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"Essentials of Microeconomics is an excellent introduction to microeconomics. It presents the basic tools of microeconomics clearly and concisely. It presents a vigorous treatment of all relevant introductory microeconomic concepts, and emphasizes on modern economics - game theory and imperfect markets. Each chapter is self-contained and includes the required key mathematical skills at the start. Now in its second edition, this updated textbook includes: Expanded lecturer resources, including detailed lecture slides, sample exam questions and updated test bank MCQs An additional section on Economics in Practice, focused on policy, econometrics, and behavioural economics This book is ideal not only for introductory microeconomics course, but its level of analysis also makes the book appropriate for introductory level economics taught at postgraduate level. With the emphasis on strategy, this text is also well suited for use in business economics courses"--

We study a market-entry game with a second-mover advantage. In the symmetric equilibrium, there can be a non-monotonic relationship between the probability with which a player will invest (entry) and the length of time until the deadline. Moreover, the probability of investment can move chaotically as the horizon is extended. In the limit when the period length goes to zero chaotic trajectories arise when the efficiency effect does not hold -- that is, when the one-period monopoly profit is less than the total of the one-period duopoly profits. We also show that the presence of chaotic trajectories is associated with a smaller expected delay in entry.

This paper explores the hold-up problem between two parties (an entrepreneur and an investor) when one of the parties (the entrepreneur) is unable to commit not to repudiate the initial contract. To mitigate hold-up we allow the parties to stage investments over time and derive the optimal investment path in a model that places no restrictions on the growth of collateral. Our model predicts that neither positive wealth of the entrepreneur nor the lack of discounting ensures that all profitable projects proceed. We also derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the project to be financeable when there are no costs of delay.

AbstractWe extend the property‐rights framework to allow for a separation of the ownership rights of access and veto and for sequential investment. Parties investing first do so before contracting is feasible. It is possible, however, that parties investing second can share (at least some of) their investment costs. Along with this cost‐sharing effect, the incentive to invest is affected by a strategic effect generated by sequential investment. Together these effects can overturn some of the predictions of the property‐rights literature. For example, the most inclusive ownership structure might not be optimal, even if all investments are complementary.