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Six decades after its establishment, the United Nations and its system of related agencies and programs are perpetually in crisis. While the twentieth-century's world wars gave rise to ground-breaking efforts at international organization in 1919 and 1945, today's UN is ill-equipped to deal with contemporary challenges to world order. Neither the end of the Cold War nor the aftermath of 9/11 has led to the "next generation" of multilateral institutions. But what exactly is wrong with the UN, and how can we fix it? Is it possible to retrofit the world body? In his succinct and hard-hitting analysis, Thomas G. Weiss takes a diagnosis-and-cure approach to the world organization's inherent difficulties. In the first half of the book, he considers: the problems of international leadership and decision making in a world of self-interested states; the diplomatic difficulties caused by the artificial divisions between the industrialized North and the global South; the structural problems of managing the UN's many overlapping jurisdictions, agencies, and bodies; and the challenges of bureaucracy and leadership. The second half shows how to mitigate these maladies and points the way to a world in which the UN's institutional ills might be "cured." His remedies are not based on pious hopes of a miracle cure for the UN, but rather on specific and encouraging examples that could be replicated. With considered optimism and in contrast to received wisdom, Weiss contends that substantial change in intergovernmental institutions is plausible and possible. The new and expanded second edition of this well-regarded and indispensable book will continue to spark debate amongst students, scholars, and policymakers concerned with international politics, as well as anyone genuinely interested in the future of the United Nations and multilateral cooperation.

One of the more prolific and influential analysts of multilateral approaches to global problem-solving over the last three decades is Thomas G. Weiss. Thinking about Global Governance, Why People and Ideas Matter, assembles key scholarly and policy writing. This collection organizes his most recent work addressing the core issues of the United Nations, global governance, and humanitarian action. The essays are placed in historical and intellectual context in a substantial new introduction, which contains a healthy dose of the idealism and ethical orientation that invariably characterize his best work. This volume gives the reader a comprehensive understanding of these key topics for a globalizing world and is an invaluable resource for students and scholars alike.

"The authors have cajoled, intrigued, or reassured their 73 'voices' into telling a fascinating story of the UN and its institutions, which is also a story of 73 individual lives, of women and men... with their own complicated histories of emigration and education, family relationships and professional choices, hopes and successes." -- from the Foreword by Emma Rothschild"Far from being a distant bureaucracy, the UN is composed of individuals who are reshaped by vital experiences. UN Voices gives

When and why do organizations prefer high-status exchange partners? When and why do organizations prefer low-status exchange partners? A theory of organizational status preferences should be able to answer both of these questions simultaneously. I argue that an organization's status preferences with respect to partner selection should be viewed as a social process, rather than just a strategy to reduce exchange uncertainty, enhance market prestige or satisfy market institutions. Organizations are sites of social construction and negotiation. The partner selection process must cohere with the production of a legitimate, organization-specific social order. In heterogeneous organizations, legitimacy is established through the externalization of action; the selection of a high-status partner thus demonstrates coherence with the social order. In homogeneous organizations, legitimacy is tradition-based; the selection of a high-status partner will be viewed as disruptive to the social order. Thus status does not determine a firm's market legitimacy. The characteristics of the evaluator determine the legitimacy of status. This is illustrated by an examination of the municipal bond issuance process, where local governments in the United States select investment banks in order to issue debt obligations. Specifically, I find that racially/ethnically, functionally and politically heterogeneous organizations have a preference for higher-status partners, while homogeneous organizations prefer lower-status partners. Thus, organizations interact with external actors through an internally negotiated lens. Partner status is a symbol relevant to the construction of an organization-specific social reality.

The British Air CampaigndDuring the Battle of the Somme, April-November, 1916: A Pyrrhic Victory The Battle of the Somme was Britain's first major offensive of the First World War. Just about every facet of the campaign has been analyzed and reexamined. However, one area of the battle that has been little explored is the second battle which took place simultaneously to the one on the ground. This second battle occurred in the skies above the Somme, where for the first time in the history of warfare a deliberate air campaign was planned and executed to support ground operations. The British Royal Flying Corps (RFC) was tasked with achieving air superiority over the Somme sector before the British Fourth Army attacked to start the ground offensive. This study focuses on the Royal Flying Corps, its organization and leaders, as well as the strategy and doctrine it employed in its attempt to regain air superiority from the German Army Air Service (GAAS) in the spring of 1916. Prior to the start of the ground battle, the commander of the RFC, General Hugh Trenchard, directed his squadrons accomplish six tactical tasks in order for the RFC to achieve aerial superiority over the Somme. These tasks were: 1) aerial reconnaissance, 2) aerial photography, 3) observation and direction of artillery, 4) tactical bombing, 5) `contact' patrols in support of the infantry and 6) air combat against the GAAS to enable achievement of the other five tasks. Critical to answering the question of whether or not the RFC accomplished its assigned tasks this study also examines the development of air power strategy by the RFC before and during the battle. Five factors are used to frame the analysis: strategy, organization, leadership, selection and training of aircrew. Although the RFC suffered high losses because it rigidly adhered to an offensive strategy throughout the air campaign, when the battle ended, the RFC still controlled the skies above the Somme. While the ground campaign failed to accomplish most of its stated objectives, ...