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The Anti-trafficking Protocol reflects the interests of the major powers. Due to the high costs of compliance, countries will strategically select certain obligations to comply, which can satisfy the major powers with smaller costs. Among the three main obligations of the Protocol - prevention, protection and prosecution, we predict that ratification leads to compliance with the prevention policy first because prevention is less costly for member states to comply with. Therefore it is the most efficient form of compliance. We empirically test this hypothesis by employing panel data from 147 countries during the period of 2001-2009. As the theory predicts, the ratification of the Protocol has the strongest effect on the prevention policy of a member state compared to protection and prosecution. Our findings are robust to the method of estimation and the choice of variables.

AbstractUnderstanding why states voluntarily cede power to international institutions, and if those institutions fulfill their stated goals, remain a pressing question in international relations. In order to evaluate the material and normative logics that may drive this type of behavior, this paper considers state commitment to and compliance with the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) initiative launched by the IMF in 1996. This effort seeks to enhance the availability of comprehensive economic data based on best dissemination practices to facilitate pursuing sound macroeconomic policies. Using panel data on 120 countries during the 1996–2011 period, we find that commitment to the SDDS occurs when costs for states are low, and that compliance with the SDDS initiative is associated with increased data transparency after controlling for self‐section bias. Our results are robust to controlling for endogeneity, alternative sample, and estimation methods.