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Abstract
Technological progress generally is not disruptive but sequential. Innovations build on prior innovations, typically by presenting improvements or complements. Under patent law, such follow-on innovation meets with an obstacle if the use of the invention underlying it infringes a prior patent, and if, for one reason or another, the owner of that prior patent prefers, as it may, to refuse granting a license. It is only in case the follow-on (or 'second') invention involves an important technical advance of considerable economic significance in relation to the invention claimed in the prior (or 'first') patent that in Europe, in accordance with Art. 31 TRIPS, national patent laws provide for a right of the owner of the second patent to obtain, by way of a decision of the patent office or of a court, a dependency license. By contrast, the EU's system of unitary patent protection does not provide for a dependency licensing regime. Instead, Regulation 1257/2021 on the European patent with unitary effect refers the matter to national law. This means that despite the importance of its invention the owner of a dependent patent will never obtain a mandatory license covering the Internal Market but only territorially limited national licenses for which it must apply separately in each Member State, go through multiple different procedures and comply with different national requirements. The absurdity of such hindering of follow-on innovation in the Internal Market by regulatory abstention is no less as regards national patents that the European Patent Office grants as a bundle in the form of the European patent and that are now additionally held together by the uniform infringement rules of the Unified Patent Court Agreement. After all, that category of a European patent is supposed to represent an equivalent alternative to the unitary patent and, therefore, ought to meet the same Internal Market requirements. Therefore, this study proposes to harmonize Member States' dependency licensing regimes and to complement the system of unitary patent protection accordingly. To this end, it presents the common principles of national regimes, analyzes the particular need for and characteristics of modern mandatory licensing rules and discusses the deficits of alternative approaches that might be available under EU competition law. A particular emphasis is put on distinguishing dependency licensing from compulsory licensing in the public interest, and on the functional complementarity existing between incentivizing inventions by patent protection and stimulating follow-on innovation by mandatory licensing regimes.

Abstract
On 1 June 2023, the Unified Patent Court (UPC) for the settlement of disputes relating to European patents and European patents with unitary effect opened its doors as a common court of those European Union (EU) Member States that, in 2012, had joined in an enhanced cooperation in the area of unitary patent protection, and then, in 2013, entered into an 'Agreement on a Unified Patent Court' (UPCA) that complements their cooperation and expands it to non-unitary European patents. Although the Court's jurisdiction is strictly limited to the two main forms of actions that may be brought in the special field of patent protection—infringement and revocation—its establishment deserves an analytical evaluation from the perspective of general European Union law because it is the first time that Member States create a common court aside of the EU's judicial system not only for the settlement of disputes arising under their own—national or internationally uniform—legal regimes, but also for a legal regime of Union law, the unitary protection of patents. In this regard, it is not so much the sheer size of the new court that attracts attention or the economic importance of the subject matter that comes under its exclusive jurisdiction, but the many fundamental issues and controversies that accompanied its creation and that are still extensively discussed in literature. Leaving aside doctrinal problems of a proper qualification of the UPC as a common court of Member States, the main concerns relate to (i) the need for and the risks of the (over-)specialization of the UPC as a technical expert court; (ii) the legitimacy and democratic deficits of the UPC as a jurisdiction the rules and operation of which are essentially determined through self-regulation by the patent law community; (iii) the difficulties of properly qualifying the nature of the rules of substantive law of both the EU's Regulation on unitary patent protection and of the UPCA, the ambivalence of which seemingly allowing much room for interpretation and for curtailing the reach and primacy of Union law; (iv) the related problems of adequately defining the relationship between the UPC and the Court of Justice of the EU as regards safeguarding the autonomous and uniform interpretation of Union law; and (v), more generally, the structural imbalances within the EU's judicial system that may result from the establishment of common courts of Member States the jurisdiction of which covers the very substance of a legal regime of the Union.

AbstractPrivate enforcement of the European Union's rules on competition (Arts. 101, 102 TFEU) has become prominent as a counterpart to their public enforcement. Mostly, it is identified with tort actions brought under EU-harmonized national law by individuals claiming compensation for the harm suffered from anticompetitive agreements or practices. However, claims for compensation represent imperfect sanctions for the infringement of the competition rules because they are brought only once the damage is done and at a time when the conditions of competition may have changed. Typically also, such private actions are no equivalent or complement to administrative enforcement, but are largely dependent on it (follow-on actions). In addition, bringing them is attractive only if the damage suffered is considerable, sufficient evidence available, and the defendant solvent enough. Therefore, this paper revisits the first line of private enforcement, which is enforcing the nullity of anticompetitive agreements as provided for directly by primary Union law in Art. 101(2) TFEU. Nullity was a much-discussed issue under the authorization regime of Reg. 17/62, the first regulation implementing the enforcement of the competition rules, but has become somewhat neglected as a sanction since Reg. 1/2003 changed the enforcement system. Yet, it is precisely under the regime of immediate and direct applicability of both Arts. 101(1) and 101(3) TFEU, which Reg. 1/2003 reestablished, that the potential of nullity as a sanction of anticompetitive agreements could be fully activated. Such active use of invalidity challenges may lead to redefining the interface between EU law and national contract law, which is the line of severability of the innocent parts of a restrictive agreement from its anti-competitive parts. It should also result in reassessing the legal fate of follow-on transactions concluded by a party to an anticompetitive agreement with third parties, and it should bring abusive contracts within the realm of the nullity sanction that dominant firms impose on third parties. The guiding principle for such general reappraisal of the nullity sanction must be to bring its purpose fully to bear, which is to facilitate exit from anticompetitive agreements or from (abusive) contract clauses with a view to reopening competition and/or to allow the renegotiating of a transaction in terms of undistorted competition. This may mean that only the party whose freedom of competition is restricted may claim nullity.