Search results

This article aims to analyse the foundations of Western dominance in the discipline of International Relations (IR) in Indonesia. Drawing on a contextualized autoethnographic reflection of learning and researching IR in Indonesia during my undergraduate studies between 2008 and 2013, I argue that Western dominance in Indonesian IR discipline is not simply characterized by imposition of a certain academic tradition from the West but also reproduced in everyday academic discourse and naturalized through institutional practices of power. Drawing on my autoethnographic reflections, Western dominance has been maintained and naturalized through everyday exclusionary practices in IR discipline. I encountered this exclusionary practice through a gatekeeping question that was often asked during my time as an undergraduate student and researcher in Indonesia: 'which part of your work is IR?'. This gatekeeping practice is rooted in the larger history of bureaucratization and state co-optation of Indonesian academic community, which is still perpetuated by the government. Nevertheless, this Western epistemic dominance has been resisted through non-academic spaces. Through this contextualized autoethnographic reflections, I offer some rethinking of Global IR project by highlighting internal hierarchy and Western dominance in the discipline of International Relations, as well as resistance against it by non-academic communities.

This article aims to investigate the extent to which the Bandung Conference affected the international order after the Second World War. By locating the Bandung Conference in the international order transition between 1945 until 1970, I argue that the Bandung Conference should not be treated as merely a milestone of historic anti‐colonial struggles but also a site for the emergence of a modern international order. The Bandung Conference played a key role in shaping the Westphalian interstate system that acknowledges equal sovereignty among states in world politics. From this viewpoint, this article argues that the legacy of the Bandung Conference lies in its role to mediate the transition from colonial order before the Second World War to the modern international order, which is based on sovereignty and equal status among states as the primary members. It does so by putting forward an agenda for global decolonization and delegitimizes the practices of colonialism. The diplomatic struggle after the Bandung Conference continued until the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960, which further locates the contribution of the Bandung Conference to the making of the modern international order as we know it in the present day.

This article develops a theory of European power as 'governmentality', with a particular reference to European Union (EU)'s engagement of civil society in Indonesia through a package of "civil society strengthening programs". In contrast to some arguments of 'normative power' or 'civilian power' in the European Union, that put emphasis on EU's normative framework in explaining EU's diplomatic engagements in world politics, this article argues that European Union's global outreach is best seen as the politics of governmentality, which comprises the spread of norms to the "global south" through various developmental strategies in order to form particular subjectivities based on European Union's "normative framework". This argument will be applied to empirically explain the role of EU's engagement of civil society in Indonesia. To substantiate the argument, this article will analyse (1) the debate on recent theorisation of "European power" in EU and International Relations studies, with a reference to Ian Manners' conception of "Normative Power Europe"; (2) the snapshot of European Union's key policies on International Development Assistance in Indonesia; and (3) the case of some projects related to "civil society strengthening programs" in Indonesia.

Indonesia and the European Union (EU) have been starting to cooperate in many sectors since 1990. However, there have been shifts the area of cooperation after the New Order. EU, through Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (firstly signed in 2003), has been agreed to take part in strengthening Indonesias civil society organisations. EU offers some funded program to be conducted by Indonesias civil society organisations in broad range of area, mainly in human rights, democratic participation, and development agenda, and good governance. This cooperation agreement made EU as one of main partner for Indonesias civil society organisations to strengthen their capacities in community empowerment and policy advocacy. However, EUs involvement in assisting civil society in post-Suharto Indonesia has also become an instrument for promoting EUs norms in Indonesia. This paper will raise two questions in relations to EUs involvement: (1) What is EUs main motive in assisting Indonesias development through civil society? (2) To what extent do the projects affect social and political practices in Indonesia? By using Foucaults concept of governmentality, this paper have analysed that EUs involvement in assisting civil society in Indonesia through its funded projects reflects EUs attempts to discipline the third world, particularly Indonesia and thus control the subjectivity through civil society engagement. This paper suggests that studies on EU power should address the changing discourse in international politics and how EU interacts with other global entity, particularly the third world, in a more critical perspective.Keywords: European Union, Civil Society, Development, Human Rights, Democracy, Normative Power Global Governmentality

This article analyses the political construction of 'Moderate Islam Discourse' in contemporary Indonesian Foreign Policy. Since 2004, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has campaigned for 'Moderate Islam' as the main image of Indonesian Islam. Within this discourse, Islam is conceived as 'moderate' and 'tolerant' as well as inherently compatible with democracy. However, in a more critical perspective, 'Moderate Islam'' also contains a political and discursive construction. By using a genealogical approach, I argue that the articulation Islam in Indonesia's foreign policy is influenced by the ideological underpinnings of each political regime as well as the hegemonic discourse operating in international politics. Furthermore, I argue that there have been three discourses of Islam in Indonesia's foreign policy, as articulated by different political regimes, namely (1) Islam as religious identity; (2) Moderate Islam from below; and (3) Moderate Islam as a part of the Global War on Terror project.DOI:10.15408/sdi.v23i3.3157

In the early of 2012, The Government of Indonesia launched a policy proposal remove fuel price subsidy and raise its price up to Rp 6.000. This proposal was followed by mass protests from student, labor, and civil society movement in many provinces. These protest, which was supported by opposition party in parliament (PDIP, Gerindra, and Hanura), ended up with a political compromy at the House of Representative plenary session: The government has opportunity to adjust fuel prices with 'international oil price' of Indonesian Crude Price (ICP) rises or falls around 15% in 6 months. Why do the fuel pricing scheme become very dependent with international oil price which is very oligopolistic (Berger dkk, 1988)? Is it a part of the oligarchy consolidation in Indonesia (Robison dkk, 2004)? This paper will try to answer this question by analyzing the political economy of Post-1998 Indonesian oil sector management.

Radicalism nowadays becomes a popular discourse in Indonesia. The fall of Soeharto in 1998 was also followed by the rise of some groups which enroots their ideology and value with the ideology of Islamic political movement in Middle East. Many authors even connect this phenomenon to terrorism. By those points of view, they try to encounter terrorism by de-radicalizing people and promoting the empowerment of moderate society. But this point of view is argued by some authors who think that terrorism differs from radicalism. It is structural problem –poverty, oppression, political authoritarianism— which implies violence and terror. It leads us to a question: What cause radicalism? This article attempts to analyze the historical and political-economic root of Radical Islam group in Indonesia. By analyzing those problems, we will elaborate the problem of Islamic radicalism in structural perspective of post-New Order Indonesia.