especially those holding strong views, to succeed. Such conclusions might be drawn from the last election held in Poland, which led Janusz Korwin-Mikke's New Right to unexpected success.

Linkages between political parties and society have been considered weak from the very beginning of the political transformation in Central and Eastern Europe, including in Poland. One result has been the employment of clientelistic strategies by political parties across the region. Clientelism in Polish politics has been present for three decades, however, the way it manifests itself today varies significantly from how it appeared in the past in terms of its scale but also because it has "thickened" by incorporating Catholic, national, and patriotic symbols. Furthermore, the number of contracting parties is not limited to the patron (PiS) and their clients (voters); a crucial role seems to be played by the organisations supported financially by the PiS government whose task may be to entice citizens to vote for the party. It can be argued that the financial standing of these organisations was built with support from the state budget and that their operations are highly dependent on these resources. We conclude that PiS has created a clientelistic machine formed by populist, nationalist, and religious ideological discourses.

Presidential elections in Poland have always drawn more voters to the ballot box than parliamentary ones. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the turnout in the 2020 presidential elections was the second-highest since 1989. The glib answer might be that voters were simply availing themselves of the opportunity to leave the house, however briefly, since COVID-19 measures had largely confined people to their homes for most of the year. More likely, albeit paradoxically, heightened voter interest was triggered by political autocratisation, the other plague that Poles have been struggling with, in this case since 2015. The election was won by the incumbent, Andrzej Duda, whose advantage was credited to his appeal among less-educated and older people living in rural areas. In the end, the governing Law and Justice (PiS) party, which had backed Duda's campaign, managed to avoid cohabitation-related inconvenience for the second time.

Presidential elections in Poland have always drawn more voters to the ballot box than parliamentary ones. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the turnout in the 2020 presidential elections was the second-highest since 1989. The glib answer might be that voters were simply availing themselves of the opportunity to leave the house, however briefly, since COVID-19 measures had largely confined people to their homes for most of the year. More likely, albeit paradoxically, heightened voter interest was triggered by political autocratisation, the other plague that Poles have been struggling with, in this case since 2015. The election was won by the incumbent, Andrzej Duda, whose advantage was credited to his appeal among less-educated and older people living in rural areas. In the end, the governing Law and Justice (PiS) party, which had backed Duda's campaign, managed to avoid cohabitation-related inconvenience for the second time. ; Wybory prezydenckie w Polsce zawsze przyciągały więcej wyborców niż parlamentarne. Pomimo pandemii COVID-19 frekwencja w 2020 r. była niemal najwyższa od 1989 r. Może się wydawać, że wyborcy zwyczajnie skorzystali z okazji, żeby wyjść z domu, ponieważ restrykcje wprowadzone z powodu pandemii znacznie ograniczyły swobodę poruszania się. Paradoksalnie, bardziej prawdopodobne może być jednak wyjaśnienie, że zwiększone zainteresowanie wyborców wynikało z postępującej autokratyzacji systemu – kolejnego wyzwania, z jakim Polacy mierzą się od 2015 r. Wybory zakończyły się reelekcją Andrzeja Dudy, który zawdzięczał swe zwycięstwo między innymi poparciu wśród słabiej wykształconych i starszych mieszkańców obszarów wiejskich. W rezultacie rządząca partia Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, która wsparła Dudę w kampanii wyborczej, ponownie zdołała uniknąć problemów wynikających z kohabitacji.

Presidential elections in Poland have always drawn more voters to the ballot box than parliamentary ones. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the turnout in the 2020 presidential elections was the second-highest since 1989. The glib answer might be that voters were simply availing themselves of the opportunity to leave the house, however briefly, since COVID-19 measures had largely confined people to their homes for most of the year. More likely, albeit paradoxically, heightened voter interest was triggered by political autocratisation, the other plague that Poles have been struggling with, in this case since 2015. The election was won by the incumbent, Andrzej Duda, whose advantage was credited to his appeal among less-educated and older people living in rural areas. In the end, the governing Law and Justice (PiS) party, which had backed Duda's campaign, managed to avoid cohabitation-related inconvenience for the second time. ; Wybory prezydenckie w Polsce zawsze przyciągały więcej wyborców niż parlamentarne. Pomimo pandemii COVID-19 frekwencja w 2020 r. była niemal najwyższa od 1989 r. Może się wydawać, że wyborcy zwyczajnie skorzystali z okazji, żeby wyjść z domu, ponieważ restrykcje wprowadzone z powodu pandemii znacznie ograniczyły swobodę poruszania się. Paradoksalnie, bardziej prawdopodobne może być jednak wyjaśnienie, że zwiększone zainteresowanie wyborców wynikało z postępującej autokratyzacji systemu – kolejnego wyzwania, z jakim Polacy mierzą się od 2015 r. Wybory zakończyły się reelekcją Andrzeja Dudy, który zawdzięczał swe zwycięstwo między innymi poparciu wśród słabiej wykształconych i starszych mieszkańców obszarów wiejskich. W rezultacie rządząca partia Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, która wsparła Dudę w kampanii wyborczej, ponownie zdołała uniknąć problemów wynikających z kohabitacji. ; 2 ; 27 ; 45 ; Przegląd Politologiczny