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Introduction : warlord democrats : wartime investments, democratic runs? / Anders Themnér -- Pompier-pyromanocracy : Mbusa Nyamwisi and the DR Congo's inflammable post-settlement political order / Judith Verweijen -- Apotheosis of a warlord : Paul Kagame / Lars Waldorf -- Discourses of peace and fear : the electoral navigations of Sekou Conneh and Prince Johnson in post-war Liberia / Carrie Manning and Anders Themnér -- Afonso Dhlakama and RENAMO's return to armed conflict since 2013 : the politics of reintegration in Mozambique / Alex Vines -- From warlord to drug lord : the life of João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira / Henrik Vigh -- Shape-shifters in the struggle for survival : post-war politics in Sierra Leone / Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs and Ibrahim Bangura -- Riek Machar : warlord-doctor in South Sudan / Johan Brosché and Kristine Höglund -- Conclusion : ambiguous peacelords : the diminishing returns of post-war democracy / Anders Themnér.

In this paper I critically discuss the pros and cons of working with research brokers from a political science perspective. I do this by sharing my experiences of collaborating with two types of local "fixers" – cultural and communal brokers. I argue that even if similar approaches risk introducing a number of broker-induced biases, countermeasures can be taken to mitigate their effect: e.g. continuous triangulation, interviewing "sleepers" and asking in-depth questions to exclude interviewees who misrepresent themselves. However, researchers must be aware that working with multiple brokers can also generate methodological and ethical challenges that need to be taken into consideration.

Recent research has shown that disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs often fail to uproot wartime command structures. A key question is why some ex-commanders succeed in retaining control over their ex-fighters, while others are less successful. This study seeks to address this question by comparing four former midlevel commanders (ex-MiLCs) in Liberia and the ex-combatant networks that they head. Contrary to previous assumptions, which have stressed the tendency of ex-fighters to flock around ex-commanders operating in spaces of marginality, I argue that ex-MiLCs employed as government brokers and who funnel patronage from ruling elites to ex-combatants are likely to possess the most durable networks. These findings highlight how ex-military bonds thrive where previous research expects them to be weakest: close to government elites who are often designated as "agents of change" by international peacemakers.

In contemporary discourses on post-war reconstruction in West Africa, ex-command structures are often assumed to play a key role in the drug economy. Such assertions have, however, not been systematically investigated. Based on in-depth field research in Liberia, this article holds that ex-command structures have not only played a limited role in the country's drug economy, the use of and trade in drugs has had a destructive impact on ex-military networks. These findings highlight that rather than seeking to dismantle strong ex-command structures, efforts to combat the drug economy may benefit from integrating them into the statebuilding process. KEYWORDS: Ex-command structures, drugs, crime, disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration, Liberia, peacebuilding

In countries transitioning from military to democratic rule, authoritarian legacies often continue to influence politics. Whereas previous research has focused on the institutional causes of such deficiencies, there is a lack of studies examining the role ex-military leaders who re-emerge as civilian presidents have in sustaining authoritarian tendencies. In this article, we begin to fill this lacuna by investigating the question: how and under which conditions do ex-military leaders' political identity constructions affect their tendency to place themselves above politics (i.e. expressing the attitude and behaviour of being superior to democratic rules)? The literature on neo-patrimonialism and post-civil war politics points to the importance of the political identities of ex-militaries, and we propose a theory that highlights the role identity construction plays in shaping elites' decision-making processes. Based on a comparison of two Nigerian presidents, Olusegun Obasanjo and Muhammadu Buhari, we find that ex-generals' tendency to engage in politics from above is largely a function of to what extent they have diversified their political identities beyond their role as "militaries". In this process, the degree of democratic consolidation also seems to play a role; ex-militaries operating in newly established democracies appear to have more opportunities to place themselves above politics.