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"A work in metaethics that focuses on the two types of normative judgments, evaluative judgments and directive judgments; how the two interconnect; and what makes them true when they are true"--Provided by publisher

O artigo analisa os argumentos contrários ao direito da mulher à interrupção voluntária da gravidez, fundamentando assim sua posição em defesa do direito ao aborto. A análise das contradições nos discursos do "direito à vida" ultrapassa as situações nas quais há risco de morte da mãe ou nas quais a gravidez decorreu de estupro. A consideração da mãe como pessoa moral inclui, na posição sustentada no texto, o direito a assegurar a própria vida e a escolher como esta vida será vivida. Nesta análise, o aborto é discutido em suas implicações políticas, morais e filosóficas.

IThere are a great many ways in which a thing can be good. What counts as a way of being good? I leave it to intuition. Let us allow that being a good dancer is being good in a way, and that so also is being a good carpenter. We might group these and similar ways of being good under the name activity goodness, since a good dancer is good at dancing and a good carpenter is good at carpentry. Everything good at doing something D is good in a way, and for each activity D, being good at D-ing falls into the class of ways of being good which I call activity goodness.Again, let us allow that being a good hammer is being good in a way, and that so also is being a good butter knife. We might group these ways of being good under the name equipment goodness, since a good hammer is good for use in hammering nails and a good butter knife is good for use in buttering bread. Everything good for use in achieving a purpose P is good in a way, and for each purpose P, being good for use in achieving P falls into the class of ways of being good which I call equipment goodness.Again, let us allow that tasting good is being good in a way, and so also are looking good, sounding good, and so on. The class here is aesthetic goodness.Is all goodness goodness-in-a-way? Intuitively, the answer is yes: it seems right to think that everything is good only insofar as it is good in one or more ways.

Moral theorists often say such things as "But surely A ought to do such and such," or "Plainly it is morally permissible for B to do so and so," and do not even try to prove that those judgments are true. Moreover, they often rest weight on the supposition that those judgments are true. In particular, they often rest theories on them: they take them as data.Others object. They say that nobody is entitled to rest any weight at all on judgments such as those. They say, not that the judgments are false, but that there is no reason to believe them true. They say, more generally, that there is no reason to think of any moral judgment that it is true. I will call this The No Reason Thesis.Is there reason to think The No Reason Thesis true? There are lots of arguments for it in the literature, but I want to focus on one of them in particular. I think that the one I will focus on lies behind all the others, but no matter if it does not: I suggest that if this argument fails, they all fail.

THERE IS NO CONCRETE & DEFINABLE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, BUT RATHER CLUSTERS OF DIVERSE RIGHTS LACKING A COMMON FOUNDATION. EACH OF THESE CLUSTERS IS ACTUALLY CONCERNED WITH SOME OTHER RIGHT--EG, RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP, WHICH ALLOWS THE OWNER POSITIVE & NEGATIVE RIGHTS REGARDING POSSESSION. POSITIVE RIGHTS INVOLVE DISPOSAL OF ONE'S PROPERTY & NEGATIVE RIGHTS INCLUDE PROTECTION OF IT FROM OTHERS. THE 'RIGHT TO PRIVACY' EMBODIES CLUSTERS OF RIGHTS & ALSO 'BAD BEHAVIOR' OF OTHERS--EG, EAVESDROPPING, BOORISH QUESTIONING ABOUT PERSONAL MATTERS, ETC. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IS ACTUALLY DERIVED FROM THESE DIVERSE CLUSTERS OF RIGHTS, THOUGH NOT DEFINABLE BY ANY TENDENCY CENTRAL TO THEM. IN THOMSON ON PRIVACY, THOMAS SCANLON (PRINCETON U, NJ) AGREES THAT CLUSTERS OF OVERLAPPING RIGHTS DO COMPRISE THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, BUT CLAIMS THERE IS A TENDENCY CENTRAL TO ALL--THIS IS THE 'RIGHT TO PRIVACY'. THE 'RIGHT' TO PRIVACY IS BASED ON A CONVENTIONALLY DEFINED ZONE OF PRIVACY--& RESPECT &/OR INVASION OF THIS ZONE. IT DEPENDS NOT ONLY ON THE LOCATION OF THE INVADER, BUT ALSO THE MEANS USED FOR INVASION. EVEN 'BAD BEHAVIOR' IS A FORM OF INVASION AGAINST THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY. T. BABITSKY.

A very limited range of preferential hirings is dealt with; only hiring decisions in U's are explored. The qualifications that are relevant & those that are not are considered. The question arises whether race & sex are qualifications for U jobs, whether blacks learn better from blacks & women learn better from women--if so, it follows that white M's learn better from white M's as well. It is public support of U's that causes preferential hiring to be problematic. The problems associated with preferential treatment through gratitude, necessity, personal motives, violation of a right, the overriding of a right in necessary cases, & through reason of indebtedness are examined. While it is obvious that blacks & women were discriminated against in the past, it is assumed that these practices are no longer occurring. Modified HA.