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Article(electronic)#12022

Book review of Fernando CASAL BÉRTOA & Zsolt ENYEDI. 2021. Party system closure: Party alliances, government alternatives, and democracy in Europe

In: Analele Universității București: Annals of the University of Bucharest = Les Annales de l'Université de Bucarest. Științe politice = Political science series = Série Sciences politiques, Volume 24, Issue 1, p. 101-107

University of Oxford, UK; CHIRU, Mihai

Book review of Fernando CASAL BÉRTOA & Zsolt ENYEDI. 2021. Party system closure: Party alliances, government alternatives, and democracy in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 320 pp. ISBN 9780198823605

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Article(electronic)#22014

Crime and immigration

In: IZA world of labor: evidence-based policy making

University of Oxford, UK; Bell, Brian

ISSN: 2054-9571

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Article(electronic)#32014

Do immigrants improve the health of native workers?

In: IZA world of labor: evidence-based policy making

University of Oxford, UK; Giuntella, Osea

ISSN: 2054-9571

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Article(electronic)#4December 7, 2021

A deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast, and fair childcare assignment

In: Journal of mechanism and institution design: JMID, Volume 6, Issue 1, p. 59-100

University of Münster, Germany; Reischmann, Tobias; Klein, Thilo; Giegerich, Sven; Pforzheim University and ZEW -- Leibniz-Centre for European Economic Research, Germany; University of Oxford, UK

ISSN: 2399-8458

We design and implement a program-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with ties (DAT) and apply it to childcare assignment in two German cities. The mechanism can accommodate complementarities in providers' preferences, is fast to terminate even in larger cities, is difficult to manipulate in practice, and produces stable allocations. It can be further sped up by introducing two new features. First, allowing for an arbitrary share of facilities who participate in a centralized manner by submitting a rank-order-list over applicants. Second, by breaking ties in applicants' rank-order-lists on a first-come-first-serve basis, which sets incentives for programs to propose faster. We provide and evaluate simulation results.

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