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In federal countries, competence for policy matters is often shared between various levels of government. As only overall outcomes are observed, this might blur accountability by decreasing voters' ability to infer information about the performance of their leaders. In this article, we analyse how party cues (i.e., politicians' party membership acting as a cue towards their characteristics) affect voters' incomplete information about politicians in a federal setting. We first of all show that party cues allow indirect inference regarding politicians using observed policy outcomes, alleviating the accountability problem. Empirical evidence from US presidential election results across all 50 US states over the period 1972-2008 provides support for this proposition. Yet, while the availability of party cues in a federal setting increases the national incumbents' effort in some cases, it may reduce effort particularly when the regional incumbent if of a different party.

Politicians within any given party generally exhibit a degree similarity in terms of (political) viewpoints. Moreover, they are often constrained to follow general party lines on certain policy issues. Finally, they may be more likely to mimic one another than politicians from another party. Hence, parties provide important cues on how politicians will act once elected. The present paper assesses the implications of such party cues for the traditional model of yardstick voting (where voters use what they observe in neighbouring jurisdictions to judge the performance of their incumbent). It is shown that the information content of what happens in neighbouring jurisdictions differs depending on whether or not the same party governs this jurisdiction. More specifically, we find that voters might still take neighbouring jurisdictions into account, but should distinguish between jurisdictions where the same or a different party is in power. The results of the model are in line with recent empirical observations in Sweden and the United States. ; Politiker einer beliebigen Partei zeigen gewöhnlich Ähnlichkeiten bezüglich (politischer) Ansichten. Zudem sind sie in bestimmten Politikfeldern oft abhängig von Grundsätzen ihrer Partei. Letztlich übernehmen sie Standpunkte eher untereinander als von Politikern anderer Parteien. Daher liefern Parteien wichtige Hinweise wie Politiker nach ihrer Wahl handeln werden. Das vorliegende Papier beurteilt die Auswirkungen solcher Informationen über die Partei auf das bekannte "Yardstick Voting" Modell (Wähler nutzen ihre Beobachtungen aus benachbarten Regionen zur Beurteilung ihrer eigenen Regierung). Es wird gezeigt, dass der Informationsgehalt der Ereignisse in Nachbarregionen stark davon abhängt, ob dieselbe Partei die Regierung stellt. Genauer gesagt, Wähler können andere Regionen bei ihren Entscheidungen berücksichtigen, jedoch sollten sie zwischen solchen mit derselben und mit einer anderen Partei in der Regierungsverantwortung differenzieren. Die Ergebnisse des Modells decken sich mit jüngsten Beobachtungen in Schweden und den Vereinigten Staaten.

Previous studies indicate that higher tax burdens reduce incumbents' popularity and re-election odds. The present paper offers a new test of this relation for German data. Our findings indicate that taxation indeed negatively affects German federal government approval ratings, in line with previous international research. Nonetheless, the government's popularity losses do not necessarily translate into comparable gains in the opposition's popularity. In fact, the opposition may even lose support when there is 'divided government' (i.e. when it has some power over policies). Finally, we find some (albeit weak) evidence that the costs of taxation are limited to the tax burden imposed by the federal government and do not extend to taxes levied at lower levels of government. ; Bisherige Untersuchungen zeigen, dass höhere steuerliche Belastungen die Beliebtheit und Wiederwahlchancen von Amtsträgern mindern. Das vorliegende Papier überprüft diese Beziehung erneut anhand von Daten für Deutschland. Übereinstimmend mit internationalen Forschungsergebnissen zeigen unsere Resultate, dass Besteuerung die Zustimmung zur Arbeit der Bundesregierung tatsächlich negativ beeinflusst. Der Popularitätsverlust der Regierung setzt sich jedoch nicht notwendigerweise in vergleichbare Gewinne der Opposition um. Vielmehr ist im Falle von "Divided Government" (d.h. die Opposition trägt ebenfalls Regierungsverantwortung) ein Verlust an Unterstützung der Opposition möglich. Schließlich finden wir Beweise (wenn auch schwache), dass die Kosten der Besteuerung durch die von der Bundesregierung auferlegte steuerliche Belastung begrenzt sind und nicht von Steuern beeinflusst werden, die von nachrangigen Regierungsebenen erhoben werden.

Previous research has established that taxation may impose significant electoral costs on politicians. This literature, however, focuses exclusively on the effect of the tax burden. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that both the level of the tax burden and the change in the tax structure affect the US president's approval ratings (over the 1959-2006 period). Our results support this proposition. Specifically, we find a negative impact from the magnitudes of the tax burden and the deficit as well as from changes in the tax structure on presidential approval ratings. Adapted from the source document.

Previous studies indicate that higher tax burdens reduce incumbents' popularity and re-election odds. The present paper offers a new test of this relation for German data. Our findings indicate that taxation indeed negatively affects German federal government approval ratings, in line with previous international research. Nonetheless, the government's popularity losses do not necessarily translate into comparable gains in the opposition's popularity. In fact, the opposition may even lose support when there is 'divided government' (i.e. when it has some power over policies). Finally, we find some (albeit weak) evidence that the costs of taxation are limited to the tax burden imposed by the federal government and do not extend to taxes levied at lower levels of government. [Copyright 2008 Elsevier Ltd.]

Previous research has established that taxation may entail significant electoral costs to politicians. This literature, however, focuses exclusively on the effect of the tax burden. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that both the level of the tax burden and the change in the tax structure affect the US president's approval ratings (over the period 1959-2006). Our results support this proposition. Specifically, we find a negative impact from the levels of the tax burden and the deficit as well as from changes in the tax structure on presidential approval ratings. ; Bisherige Untersuchungen haben gezeigt, dass Besteuerung mit erheblichen Kosten für Politiker bei Wahlen einhergeht. Die entsprechende Literatur fokussiert allerdings ausschließlich den Effekt der Steuerbelastung. Im vorliegenden Artikel testen wir die Hypothese, dass sowohl das Niveau der Steuerbelastung als auch Veränderungen der Steuerstruktur den Grad der Zustimmung für den US-Präsidenten beeinflussen (im Zeitraum 1959-2006). Die empirischen Ergebnisse stützen diese Behauptung. Es wird gezeigt, dass neben dem Defizit sowohl das Niveau der Steuerbelastung als auch Änderungen in der Steuerstruktur negative Auswirkungen auf den Zustimmungsgrad für den Präsidenten haben.

We analyze the presence of a cost of ruling and/or incumbency advantage in the municipal elections in Flanders of 1988, 1994 & 2000. The empirical work concentrates on vote share evolutions of the three main parties: CD&V, Sp.a & VLD. We find evidence that being in power leads to an incumbency advantage, especially for those parties who provide the mayor. The results indicate that this electoral advantage is not uniform among parties (the socialist party appears to benefit more) and, importantly, the incumbency advantage seems to dampen over successive elections. From the perspective of the local politicians, it is important to keep in mind that this incumbency advantage at the local level was insufficient to compensate for the general trend of the major parties to lose votes at all levels of government. Indeed, even in the 1988 elections -- where a clear local incumbency (mayor) advantage could be identified for each of the three parties -- it was the case that government parties on average lost votes. Tables. Adapted from the source document.

International audience ; Recent theoretical papers develop political agency models in which voters compare tax policy with that in neighbouring jurisdictions. In these yardstick competition models voters judge incumbents by comparing their policy with policy in neighbouring jurisdictions. We analyse municipal elections in Flanders during the period 1982-2000 and find empirical evidence for yardstick voting. Incumbents are punished for higher tax rates. Importantly, the electoral punishment also depends on tax rates in neighbouring municipalities. Higher rates in neighbouring municipalities are favourable for the incumbents.