Search results

In many Western countries, alongside NPM-rhetoric, important tasks of public service delivery have been devolved to autonomous single purpose agencies. This was also the case in Flanders (Belgium). This reform rhetoric also has a clear vision on how tasks in the policy cycle are to be distributed between actors: policy-making is a political prerogative, supported by core governmental departments, whereas executive agencies have policy implementation as their main task. This article addresses whether this ideal-typical model really exists, drawing on two case studies of policy initiatives in Flanders. Our observations confirm a policy-operations divide between politics and administration, but it needs refinement: ministers and their advisors make the strategic policy decisions, in which they are assisted by executive agencies. Ministerial departments are hardly involved in the policy-making process. Executive agencies are more than policy implementers alone, as they often have a large input in the operational stages of policy-making.

The involvement of private actors (non-profit and/or for-profit) in public service provision has a lot of consequences and implications not only for users and service providers, but also for government. This article explores the consequences for the relations within public-private service provision networks, by focusing on the governance regime of childcare in Flanders. Our case analysis clearly shows that public-private service provision networks may threaten the transparency of the service provision field for users, and challenge the role of the oversight authority, often requiring a two-level steering of the service provision field: a direct steering of individual service providers and the network and/or market steering of the whole service provision field (in a community or region). Governance regimes comprising service providers of different sectors may complicate this kind of network steering, as there seem to exist at least six relationships within such networks. Furthermore, we noticed that service providers may face conflicting (public) accountabilities.

The Belgian politico-administrative relationship is known for its large ministerial cabinets who operate as interfaces between ministers & civil servants. According to Dierickx & Majersdorf (1994) ministerial cabinets are the central nodes in the Belgian policy-making networks, reducing the policy role of civil servants & shielding them from all relevant policy-making interactions. They found that pressure groups hardly ever turned to civil servants & stated that civil servants lived in an administrative beguinage. This article tests whether the conclusions of Dierickx & Majersdorf (1994) are still valid. Next, it seeks to explore the policy-making interactions of both actors in a more detailed way, since Dierickx & Majersdorf (1994) only measured the frequency of their contacts, not the direction, goal and/or content of the interactions. Based on a unique written survey-research among top civil servants & ministerial advisers, we discuss the role differences with regard to their interactions in four 'arenas.'. Adapted from the source document.

Policy-making in Flanders (Belgium) is traditionally characterized by a dense advisory system with a high number of advisory councils, firmly integrated into the policy-making process. Recently, the Flemish government has reshaped its strategic advisory council system, responding to concerns over growing advice competition. This reorganization was part of a broader reform aimed at increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of policies. In this article, we analyze the defining aspects of this new advisory council system, and explore members' satisfaction about the advisory process and the use of advice by policy-makers. The latter can be considered a prerequisite for advice to contribute to policy-making. Our analysis is based on a 2009 survey with the members of the new strategic advisory councils (response 72.4%). The results show that reorganizing the advisory council system has not led to uniformity regarding council size, budget or membership constitution. And although satisfaction with the advisory process is generally high, the influence of the advice is perceived as low, which poses a challenge to neo-corporatist policy-making in Flanders.