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AbstractA central puzzle in federalism research is that federal arrangements have been associated with a variety of policy effects, ranging from emulation of policy innovations among sub-national units to policy variation based on preferences of state or provincial voters and elites to a competitive "race to the bottom." This article outlines twelve federalism policy dynamics discussed in the literature and provides an analytical framework for understanding when specific policy dynamics are likely to emerge, in either a strong or muted form. Shifts in four sets of facilitating and limiting conditions shape specific federalism policy dynamics and their emergence, consolidation, or weakening over time.

AbstractAutomatic stabilizing mechanisms (ASMs) in pension systems change the policy default so that benefits or contributions adjust automatically to adverse demographic and economic conditions without direct intervention by politicians. This is politically attractive to politicians because it facilitates blame avoiding. But it only works if politicians can refrain from ad hoc interventions when an ASM is triggered. Evidence from Canada, Sweden and Germany suggests a mixed record about their sustainability. Politicians may seek to evade or manipulate the trigger mechanism to avoid blame. A cartel of major parties that insulates pension policy‐making from electoral competition can help to sustain ASMs.

AbstractMany government policies attempt to change the behavior of individuals and businesses. This article argues that policy makers and administrators should (1) think comprehensively about the barriers that may keep target populations from complying with government policies, (2) match policy instruments to the most important barriers that inhibit compliance, and (3) take into account heterogeneity within the target population. Relatively nonintrusive strategies such as social marketing, providing resources to targets to help them comply, and manipulating options and defaults (choice architecture) are politically attractive but unlikely to secure compliance when incentives for noncompliance are high. Based on the three basic principles outlined in the article, the author recommends strategies to increase compliance, including the use of leverage points and secondary targets, adjusting for unanticipated behavioral responses, and employing long‐term, multiphase strategic management of behavior change initiatives.

Existing research on compliance failures by individuals and businesses focuses primarily on information and incentive problems. This article develops a comprehensive framework for analyzing barriers to compliance, giving particular attention to resource and autonomy barriers, heterogeneity of the target population, multiple barriers to compliance, and problems that arise when a complex and ongoing set of actions is require to be 'in compliance.' How governments react to compliance failures is heavily influenced by the social construction and political power of target populations. The propositions developed in the article are tested against the cases of the Swedish individual account pension system and welfare reform in the United States. Adapted from the source document.

Existing research on compliance failures by individuals and businesses focuses primarily on information and incentive problems. This article develops a comprehensive framework for analyzing barriers to compliance, giving particular attention to resource and autonomy barriers, heterogeneity of the target population, multiple barriers to compliance, and problems that arise when a complex and ongoing set of actions is require to be "in compliance." How governments react to compliance failures is heavily influenced by the social construction and political power of target populations. The propositions developed in the article are tested against the cases of theSwedish individual account pension system and welfare reform in theUnitedStates.

AbstractThe literature on path dependence has emphasized positive feedback effects that make it difficult to shift from a policy regime once it is in place. This article argues that policy regimes may also have strong negative feedback effects that undermine the political, fiscal or social sustainability of an existing policy regime. The prospects for a shift in policy regime depend largely on the balance between positive and negative feedback effects; the availability of incremental reform options that can be used to patch the status quo; and the availability of politically and fiscally attractive regime transition options. The paper argues that differential survival rates of different public pension regimes in western industrial countries can be understood by the interaction of these three factors.