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In 2004 the economy of Cambodia was still regarded as being a big loser, at least in the eyes of foreigners; three years later however it is praised, on the contrary, as a kind of go-getter. Main reasons for this fundamental change of view were the turning of Cambodia into a (nearly) free market economy in general & the contribution of quite a few economic sectors (like textile industry, tourism, agriculture & extraction economy) in particular. Even a skeptical institution like the IMF has become optimistic in the meantime & predicts a GNP-growth of 9% until the end of 2007. What is it about? A lasting upswing or just a sham boom? In favor of Cambodia there is the persistence of strong increases since 2003, is a low inflation, a stable exchange rate & the rather realistic expectation that the kingdom can turn into a petroleum-exporting country until 2009/10. On the other side, Cambodia suffers from infrastructural bottlenecks & from depressing social loads: 35% of the population continue living below the official poverty line. Adapted from the source document.

At first sight, 2006 was one of the better years within the history of the new kingdom of Cambodia, which began in 1993. The three leading political parties became to some extent reconciled. Economic growth remained high and the country witnessed the biggest bumper rice harvest in its history. The end of much misery and famine was, however, the beginning of a lot of self-delusion.

Die beiden Großstaaten China und Indien haben sich in erstaunlich kurzer Zeit zu neuen Antriebskräften der Weltwirtschaft entwickelt. Beide Länder haben sich von ihrem "autozentristischen" Kurs in der Politik abgewandt und wachsen seit ihrem "großen Sprung" in die Marktwirtschaft und in die Globalisierung mit einem rekordverdächtigen Tempo von jährlich sechs bis acht Prozent des nominellen Bruttoinlandsprodukts. Zudem sind sie auch längst aus traditionellen agrarischen Strukturen ausgebrochen. Beide Volkswirtschaften stellen somit ernsthafte Konkurrenten zu den europäischen Ländern und zu den USA dar. Sind sie aber in der Lage, den Westen in überschaubarer Zeit - bis etwa zur Jahrtausendmitte - zu überflügeln und damit den Prozess der Globalisierung zu "entwestlichen"? Der Autor zeigt in seiner Erörterung dieser Frage, dass China und Indien einen zumindest dreifachen Vorsprung im wirtschaftlichen Wettbewerb erreichen müssen, um eine Globalisierung "mit asiatischem Gesicht" herbeizuführen: mehr Synergie, qualitative Überlegenheit und quantitatives Übergewicht. Diesen Zielen steht jedoch eine Reihe von Hindernissen im Wege, die Autor in seinem Kommentar kurz skizziert. (ICI2)

It took the Vietnamese reformers only five years to realize that quick development of their country's
economy could be pushed forward not only by work and capital, but also by utilizing the factor
space. Capitalizing on the experiences of several maritime Southeast Asian countries with "Growth
Triangles" as well as of "Silicon Valley Industrial Park", of Taiwan and of China with their "Special
Economic Zones", Vietnam decided in 1991 to establish its first "Special Economic Zone" (SEZ)
in Tan Thuan/Saigon. During the following fifteen years three so-called "Key Economic Areas"
and 140 "Industrial Zones", "Export Processing Zones" and other units with similar names have
been created.
The SEZ have proven to be cornucopias on the one hand, because they helped to accelerate
the transfer of capital, technology and management to Vietnam and provided almost 1 million jobs.
Furthermore they served as catalysts for the industrialization and urbanization of some areas and
served, moreover, as models of dealing with the complexities of modernization. On the other side,
the SEZ are extremely unequally distributed over the country, and therefore tend to reinforce the
social and regional differences within Vietnam. Moreover, foreign companies to be invested in
the SEZ frequently have to lead a Robinson Crusoe existence and are therefore rather insulated
from the domestic economy. Last but not least however, the Vietnamese legislation, facing the SEZ
proves frequently to be a toothless tiger.

Becoming member of theWorld Trade Organisation was the decisive follow-up of Vietnam's reform
resolutions taken in 1986. Nevertheless the process of acceding the "club" was not a walkover but
took the SRV not less than two decades, marked by seven steps: The doi-moi-resolution (1986),
the normalization of her relationship with the international financial organisations (1993), the
formal applying for membership to the WTO (1995), the membership of the ASEAN (1995), of
the ASEM (1996) and of the APEC (1998), and the accession to the WTO (2006/07). Having
achieved this final destination, Vietnam's expectations continue to be strangely mixed. On the one
hand there are at least three great opportunities for the country: to join the global trade market, to
absorb capital, know-how and management, and to improve its status in the international economy
and politics.
On the other hand Vietnam has to meet several challenges coming up in different realms: The
SRV is partially afraid of becoming confronted with a disintegration of its economy: Whereas the
strong secondary sector is supposed to continue to grow, the service industry and particularly the
agriculture may decline at the same time. Functionally there is much concern about efficiency
and competitiveness of the economy in general and about the qualification of workers and the
flexibility of the state owned enterprises in particular. Last not least there remains a conceptional
problem to be settled which could trouble the political leadership. The more the Vietnamese
enterprises are sticking to WTO-rules, the more the authoritarian tutelage of the CPV-leadership
is becoming undermin

There are many parallels between Germany and Vietnam, if it is with the number of inhabitants,
with the size of territory or it is with the war trauma. In spite of these similarities which could
evoke spontaneous interest if not sympathies for each other, it was the division of both of their
countries which prevented them from becoming good fellows earlier. Since both countries were
reunited however, the rapprochement became easier, though many more hurdles had to be taken,
particularly during the entire phase of the nineties. Politically only two issues still make some
trouble: the human rights situation in Vietnam and the policy of repatriation of thousands of
Vietnamese still living illegally in Germany. Economically things are running smoothly. Germany
is handling 30% of the Vietnamese trade with EU. Culturally the Vietnam visit of the German
Bundespräsident in May 2007 has done a lot. According to the contract concluded in Hanoi a
GVU (German-Vietnamese University) will be established in order to promote sustainability in the
relationship between both countries.

In 2004 the economy of Cambodia was still regarded as being a big loser, at least in the eyes of
foreigners; three years later however it is praised, on the contrary, as a kind of go-getter.
Main reasons for this fundamental change of view were the turning of Cambodia into a (nearly)
free market economy in general and the contribution of quite a few economic sectors (like textile
industry, tourism, agriculture and extraction economy) in particular. Even a sceptical institution
like the IMF has become optimistic in the meantime and predicts a GNP-growth of 9% until the
end of 2007.
What is it about? A lasting upswing or just a sham boom? In favour of Cambodia there is the
persistence of strong increases since 2003, is a low inflation, a stable exchange rate and the rather
realistic expectation that the kingdom can turn into a petroleum-exporting country until 2009/10.
On the other side, Cambodia suffers from infrastructural bottlenecks and from depressing social
loads: 35% of the population continue living below the official poverty line.