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Politieke partijen zijn alomtegenwoordig in de Belgische politiek. Ze zijn bepalend voor de regeringsvorming, het (stem)gedrag van hun parlementsleden, de invulling van verkiesbare plaatsen en het standpunt in belangrijke beleidsdossiers. Toch lijken partijen het tegenwoordig erg moeilijk te hebben. Dat blijkt onder meer uit dalende ledenaantallen, lage vertrouwensscores, ontrouwe kiezers en steeds minder actieve partijafdelingen. Dit boek bekijkt de crisis in partijen door de bril van hun leden. Zijn partijleden vandaag nog wel van de partij? In de praktijk taant hun rol, hoewel ze voor partijen formeel van groot belang blijven: ze kiezen de partijvoorzitter, keuren kandidatenlijsten voor parlementsverkiezingen goed, bepalen en wijzigen partijregels, vormen een reservoir aan potentiële kandidaten, zijn ambassadeurs van de partij in verkiezingstijden, staan deels in voor de verkiezingscampagne en geven mee vorm aan de programmapunten van hun partij. Het loont dus wel degelijk de moeite om na te gaan wat er bij hen leeft

Personalization refers to a shift over time in attention and/or power from collective actors to individuals. I focus on personalization in voting behavior, measured by the use of preference voting in flexible list-PR systems. I will argue that in a multi-level context this kind of personalization can take place at different policy levels, which could influence each other. In local elections, voters can be attracted by the mayor and/or other local figureheads, but also by the national party leader and/or national politicians figuring on the local list. Therefore, scholars should not only focus on the number and importance of people to which personalization applies ('person level' of personalization), but also on how processes at one policy level impact on other policy levels ('territorial level' of personalization). By combining literature on intra-party competition and personalization on the one hand, and on electoral patterns in multi-level states on the other, I engage in a conceptual discussion about the nature of personalization. I add empirical evidence to this conceptual discussion by analyzing preference voting patterns in local elections in Flanders (Belgium). As such, we gain more insights in the remarkable decline of preference voting that took place there.

As a reaction to the erosion of political parties, citizens increasingly engage in participation independently from parties (such as boycotts, petitions and street demonstrations). Looking beyond the often-stated contradiction between party membership and these forms of non-institutionalized participation, we tried to determine whether party members participate in non-institutionalized participation as a complement or an alternative to their party membership activities. Based on the relative deprivation and civic voluntarism model, three party variables were selected: activity rate in the party, government status and ideological orientation of the party. The results of our analysis conducted on party members in 22 European countries show that the government status and the ideological position of a party have the largest effects on the propensity to participate in direct action. Activity rate does not have a significant effect, except a positive one for street demonstrations. In sum, direct action is not an alternative for dissatisfied party members, but rather a complement.

The organization of primaries in which all party members can participate is increasingly used by political parties to select their leader. We focus here on one of the consequences of these procedures – participation rates. Based on general participation theories (mobilization theory, instrumental motivation theory and learning theory) in combination with insights into the introduction and functioning of leadership primaries, we expect that the first time a party organizes leadership primaries, participation rates will be high, but that they will decline gradually afterwards. We have focused on direct member votes for the selection of party leaders in Belgium, Israel and Canada. Our results show that participation rates are not influenced by how many times such a contest is held in a party (only first-time participation tends to be higher), but mainly by how competitive the contest is.

Political parties are increasingly adopting more inclusive procedures to select their party leader, most notably by introducing party primaries. This article tries to detect motives and decision makers for this introduction in Belgian parties. The literature on Westminster-style parties contends that party elites only reluctantly transfer more power from the parliamentary party group (PPG) to party members. They do so only when finding themselves in a weak position: after electoral defeat, when in opposition, when other parties are doing so or when the party is new. The situation in Belgium is different, as is demonstrated with quantitative and qualitative data. Mostly, the party elite was keen on introducing party primaries and took the initiative itself to carry them through. The mechanism at work, however, is the same as in Westminster parties: avoiding too much power for middle-level elites. Because of the different starting position (party delegates selecting the leader), the decision-making process looks completely different. We also argue that the results from Belgian parties might apply to consensus democracies in general. Adapted from the source document.

Political parties are increasingly adopting more inclusive procedures to select their party leader, most notably by introducing party primaries. This article tries to detect motives and decision makers for this introduction in Belgian parties. The literature on Westminster-style parties contends that party elites only reluctantly transfer more power from the parliamentary party group (PPG) to party members. They do so only when finding themselves in a weak position: after electoral defeat, when in opposition, when other parties are doing so or when the party is new. The situation in Belgium is different, as is demonstrated with quantitative and qualitative data. Mostly, the party elite was keen on introducing party primaries and took the initiative itself to carry them through. The mechanism at work, however, is the same as in Westminster parties: avoiding too much power for middle-level elites. Because of the different starting position (party delegates selecting the leader), the decision-making process looks completely different. We also argue that the results from Belgian parties might apply to consensus democracies in general.

This article focuses on the participation of party members in intra-party elections and on explanations for this behaviour. The number of intra-party elections is increasing, but their study remains an under-researched phenomenon in contemporary Party Politics. I test whether participation theories applicable to participation in society also obtain in intra-party elections. The theories tested are: instrumental motivation theory, mobilization theory, resource theory and participation as habit. My analysis on the individual level focuses on two particular internal elections in Belgian parties (VLD and VU) that differ in type and in the membership and ideology of the parties organizing these elections. The results largely confirm the instrumental motivation theory and participation as habit. Neither the mobilization theory nor the resource theory are supported. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

This article focuses on the participation of party members in intra-party elections and on explanations for this behaviour. The number of intra-party elections is increasing, but their study remains an under-researched phenomenon in contemporary party politics. I test whether participation theories applicable to participation in society also obtain in intra-party elections. The theories tested are: instrumental motivation theory, mobilization theory, resource theory and participation as habit. My analysis on the individual level focuses on two particular internal elections in Belgian parties (VLD and VU) that differ in type and in the membership and ideology of the parties organizing these elections. The results largely confirm the instrumental motivation theory and participation as habit. Neither the mobilization theory nor the resource theory are supported.