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Der libertäre Paternalismus (LP) genießt in Politik, Wissenschaft und Öffentlichkeit eine große Popularität, die er insbesondere zwei Merkmalen verdankt: Erstens stützt sich der LP auf verhaltensökonomische Ergebnisse, die zeigen, dass individuelle Entscheidungen oft nicht der neoklassischen Rationalitätskonzeption entsprechen, sodass Individuen durch sogenanntes Nudging zu besseren, ihren wahren Präferenzen entsprechenden Entscheidungen verholfen werden könne. Zweites ist damit der Anspruch verbunden, das Wohlergehen der Individuen, wie sie selbst es verstehen, zu erhöhen. Dieser Beitrag zeigt anhand einer dogmengeschichtlichen Analyse der zentralen, dem LP zugrunde liegenden Begriffe Präferenz, Nutzen, Rationalität und Wohlergehen, dass der LP diesen Anspruch nicht einlösen kann. Eine detaillierte begriffliche Analyse ist deshalb geboten, weil diese Konzepte in der Ökonomik immer wieder für Missverständnisse sorgen. Eine theoriegeschichtlich informierte Untersuchung wiederum ist notwendig, da diese Konfusion insbesondere auf der Tatsache beruht, dass der Gehalt dieser Begriffe sich im Laufe der Zeit gravierend verändert hat und sich die verschiedenen Bedeutungen heute z. T. wechselseitig überlagern. ; The libertarian Paternalism (LP) enjoys great popularity in politics, science and public life, which is mainly due to two characteristics: Firstly, it is based on behavioural economic research insights, which show that individual decisions often do not follow the neoclassical conception of rationality. This means that individuals can be influenced by the so called "nudging" to make decisions which are more in line with their real preferences. Secondly, it is associated with the aspiration to increase what individuals see as their own well-being. This essay shows on the basis of a dogma-historical analysis of the central, underlying concepts of LP (i.e. preference, use, rationality and well-being), that LP cannot achieve this commitment. A detailed conceptual analysis is required as these concepts often cause misunderstandings in economics. An analysis based on historical and theoretical background is necessary because this confusion particularly stems from the fact that the meaning of those concepts has seriously changed over time so that different meanings overlap partially.

Abstract
Inhabitants of low-lying islands flooded due to anthropogenic climate change will lose their territory and thereby their ability to exercise their right to political self-determination. This paper addresses the normative questions which arise when climate change threatens territorial rights. It explores whether the loss of statehood supports a claim to territorial compensation, and if so, how it can be satisfied. The paper concludes that such claims are well founded and that they should be met by providing compensatory territories. After introducing a differentiation between land rights and territorial rights, previous theoretical responses to the problem of sinking islands are criticized. It is argued that states may be required to give up parts of their territory as compensation. The paper develops criteria of sufficiency for compensatory territories and proposes to base their selection process on a negative auction. Since it is unlikely that unsettled compensatory territories that meet the specified requirements are available, the rights of their original inhabitants are discussed.