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POLITICAL CONFLICT STRUCTURE IN NORWAY CHANGED IN CHARACTER BECAUSE OF THE ISSUE OF EEC ENTRY. THREE EMINENT CLEAVAGES EXIST: CENTER-PERIPHERY AXIS; URBAN-RURAL CONFLICT; LEFT-RIGHT CONFLICT. THE MOST IMPORTANT GROUPS IN FAVOR WERE: CONSERVATIVE AND LABOR PARTIES; EMPLOYERS' ORGANIZATION; AND TRADE UNIONS. THE CORE OF OPPOSITION WAS THE URBAN RADICALS, FARMERS, AND FISHERMEN.

THE THREE SCANDINAVIAN ELECTIONS IN THE AUTUMN OF 1973 OFFER EXCITING DATA FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS. THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF EVIDENCE OF A WIDESPREAD "DEFREEZING" OF THE ALIGNMENT STRUCTURES OF THE FIFTIES AND EARLY SIXTIES AND OF INCREASING VOLATILITY WITH IN NATIONAL ELECTORATES. WHAT WE WANT TO KNOW IS HOW FAR THE EEC WAS AN ISSUE IN ITS OWN RIGHT.

THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENTARY (STORTING) ELECTION OF SEPTEMBER 9, 1985, RESULTED IN A SWING IN FAVOUR OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES TO THE LEFT. THESE OPPOSITION PARTIES DID NOT OBTAIN A MAJORITY IN THE NEW STORTIG, HOWEVER, OWING TO AN ELECTORAL REFORM INTRODUCED BEFORE THE ELECTION BY THE BOURGEOIS COALITION GOVERNMENT. THE COALITION REMAINED IN OFFICE AFTER THE ELECTION, BUT ONLY AS A MINORITY GOVERNMENT, SINCE TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RIGHT-WING PROGRESS PARTY HOLD THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE SOCIALIST AND BOURGEOIS BLOC IN THE NEW STORTING. IN THE ELECTION OF 1985 THE VOTERS WERE FACED WITH TWO COMPETING GOVERNMENT ALTERNATIVES: EITHER MAINTENANCE OF THE BOURGEOIS COALITION, OR A MINORITY GOVERNMENT FORMED BY THE LABOUR PARTY WITH SUPPORT FROM THE SOCIALIST LEFT PARTY AND THE TINY LIBERAL PARTY. THREE ASPECTS OF THE 1985 STORTING ELECTION ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTING:

Many changes, both internally & externally, have been felt during the 20 yrs that a Democratic majority governed the US. Since Eisenhower's election in 1952 & re-election in 1956, it would be interesting to know to what extent the Republican majority can be considered to be stable. In 1956, the Democrats won the elections, the presidential party having failed, for the 1st time since 1848, to carry a majority to Congress in a Presidential election yr. PO polls show that there are 3 Democrats for every 2 Republicans. Stevenson was defeated because the Republicans were better organized than the Democrats, many of whom voted for Eisenhower or did not vote at all. Finally, the Republicans control almost all of the press & the media of propaganda & information, & the SS of Republicanism is more a matter of prestige than one of soc pressure. The Wc, while still almost exclusively Democratic in 1948, is becoming more & more Republican, while the moderates are gradually drifting from the Democratic party. Cath's, Ru voters, & individuals living in small towns are tending toward Republicanism, while the younger age groups of the New Deal generation are remaining faithful to the Democratic Party. The qualities of the candidates in 1952 & 1956 certainly played a role in the division of the votes, but if the prestige of the General was a factor, Stevenson also had traits in his favor. Domestic issues, especially the Negro question, had their influence, but foreign affairs is the area in which the diff's in the parties is most apparent. Tr by J. A. Broussard from IPSA.

Why do sudden changes occur in electoral turnout from one election to the next? This article proposes two general hypotheses as explanations for declining turnout. The first hypothesis draws on rational choice theory, and is based on the assumption that elections are devices for the selection of governments. It states that abstention is rational when government alternatives are unclear. The second hypothesis implies that non-voting is a result of social-psychological mechanisms, and suggests that voters abstain in situations of disagreement with their own party concerning some important issue. The hypothesis predicts that strong identifiers under cross-pressure are more inclined to stay home than weak identifiers and non identifiers. In using the 1993 parliamentary election in Norway as a test case, the analysis suggests that the application of a rational choice approach is fruitful for studying electoral turnout. Because of the absence of clear-cut government alternatives voter involvement was low in the election and people did not distinguish much between the various political platforms offered to them. The second hypothesis of disagreement with own party received only limited support. The differences due to cross-pressures are not very big, and the prediction that strong identifiers under cross pressure are more inclined to stay home was not supported. Altogether, our case study suggests that very few costs are involved in changing partisanship and that party identification reflects a strong cognitive rather than affective aspect. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

PARTISANSHIP WAS THE DOMINANT FACTOR AFFECTING THE REFERENDA ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN BRITAIN AND NORWAY, BUT LEFT-RIGHT LOCATIONS, IN THE DOWNSIAN SENSE OF ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE ECONOMY, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT CENTER-PERIPHERY CONSIDERATIONS ALSO INFLUENCED THE OUTCOMES. THESE FINDINGS ARE CONSISTENT WITH EARLIER STUDIES THAT EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY POINT FIRST TOWARD PARTISANSHIP AND SECOND TOWARD BASIC ATTITUDES AS DETERMINING FACTORS IN REFERENDUM VOTING. STILL, FOR PARTISANSHIP TO HAVE MAXIMUM IMPACT THE PARTIES MUST TAKE CLEAR AND UNIFORM POSITIONS. WHEN PARTIES DIVIDE, SO DO THEIR FOLLOWERS. AND FOR BASIC ATTITUDES TO OPERATE, THEY MUST BE ENGRAINED IN THE FABRIC OF NORMAL POLITICAL CONFLICT AND BE RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE AT STAKE.