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Abstract
How can we analyze violence against civilians in civil wars over time and with attention both to local context and international comparability? I argue that we should integrate theories across levels of analysis, applying this to testing existing theories of civil war violence and state repression in the case of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) in Nicaragua. Using interviews, archival evidence, and human rights reports, I argue that compared to domestic rivals and from an international perspective, the FSLN generally exhibited restraint, limiting violence against civilians due to an ideological commitment to discipline and civilian protection. Disaggregating the geographic and temporal contexts of violations at the subnational level reveals, however, that significant violence occurred where the FSLN had less territorial control, fewer civilian ties, and looser discipline, supporting contestation and command and control theories. Theories of violence may therefore explain variation at one level of analysis and not others within a given case, emphasizing the need for within-case disaggregation in explaining and comparing patterns of violence and state repression in civil wars, and the importance of unpacking violence committed by more restrained actors.

What types of relationships do armed groups have with states? How do different levels of ties and power relations affect both armed group and government behavior? This article develops a spectrum across which armed group–state relationships can move, focusing on three key types of relationships—delegation, sponsorship, and autonomy. An armed group–state relationship may be classified depending on the degree to which the armed group receives material or security support from a state, whether it pursues the strategic aims of the state, and the balance of power between the armed group and the state. I examine cases and empirical examples of relationships between states and armed groups ranging from criminal organizations to Cold War-era rebels to pro-government and communal militias to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and al-Qaeda. As lines between categories of armed groups and between state and non-state actors are increasingly blurred, the integrated framework enhances our ability to analyze the behavior and liabilities of both armed groups and states and to understand sources of leverage for protecting human rights and resolving conflicts.

AbstractWhat types of relationships do armed groups have with states? How do different levels of ties and power relations affect both armed group and government behavior? This article develops a spectrum across which armed group–state relationships can move, focusing on three key types of relationships—delegation, sponsorship, and autonomy. An armed group–state relationship may be classified depending on the degree to which the armed group receives material or security support from a state, whether it pursues the strategic aims of the state, and the balance of power between the armed group and the state. I examine cases and empirical examples of relationships between states and armed groups ranging from criminal organizations to Cold War-era rebels to pro-government and communal militias to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and al-Qaeda. As lines between categories of armed groups and between state and non-state actors are increasingly blurred, the integrated framework enhances our ability to analyze the behavior and liabilities of both armed groups and states and to understand sources of leverage for protecting human rights and resolving conflicts.

Includes abstract. ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 162-182). ; High levels of crime and violence continue to plague South Africa after nearly two decades of peace and democratic rule. While collective violence continues to occur in the form of violent protests and community mob justice, the majority of violent incidents in South Africa are instances of individual, interpersonal violence.

Dans son grand récit historique sur les armées africaines, Edgerton (2004) affirme que les armées du continent sont passées de l'honneur à l'infamie. D'autres conceptions populaires qualifient les armées africaines de « non professionnelles », « non pertinentes » et « dangereuses » (Howe, 2005). Est-ce le cas ? Et si oui, pourquoi ? Aujourd'hui, près de soixante ans après les indépendances, que savons-nous de la nature des armées africaines, de leurs évolutions et de leur position à la croisée des intérêts des États, des dirigeants, de la société civile et de l'ensemble de la communauté internationale ? Nous examinons ici l'état des connaissances et des débats sur les armées africaines, en proposant une réflexion et des exemples concrets permettant de contextualiser.