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The author gives a brief review of the theory of political obligation of citizens in democracy. If democracy is a regime based on the free will of individuals (citizens), then the concept of political obligation cannot be based outside this & such freedom. Unlike rights, obligations are always social (relational, reciprocal). Because their nature is social, they have to be socialized by the processes of education: this is the process of building a political habitus in the individual identity of every person. The political responsibilities, unlike the legal ones, cannot be adopted by chance (by the processes of functional socialization), but solely by means of citizens' systematic education, as they are grounded in the freedom of choice & the nurtured civic virtues. As such, they a part of the consciously built democratic political culture of citizens, & culture must be acquired only by the processes of learning & education. A separate analysis of the relationship between the citizens' political obligations & those of the political community has been carried out since the issue here is who citizens in democracy really are responsible to. Political responsibility is not due only to authority (state, sovereign) -- as initially emphasized by the social contract theories -- but also to the other fellow citizens, & to the political community as a historical repository of our obligations & responsibilities in their entirety. Finally, the problem of political obligations from the perspective of the logic of collective action is analyzed as well as the likelihood of the existence of 'freeriders' in the achieved structure of the common good. This analysis also shows how civic education is inherent to democratic regimes. References. Adapted from the source document.

In this paper, the author argues that political education is indispensable to democracy & dependent on models of democracy. In analysing normative models of democracy, his focus is on the process of creating political will because it is during this process where the role of citizens themselves becomes prominent. The analysis has demonstrated that there are various ways in which citizens can become engaged in the process of creating political will, & that these various ways in fact determine the distinctiveness of each model of democracy. The author shows that strategic political action, as instrumental political action, is characteristic of the classical liberal model, whilst value-rational, ethically laden, action is characteristic of the classical republican model of democracy. The problem with both these models is that the key motives for citizen political engagement -- interests in the liberal model, & the common good in the republican model -- are in a way exogenous to the political process itself. The development of the third model, the theory of deliberative democracy, seeks to overcome these exogenous qualities of interests & the common good in relation to the political process & thus reassert the role of politics in constituting interests & the common good. Thus, the deliberative model of democracy has the potential for constituting & transforming interests & conceptions of the common good. In this model, politics assumes its distinctive function of organising society, resolving conflicts & achieving consensus. In the deliberative model of democracy, political education is provided with new outlines & dimension. These are based on the premises of social cooperation & the notion of the person as capable of acting justly & participate in the public sphere for the purpose of resolving shared problems. References. Adapted from the source document.