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Intro -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: Understanding Organized Crime -- Popular Culture -- Scientific Definitions -- Italian Organized Crime -- Criminal Organizations and the Community: The Code of Omertà -- Explanations of Omertà: Fear and Passivity -- Omertà: An Alternative Account -- Chapter 3: Intracultural Appropriation Theory -- Power, Authority and Legitimacy -- The Psychological Bases of Legitimacy and Legitimations -- Ideology and Culture -- Strategic Exploitation and Social Embedding -- Chapter 4: Assessing the Empirical Evidence: Masculine Honor Values and Organized Crime -- Honor, Masculinity, and Violence -- Criminal Organizations and Masculine Honor: Strategic Exploitation -- Social Embedding: The Roots of Omertà -- Other Predictors of Omertà -- The Role of Other Honor Codes -- Regional Identity and Honor Codes -- Chapter 5: Intergroup Contact in the Context of Criminal Organizations -- Intergroup Contact Theory -- Antecedents of Intergroup Contact: The Role of Individual Differences -- Culture and Contact with Members of Organized Crime -- Intergroup Contact and Social Activism -- Positive and Negative Contact in the Context of Criminal Organizations -- Chapter 6: Towards a New Understanding of Criminal Groups' Secret Power -- A Role for Culture: Culture as Ideology in the Legitimization of Illegal Groups -- Future Research Directions: What We Still Need to Understand -- Cultural Values and the Perception of State Authorities -- Contact and Opposition to Criminal Organizations -- Conclusions -- References -- Index.

AbstractWhile past research has found an association between perceived political injustice and diminished trust in institutions, the pathways connecting these constructs remain underexplored. In this study, we proposed a sequential indirect‐effect model, from perceived injustice to feelings of disrespect and ultimately lower trust, via the dual pathways of anger against institutions and constructive patriotism. We tested our model using samples from four countries, namely South Korea, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States (NTotal = 2502). Results revealed a simple indirect effect of injustice via perceived personal respect. Additionally, two sequential indirect pathways emerged via anger and constructive patriotism. Specifically, individuals with higher levels of perceived personal injustice were less likely to trust institutions through decreased perceived personal respect. Moreover, perceived personal respect was associated with reduced trust via increased anger and decreased constructive patriotism. While the results were largely consistent across countries, the significance and relative strength of some of the paths exhibited variability. The findings offer insights into the psychological underpinnings of political trust across contexts. Limitations, implications of the results, and avenues for future research are discussed.

System Justification Theory posits that individuals are less prone to engage in radical action against a system on which they depend. In the present research, we investigated how the association between system‐justifying tendencies and radical intentions is moderated by individuals' orientation towards power differentials, namely their "power distance." A stronger power distance orientation implies that individuals perceive power differentials as a fixed feature of society, curtailing prospects for change. We hypothesized that, at lower levels of power distance orientation, system‐justification tendencies would be associated with reduced radical intentions. We contend this will occur because individuals feel dependent on a system perceived as malleable (dependency hypothesis). Conversely, at higher levels of power distance orientation, we expected system‐justification tendencies to be associated with stronger radical intentions. We argue that this effect reflects the rejection of dependency on a system perceived as fixed (counterdependency hypothesis). This dependency‐counterdependency dynamic was tested using a multigroup latent structural equation model and samples from four countries (NTotal = 2,502), South Korea, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Results were consistent with the hypothesized dynamic across all countries. Theoretical implications of the findings, limitations, and future research directions are discussed.

The coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented health crisis. Many governments around the world have responded by implementing lockdown measures of various degrees of intensity. To be effective, these measures must rely on citizens' cooperation. In the present study, we drew samples from the United States (N = 597), Italy (N = 606), and South Korea (N = 693) and examined predictors of compliance with social distancing and intentions to report the infection to both authorities and acquaintances. Data were collected between April 6th and 8th 2020. We investigated the role of cultural orientations of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism, self-conscious emotions of shame and guilt related to the infection and trust in the government's action. Across all countries, vertical collectivism (VC) predicted stronger shame, whereas horizontal collectivism predicted stronger trust in the government. Only in the United States, VC was associated with stronger trust. Stronger feelings of shame predicted lower compliance and intentions to report the infection to both authorities and acquaintances. In contrast, guilt was associated with stronger intentions to report the infection to the authorities. Finally, trust was associated with stronger compliance and intentions to report the infection to the authorities. Unlike Italy and South Korea, the association between trust on compliance was not statistically significant in the United States, implications of the findings, and directions for future research are discussed.

The coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented health crisis. Many governments around the world have responded by implementing lockdown measures of various degrees of intensity. To be effective, these measures must rely on citizens' cooperation. In the present study, we drew samples from the United States (N = 597), Italy (N = 606) and South Korea (N = 693) and examined predictors of compliance with social distancing and intentions to report the infection to both authorities and acquaintances. Data were collected between April 6th and 8th 2020. We investigated the role of cultural orientations of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism, self-conscious emotions of shame and guilt related to the infection and trust in the government's action. Across all countries, vertical collectivism predicted stronger shame, whereas horizontal collectivism predicted stronger trust in the government. Only in the United States, vertical collectivism was associated with stronger trust. Stronger feelings of shame predicted lower compliance and intentions to report the infection to both authorities and acquaintances. In contrast, guilt was associated with stronger intentions to report the infection to the authorities. Finally, trust was associated with stronger compliance and intentions to report the infection to the authorities. Unlike Italy and South Korea, the association between trust on compliance was not statistically significant in the United States, Implications of the findings, and directions for future research are discussed.

The cultural dimension of power distance refers to individuals' acceptance of power inequalities in society. Countries characterized by high power distance at the collective level face more domestic extremism. However, research has yet to examine how individual differences in power distance orientation may affect individuals' intentions to engage in radical and violent political action. In this research, we test the hypothesis that stronger endorsement of power distance values makes people more prone to express the intentions to engage in radical and violent political action. To test the hypothesis' generalizability across contexts, we sample from two countries characterized by different levels of power distance at the collective level, South Korea (higher power distance) and the United States (lower power distance). Studies 1a and 1b were surveys (Ntot = 1,214) demonstrating an association between power distance orientation and radical political action over and beyond other known predictors of political participation, including political efficacy, perceived justice, emotions of anger and contempt, political orientation, and social dominance orientation. In Studies 2a-2c (Ntot = 430; 2c preregistered), priming a higher (vs lower) power distance orientation heightened individuals' propensity to express the intentions to engage in radical political action. Theoretical implications of the findings, and future research directions, are discussed.

A few weeks prior to the EU referendum (23rd June 2016) two broadly representative samples of the electorate were drawn in Kent (the south‐east of England, N = 1,001) and Scotland (N = 1,088) for online surveys that measured their trust in politicians, concerns about acceptable levels of immigration, threat from immigration, European identification, and voting intention. We tested an aversion amplification hypothesis that the impact of immigration concerns on threat and identification would be amplified when political trust was low. We hypothesized that the effect of aversion amplification on voting intentions would be mediated first by perceived threat from immigration, and then by (dis) identification with Europe. Results in both samples were consistent with this hypothesis and suggest that voters were most likely to reject the political status quo (choose Brexit) when concerns that immigration levels were too high were combined with a low level of trust in politicians.

A few weeks prior to the EU referendum (23rd June 2016) two broadly representative samples of the electorate were drawn in Kent (the south-east of England, N = 1,001) and Scotland (N = 1,088) for online surveys that measured their trust in politicians, concerns about acceptable levels of immigration, threat from immigration, European identification, and voting intention. We tested an aversion amplification hypothesis that the impact of immigration concerns on threat and identification would be amplified when political trust was low. We hypothesized that the effect of aversion amplification on voting intentions would be mediated first by perceived threat from immigration, and then by (dis) identification with Europe. Results in both samples were consistent with this hypothesis and suggest that voters were most likely to reject the political status quo (choose Brexit) when concerns that immigration levels were too high were combined with a low level of trust in politicians.

Previous research (Zick et al. 2008) suggested that animosity toward social minorities in Europe is intertwined, forming a syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity (GFE). In the current research, we extended the notion of GFE by identifying the GFE structure in a non-European context (South Korea). We also tested a novel hypothesis that stipulates an interplay between individuals' self-concept and their value orientation in predicting the overall level of GFE. Two nation-wide surveys in South Korea showed that antagonism toward social minorities that have typically been marginalized and devalued in that country forms GFE while reflecting the unique intergroup context of Korean society. Further, we found as expected that independence in self-concept and a collectivistic value orientation jointly predict lower levels of GFE (Study 1). When political orientation and national identification were taken into account, the predicted interaction was observed only on antagonism toward ingroup minorities but not toward outgroup minorities by race or ethnicity (Study 2). Implications of these findings and directions for research on GFE are discussed.

Criminal organizations have a strong influence on social, political, and economic life in Italy and other parts of the world. Nonetheless, local populations display collective passivity against organized crime, a phenomenon known as omertà. Omertà is linked to the concepts of honor and masculinity. That is, in order to fit ideological constructions of manliness, individuals should display indifference toward illegal activities and should not collaborate with legal institutions. In two studies, we investigated the link between endorsement of a masculine honor ideology and collective action intentions against criminal organizations (antimafia). Study 1 (N = 121) involved a Northern Italian sample, and Study 2 (N = 301) involved a Southern Italian sample. Across studies, results showed that endorsement of masculine honor ideology was associated with lower willingness to engage in social activism against criminal organizations. This relationship was mediated by attitudes toward criminal organizations (Study 1 and 2) and, in line with the notion of omertà, by lower levels of collective motive and more anxiety about interacting with police (Study 2). Directions for future research are discussed.

We conducted two studies examining the factors underlying individuals' legitimization of hackers (digital actors operating on the internet). Drawing on the social banditry framework, and research on political action, we focused on the mediating role of anger in the association between external political efficacy and perceived legitimization of hackers' actions. Specifically, we manipulated whether the system was responsive to participants' demands following unfair treatment in a university (Study 1) and in an online work platform (Study 2) context. In Study 1 (N = 259) British undergraduate students read about unfair 'grading' practices. They were then informed that the management was either willing (high external political efficacy) or unwilling (low external political efficacy) to investigate the matter. In Study 2 (N = 222), British participants were recruited via Prolific Academic and were presented with a scenario describing an unfair rejection of their work. They were then informed that the platform admin was either willing or not willing to investigate their case. Across studies, participants were informed that hackers had attacked the website. Supporting the social banditry framework, results indicated that individuals who perceive the system as unresponsive to their demands tended to legitimize hackers' actions via stronger perceived anger against the system. Implications of the results, and future directions are discussed.

Personal secrets are a ubiquitous fact of group life, but the conditions under which they are revealed have not been explored. In five studies, we assessed secret disclosure in groups governed by four models of human sociality (Communal Sharing, Equality Matching, Authority Ranking, Market Pricing; Fiske). In Studies 1a and 1b, participants indicated their willingness to disclose secrets in hypothetical groups governed by the models. In Studies 2a and 2b, participants rated how much a group in which they disclosed secrets or nonsecrets is governed by the models. In Study 3, participants indicated their disclosure of various types of secrets in Communal Sharing and Equality Matching groups to which they belonged. Across studies, disclosure was most strongly associated with Communal Sharing, followed by Equality Matching. Study 3 further showed that identity fusion predicted disclosure in these two kinds of groups. Implications for understanding disclosure of personal secrets in group contexts were discussed.