Search results

Abstract
Post-communist states of East Central Europe face the authoritarian challenge to their young democracies, the sources of which are both historical and contemporary. Economic underdevelopment, the retarded process of nation-building and several decades of communist rul made countries of the region less well prepared for democratic transformation than their Western neighbors, but better than former Soviet Union. Combination of economic and social tensions, nationalism and religious fundamentalism creates conditions conducive tom the crises of democracy, but such crises can be overcome if liberal and socialist forces join hands.

The Russian revolution of 1917 was one of the turning points in world history, even if its radical (communist) stage proved to be a historical blind street. There was just one revolution – not two, as it had been interpreted by the Soviet historiography. The uniqueness of the Russian revolution results from the fact that the radical seizure of power in November 1917 turned to be the beginning of a long process of totalitarian dictatorship, which lasted for mor than seventy years. Today, it is the heritage of the victory in the Second World War that constitutes the founding myth of modern Russian state.

Political scientists discussed the role of the smaller states in several studies published in the 1960s and 70s. They focused on policy choices a small power faced when joining multinational alliances and within them. Recently, attention has focused on how many a small powers can influence political developments both within the alliances they belong to and outside them. Poland's involvement in the negotiated solution of the Ukrainian political crisis of 2004 shows that a smaller power can use its assets to influence events. When the political scene in Ukraine polarized between two camps (respectively represented by Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych and the opposition leader Victor Yushchenko) Russia tried to influence the outcome by giving support to Yanukovych. The United States and the European Union remained neutral in the crisis, mostly due to their unwillingness to damage their relations with Russia. When the run-off election had been rigged and Yushchenko's supporters began street protests, Polish public opinion solidly sided with the Ukrainian opposition. Poland's President Aleksander Kwasniewski, in a series of visits to Kiev, helped both sides of the Ukrainian crisis to reach a negotiated compromise. The run-off results were declared void by the Supreme Court and in the repeated vote Yushchenko won the presidency. Poland was able to help her neighbour to chose a democratic solution to the crisis and continues to support Ukraine's efforts to join the European Union. In the long run such policy serves Poland's interests but its immediate consequence has been a deterioration in Polish-Russian relations.

Do leaders make a differenceΠDo they actually leadΠThere is a rich body of theoretical literature in which one can find many different responses.1 The question can be dealt with on the level of the philosophy of history as well as on the basis of empirical political sociology. The present paper takes the second road. Using data from the behavioral research conducted in Poland since 1966,1 particularly from the four studies conducted since the beginning of democratic reforms, I shall try to illustrate the importance of reformist leadership in Poland's local politics.

The author thinks that the consensus that used to exist in Poland regarding its membership in the European Union (EU) no longer exists after the parliamentary elections in Sept 2001. Two anti-European parties entered the parliament: the radical-populist Self-defense & the League of Polish Families, representing the fundamentalist Catholic Right. The author claims that the opponents of the Polish integration into the EU are too weak in the parliament to stop this process. Though Poland enjoys the support of the states such as Germany, France, & GB the outcome of the Polish referendum on joining the EU, scheduled for the end of 2003, is far from certain. The reason for this is an intensified political campaign of the parliamentary parties opposed to Poland's EU membership & the unfavorable economic situation. The author concludes that the success of the referendum to a large extent depends on the efficiency of the government's economic policy in the first two years of its term. 3 References. Adapted from the source document.