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This paper analyses the determinants and effects of ECB interventions in times of severe distress. We focus on the Greek government bond market in mid-2010 and use a unique new dataset to show, for the first time, what type of bonds the ECB bought. We then explore the short-term effects of ECB purchases at the bond-level. The results show a large impact of the interventions on the targeted instruments. Bonds bought by the ECB see a much steeper drop in yields than those not bought. This is consistent with theories of "local supply effects" in segmented or illiquid bond markets.

Sovereign defaults are bad news for investors and debtor countries, in particular if a default becomes messy and protracted. Why are some debt crises resolved quickly, in a matter of months, while others take many years to settle? This paper studies the duration of sovereign debt crises based on a new dataset and case study archive on debt renegotiations between governments and foreign banks and bondholders. Using Cox proportional hazard models, I find that domestic political instability ('political risk') is a significant predictor of negotiation delays, after controlling for macroeconomic conditions. Government crises, resignations, and street protests are particularly disruptive for a quick settlement process. Overall, the evidence suggests that debtor countries often lack the political ability to resolve a debt crisis. Governments in turmoil are unlikely to exit a default quickly.

Sovereign defaults are bad news for investors and debtor countries, in particular if a default becomes messy and protracted. Why are some debt crises resolved quickly, in a matter of months, while others take many years to settle? This paper studies the duration of sovereign debt crises based on a new dataset and case study archive on debt renegotiations between governments and foreign banks and bondholders. Using Cox proportional hazard models, I find that domestic political instability ('political risk') is a significant predictor of negotiation delays, after controlling for macroeconomic conditions. Government crises, resignations, and street protests are particularly disruptive for a quick settlement process. Overall, the evidence suggests that debtor countries often lack the political ability to resolve a debt crisis. Governments in turmoil are unlikely to exit a default quickly.

This thesis analyzes debt crisis resolution processes, as well as their implications for debtor countries and their creditors. It consists of four self-contained chapters, which are structured along the two central themes of the dissertation. Chapters 2 and 3 examine debt crisis resolution processes and their determinants, with a special focus on politics and institutions. Chapters 4 and 5 reassess established theoretical predictions on the cost of default and the role of reputation in international financial markets. The dissertation contributes to the literature in two main ways. The first contribution is to collect new data and develop a new typology of sovereign debt crises. My co-authors and I assembled a new, comprehensive dataset on more than 180 sovereign debt restructurings in the period 1970 - 2010 (the "Sovereign Default Archive"). Based on this dataset we then classify debt crises along three dimensions: (i) by the duration of default and debt renegotiations (ii) by type of crisis resolution policies adopted by debtor governments and (iii) by the outcome of restructurings in terms of creditor losses ("haircuts"). The coding results show a stunning variation in all three of these measures: Restructuring processes can take one month or up to 15 years; debtor policies in distress range from creditor friendly to outright confrontational; and creditor losses in restructurings range from 5% to 97%. When analyzing the large variation in crisis characteristics, I find that politics and institutions play a dominant role. Political factors can best explain whether debt crises are resolved quickly and whether governments embark into confrontational policies towards their creditors or not. The second key contribution of this thesis is to test for reputational theories of sovereign borrowing in a new way. Reputation is perhaps the oldest explanation why countries ever repay their debt to creditors that have limited enforcement ability. Based on the novel data collected, our results indicate large costs of ...

Disorderly debt restructurings can be detrimental for debtor countries and creditors alike. This paper investigates delays in sovereign debt restructurings using a comprehensive new dataset since 1980. Why are some debt crises settled in just a few months, while others take many years? Have creditor coordination problems become more cumbersome in recent years? To answer these and other questions, the study provides ample case study evidence. Moreover, I apply semi-parametric duration models. The results indicate that holdouts, inter-creditor disputes and litigation explain some of the observed restructuring delays. However, government behaviour and political instability appear far more important in explaining lengthy restructurings. The volume of IMF credits has no systematic influence on the speed of crisis resolution.

Das vorliegende Papier definiert und diskutiert das Konzept der Economic Governance. Die Kernfrage des Papiers ist, in welcher Form wirtschaftliche Akteure Governance-Leistungen – wie etwa Vertragssicherheit oder Eigentumsrechte – bereitstellen können. Außerdem werden Beispiele aufgeführt, wie der Marktmechanismus gezielt bei politischer Steuerung eingesetzt wird. Dabei wird die aktuelle ökonomische Literatur zu Governance und Institutionen gezielt für die deutsche Governance-Debatte zusammengefasst. Das Papier zeigt, dass private Akteure gerade in Entwicklungsländern fehlende Staatlichkeit durch eigene Governance-Formen ersetzen. Sie schaffen sich selbst die nötigen Rahmenbedingungen ihrer wirtschaftlichen Transaktionen. Auch in entwickelten Ländern gibt es eine Vielzahl solch privater Steuerungsformen wirtschaftlicher Akteure. Diese können als Economic Governance verstanden werden, allerdings nur, wenn sie intentional auf die Ordnungsbildung der Wirtschaft Einfluss nehmen. Die "spontane" Bereitstellung von Gütern und Dienstleistungen durch Märkte kann nicht zu Governance gezählt werden.

Africa's sovereign debt markets are not well understood, partly due to a lack of data. This paper introduces the Africa Debt Database (ADD), the most granular and comprehensive dataset on external borrowing by African governments thus far. Our project moves beyond existing aggregate datasets and instead releases information on individual loans and bonds, in particular on the financial terms of each instrument. Taken together, we cover nearly 7000 loans and bonds between 2000 and 2020, with a total volume of 644 billion USD. Using this data, we study Africa's record lending boom of the 2010s in detail. The debt boom was mainly driven by large sovereign bond issuances in London and New York, as well as growing lending by Chinese state-owned banks. The micro data also reveal a large variation in lending terms across countries, time, and creditors. Sovereign external bonds have interest rates of 6 percent, on average, Chinese banks charge 2-4 percent, and multilateral organizations just 1 percent. Strikingly, many governments in Africa simultaneously borrow large amounts from both private and official creditors, at vastly different rates. The large differences in debt servicing costs are indicative of a cross-creditor subsidy, as cheap concessional loans can be used to pay the high interest to private or Chinese creditors.