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Intro -- Contents -- List of Tables and Figures -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Part I. Theoretical and Historical Overview -- 1. Introduction: Perpetuating the US Military Economy -- 2. Presidential War Powers in Historical Perspective -- Part II. World War II and the Politics of Defense Spending -- 3. World War II Military Mobilization: Origins of the Rural Defense Pork Barrel -- 4. From Shared Sacrifice to Local Subsidy: Dispersing Defense Benefits and Externalizing War Costs -- 5. Local Defense Dependence and Congressional Weapons Spending -- 6. The Distributive Politics of Defense Contracting -- Part III. You and Whose Army? Expansive Presidential War Powers -- 7. Economic Reliance and War -- 8. Executive Independence in Military Affairs -- 9. Conclusion: The Warfare State -- Appendixes -- Notes -- References -- Index.

"In The American Warfare State, Rebecca U. Thorpe argues that there are profound relationships among the size and persistence of the American military complex, the growth in presidential power to launch military actions, and the decline of congressional willingness to check this power. The public costs of military mobilization and war, including the need for conscription and higher tax rates, served as political constraints on warfare for most of American history. But the vast defense industry that emerged from World War II also created new political interests that the framers of the Constitution did not anticipate. Many rural and semirural areas became economically reliant on defense-sector jobs and capital, which gave the legislators representing them powerful incentives to press for ongoing defense spending regardless of national security circumstances or goals. At the same time, the costs of war are now borne overwhelmingly by a minority of soldiers who volunteer to fight, future generations of taxpayers, and foreign populations in whose lands wars often take place. Drawing on an impressive cache of data, Thorpe reveals how this new incentive structure has profoundly reshaped the balance of wartime powers between Congress and the president, resulting in a defense industry perennially poised for war and an executive branch that enjoys unprecedented discretion to take military action."--Publisher's Web site.

I examine the political consequences of prison development in the United States. I theorize that the prison apparatus not only upholds a system of racial hierarchy and class stratification, but also links the economic stability of lower-class, rural whites to the continued penal confinement of poor, urban minorities. Analysis of an original dataset suggests that local reliance on existing prison infrastructure throughout many economically-depressed rural communities strengthens political support for harsh criminal punishments and militates against reform efforts. Political representatives have powerful interests in protecting rural prison investments, regardless of their actual economic impact in host communities. The evidence indicates that rural prison development contributes to the perceived economic viability and political power of rural areas, while reinforcing forms of punishment that destabilize poor urban neighborhoods and harm politically marginalized populations.

This article examines how a defense sector presence in sparsely populated areas influences (a) House of Representatives defense committee assignments and (2) defense procurement allocations from 1999 to 2005. Although previous work had shown that prime contracts typically flow to headquarter locations, this article goes beyond existing research by tracking the distribution of defense expenditures to major subcontracting locations. In doing so, I find a conditional relationship between defense industry presence and rural geography: Defense funds disproportionately flow to congressional districts that are more economically reliant on the defense sector of the economy. Constituency dependence on the defense sector is one of the most important factors leading members of Congress to seek representation on defense committees and to procure defense benefits. Local dependence on the defense industry may reinforce political relationships that contribute to inefficiency and excess in weapons contracting.

This paper links the rise of a punitive punishment regime that disproportionately targets poor, urban minorities and the increasing use of rural spaces to warehouse prisoners. Preliminary evidence from a unique dataset across three states suggests that housing large, institutionalized prison populations inflates population counts in otherwise shrinking rural areas and operates as a hidden subsidy for rural counties with prison infrastructure. Prisons contribute to the immediate economic viability of predominantly white, lower class rural areas, despite devastating costs borne elsewhere.

Political scientist Hakeem Jefferson (Stanford University) facilitated a discussion about race, policing, and the state of American democracy with fellow political scientists Cathy J. Cohen (University of Chicago), Yanilda M. González (Harvard Kennedy School), Rebecca U. Thorpe (University of Washington), and Vesla M. Weaver (Johns Hopkins University) on May 26, 2021. The conversation occurred a year after George Perry Floyd Jr., a 46-year-old Black man, was murdered by a White police officer in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Moving beyond common notions of democracy that focus primarily on voting and electoral participation, the panelists discussed how American policing and the criminal justice system, more broadly, redefine citizenship, redistribute power, and shape marginalized people's understanding of their place in society. Closing remarks addressed the potential for change in how criminal justice institutions treat marginalized people and how political scientists can more usefully contribute to efforts that strengthen democracy for all. This is an edited transcript of the conversation and includes a bibliography of the sources mentioned. A video of the conversation is available online at https://www.annualreviews.org/r/BeyondtheBallotBox .