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This article examines which political parties are the most likely targets of negative campaigning in a multiparty system. The choice of target is an important strategic decision parties make when deciding on their campaign strategy. The article advances existing research on negative campaigning in several ways. First, it is the only paper of its kind to statistically test which parties are most likely to be attacked in a multiparty system and in a non-US setting. Second, it contributes to the development of a general theory on negative campaigning by examining its use in a multiparty system. Finally, it presents new content analysis data on negative campaigning from ten Dutch Parliamentary elections between 1981 and 2010. The findings show that large parties, ideologically proximate parties, parties close to the median party position and government parties are the most likely targets of negative campaigning in the Dutch multiparty system. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

This article describes how political parties in parliamentary election campaigns in Western Europe make use of negative campaigning and examines whether their behaviour differs from that of candidates competing in US presidential election campaigns. Furthermore, it theorises how the differences and similarities between negative campaigning in these countries can be explained. First of all, this comparative study adds to the development of a more general theory on negative campaigning. Second, the study presents interesting new data measuring the use of negative campaigning by 31 political parties in 23 parliamentary election campaigns in Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands between 1980 and 2006. Results show that there are no signs of an increase in negative campaigning and that the majority of attacks are issue attacks. However, there are systematic differences in the overall level of negative campaigning between these countries and we suspect that the type of party system could be the main explanatory factor. Adapted from the source document.

This article describes how political parties in parliamentary election campaigns in Western Europe make use of negative campaigning and examines whether their behaviour differs from that of candidates competing in US presidential election campaigns. Furthermore, it theorises how the differences and similarities between negative campaigning in these countries can be explained. First of all, this comparative study adds to the development of a more general theory on negative campaigning. Second, the study presents interesting new data measuring the use of negative campaigning by 31 political parties in 23 parliamentary election campaigns in Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands between 1980 and 2006. Results show that there are no signs of an increase in negative campaigning and that the majority of attacks are issue attacks. However, there are systematic differences in the overall level of negative campaigning between these countries and we suspect that the type of party system could be the main explanatory factor.

This article examines which political parties are the most likely targets of negative campaigning in a multiparty system. The choice of target is an important strategic decision parties make when deciding on their campaign strategy. The article advances existing research on negative campaigning in several ways. First, it is the only paper of its kind to statistically test which parties are most likely to be attacked in a multiparty system and in a non-US setting. Second, it contributes to the development of a general theory on negative campaigning by examining its use in a multiparty system. Finally, it presents new content analysis data on negative campaigning from ten Dutch Parliamentary elections between 1981 and 2010. The findings show that large parties, ideologically proximate parties, parties close to the median party position and government parties are the most likely targets of negative campaigning in the Dutch multiparty system.

Studies examining parties' attack behaviour, also called negative campaigning, largely neglect temporal dynamics. Therefoe, this paper examines how the electoral cycle, the period between two elections, impacts parties' attack behaviour in parliaments. We argue that parties attack all the time but that the (i) level, (ii) type, and (iii) nature of attacks are affected by the electoral cycle as parties adapt their objectives. Analysing longitudinal data on parties' attacks in the parliaments of Belgium, Croatia, and the UK (2010–2020), we find that when elections draw closer parties' use of attacks, trait attacks, and uncivil attacks increases. We also find support for the notion that not all parties' attack behaviour is equally impacted by the electoral cycle, as parties differ in sensitivity to the electoral cycle based on risk acceptance. Overall, the impact of the electoral cycle on parties' strategic choices in general, and attack behaviour specifically, should not be ignored.

What explains conspiracy thinking in Europe and America? This is the first and largest comparative study of conspiracy thinking to date, presenting findings using a representative sample of 11,523 respondents in nine countries. First, it shows that the overall level of conspiracy thinking in Europe is equal to or slightly lower than the United States, contradicting the notion that conspiracy theories is an especially American phenomenon. Second, people more inclined to conspiracy thinking position themselves towards the right of the political spectrum, engage in magical thinking, feel distrust towards public officials and reject the political system. Finally, we find that – surprisingly – the country context in which respondents reside has hardly any effect as predictor of levels of conspiracy thinking or as a moderator of individual-level determinants. Heterogeneity in conspiratorial thinking seems to be largely a function of individual traits.

What explains conspiracy thinking in Europe and America? This is the first and largest comparative study of conspiracy thinking to date, presenting findings using a representative sample of 11,523 respondents in nine countries. First, it shows that the overall level of conspiracy thinking in Europe is equal to or slightly lower than the United States, contradicting the notion that conspiracy theories is an especially American phenomenon. Second, people more inclined to conspiracy thinking position themselves towards the right of the political spectrum, engage in magical thinking, feel distrust towards public officials and reject the political system. Finally, we find that – surprisingly – the country context in which respondents reside has hardly any effect as predictor of levels of conspiracy thinking or as a moderator of individual-level determinants. Heterogeneity in conspiratorial thinking seems to be largely a function of individual traits.

Associative issue ownership refers to one of the prerequisites for representative democracy—public awareness of the issue priorities of competing political parties. This article addresses the question of how the instability of associative issue ownership at the micro level of individual voters, which could be due in part to election news and political discussion, adds up to the relative stability of associative issue ownership at the macro level. The data come from a panel survey and a content analysis of newspapers and television news bulletins in the 2010 Dutch Parliamentary Election Campaign. Cross-nested multilevel logistic regression models were applied to estimate the impact of political news and political discussion on different respondents for different parties and issues. The findings show how contagion, by traditional issue ownership associations, explains the relative stability at the macro level in spite of volatility at the micro level. Campaign news and political discussion increase the likelihood of contagion by traditional issue priorities of political parties, while also evoking change due to their convergence on the issues of the campaign, from which the parties that own these issues take advantage, among others the VVD and the PVV in the 2010 campaign.

In this article, the authors address the question of to what extent negative political campaigning differs when looking at different communication channels. They compare paid publicity, election debates, and newspaper coverage for the 2006 Dutch parliamentary elections and conduct an elaborate content analysis. Results show that the level of negative campaigning does not differ greatly across these channels, although election debates clearly show the highest amount of this type of campaigning. Notably, negative campaigning takes a different form in newspaper coverage, where appeals are more personal, focusing on character traits as opposed to being directed to political parties and dealing with political issues. The authors explain those results by pointing to the different levels of control politicians exert over communication channels. They also make a plea to other researchers investigating negative campaigning, asking them to fully consider that their results might be seriously biased by the communication channel they investigate.

AbstractExisting empirical research on voters' responses to individual politicians' moral transgressions pays limited attention to moral emotions, although moral emotions are an integral part of voters' moral judgment. This study looks at U.S. voters' discrete moral emotional responses to politician's moral violations and examines how these discrete moral emotional responses are dependent on voters' own moral principles and the extent to which they identify with a political party. We report on a 5 × 3 between-subjects experiment where 2026 U.S. respondents reacted to politicians' violations of one of five moral foundations defined by Moral Foundations Theory. We randomly vary which moral foundation is violated and the partisanship of the politician. While voters' own moral principles somewhat condition moral emotional responses, we find that voters' moral emotional responses mostly depend on partisan identification. When voters share party identity with a politician committing a moral violation, they respond with less anger, contempt, disgust and shame than when they do not share party identity. The effect is greater among strong partisans. However, we find limited evidence that specific moral emotions are activated by violations of particular moral foundations, thereby challenging Moral Foundations Theory.

Existing empirical research on voters' responses to individual politicians' moral transgressions pays limited attention to moral emotions, although moral emotions are an integral part of voters' moral judgment. This study looks at U.S. voters' discrete moral emotional responses to politician's moral violations and examines how these discrete moral emotional responses are dependent on voters' own moral principles and the extent to which they identify with a political party. We report on a 5 × 3 between-subjects experiment where 2026 U.S. respondents reacted to politicians' violations of one of five moral foundations defined by Moral Foundations Theory. We randomly vary which moral foundation is violated and the partisanship of the politician. While voters' own moral principles somewhat condition moral emotional responses, we find that voters' moral emotional responses mostly depend on partisan identification. When voters share party identity with a politician committing a moral violation, they respond with less anger, contempt, disgust and shame than when they do not share party identity. The effect is greater among strong partisans. However, we find limited evidence that specific moral emotions are activated by violations of particular moral foundations, thereby challenging Moral Foundations Theory.