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Rules of customary law figure prominently in today's law and policy. Across policy fields, courts and policy-makers are called to interpret and apply customary law. However, it is still a bit of a mystery how rules of customary law emerge and how they can be identified in the first place. In this paper, I set out why the mystery of customary law is bound to remain unresolved. Customary law cannot be treated as a body of rules 'out there', ready for application by domestic, regional or global authorities. Instead, it is part of a process of global cooperation where rules of customary law emerge and grow because they are restated. Rules of customary law only exist if they are successfully presented as already there.

Security Council resolutions seldom only appear only once. More often than not, they are recalled, reiterated, recognised, re-emphasised or reaffirmed in subsequent resolutions. In this article, I study some of the effects of such acts of repetition. Based on an analysis of acts of repetition in films and novels, I argue that acts of repetition are related to (a) the problem of origins, (b) the problem of authorship/authority and (c) the problem of continuity and change. Through acts of repetition, resolutions can claim that they had already begun before they were enacted, that there was something "before the beginning". Moreover, acts of repetition help securing the continuity of the author (authority) of resolutions. Finally, acts of repetition make it possible to confirm and at the same time adapt earlier statements or rules of law.

This article focuses on two conceptual puzzles that arise out of Kratochwil's concept of law. The first is the dual meaning of the questions 'what is the law' and 'what is society'? I will argue that a sociological approach to these questions is unable to do justice to the specific position of the legal practitioner, for whom then these questions are first and foremost normative ones with possible far-reaching implications. The second is the relation between the validity and the binding force of law. In line with institutional approaches to law, I argue that legal language cannot be reduced to one form of linguistic practice, the production of binding decisions and norms of conduct. I will show how a broader conception of law as a form of linguistic activity opens up new research agendas in (international) law.

Examines how international law is portrayed in sociological analyses, sociology's impact on the study of international law; & the kind of topics available for multidisciplinary cooperation between international political sociology & international law. Three international political sociology papers focused on law are used to address these issues. References. D. Edelman

Acts of repetition abound in international law. Security Council Resolutions typically start by recalling, recollecting, recognising or reaffirming previous resolutions. Expert committees present restatements of international law. Students and staff extensively rehearse fictitious cases in presentations for moot court competitions. Customary law exists by virtue of repeated behaviour and restatements about the existence of rules. When sources of international law are deployed, historically contingent events are turned into manifestations of pre-given and repeatable categories. This book studies the workings of repetition across six discourses and practices in international law. It links acts of repetition to similar practices in religion, theatre, film and commerce. Building on the dialectics of repetition as set out by Søren Kierkegaard, it examines how repetition in international law is used to connect concrete practices to something that is bound to remain absent, unspeakable or unimaginable

The past few decades have witnessed a renewed interest in the work of Carl Schmitt. Scholars from various disciplines have claimed that Schmitt's critique of universalism, together with his analysis of irregular warfare, provides useful lenses to make sense of the post 9/11 world. In this article, I will critically assess whether Schmitt's work is indeed useful for understanding the post 9/11 world. To that end, I will concentrate on one of the core arguments put forward by Schmitt: that the laws of armed conflict are unable to regulate irregular warfare, including acts of terrorism. In order to determine the validity of Schmitt's arguments, I will focus on one of the instruments used in contemporary counter-terrorism policies: the deliberate killing of specific individuals who are regarded as a security threat ('targeted killing'). Based on an analysis of US and Israeli practice, the article argues that using Schmitt's work as an analytical tool yields mixed results. While his analysis of irregular warfare remains relevant for contemporary conflicts, his denouncement of universalism blinds us to the transformational potential of international law.