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"The Economics of Scientific Misconduct explores episodes of misconduct in the natural and biomedical sciences and replication failure in economics and psychology over the past half century. Here scientific misconduct is considered from the perspective of a single discipline such as economics likely for the first time in intellectual history. Research misconduct has become an important concern across many natural, medical, and social sciences, including economics, over the past half century. Initially, a mainstream economic approach to science and scientific misconduct is taken drawn on conventional microeconomics and the theories of Becker, Ehrlich, and C. S. Peirce's "economy of research." Then the works of Peirce and Thorstein Veblen from the 19th century point toward contemporary debates over statistical inference in econometrics and the failure of recent macroeconomic models. In more contemporary economics, clashes regarding discrimination and harassment have led to a Code of Professional Conduct from the American Economic Association and a Code of Ethics from one of its members. The last chapter considers research ethics matters related to the Covid 19 Pandemic. There has been an explosion of research and some retractions. More generally, a concern with research ethics contributes to scientific progress by making some of its most difficult problems more transparent and understandable and thus possibly more surmountable. This book offers valuable insights for students and scholars of research ethics across the sciences, philosophy of science and social science, and economic theory"--

Science is difficult and costly to do well. This study systematically creates an economics of science. Many aspects of science are explored from an economic point of view. The scientist is treated as an economically rational individual. This book begins with economic models of misconduct in science and the legitimate, normal practices of science, moving on to market failure, the market place of ideas, self-correctiveness, and the organizational and institutional structures of science. An exploration of broader methodological themes raised by an economics of science ends the work

More than a century ago, one of the most famous essays ever written in American economics appeared in the Quarterly Journal of Economics: "Why is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?" There, Thorstein Veblen claimed that economics was too dominated by a mechanistic view to address the problems of economic life. Since the world and the economy had come to be viewed from an evolutionary perspective after Charles Darwin, it was rather straightforward to argue that the increasingly abstract mathematical character of economics was non-evolutionary. However, Veblen had studied with a first-rate intellect, Charles Sanders Peirce, attending his elementary logic class. If Peirce had written about the future of economics in 1898, it would have been very different than Veblen's essay. Peirce could have written that economics should become an evolutionary mathematical science and that much of classical and neoclassical economics could be interpreted from an evolutionary perspective.

Among the various institutional structures of an economy like the firm and the marketplace is one that is like no other. Science is unique. This uniqueness raises an important question: why does science exist? From an economic perspective, there are two potentially meaningful approaches to the existence of science. They both encompass institutional pluralism. A substitutes theory of comparative institutions presupposes the primacy of the commercial marketplace over firms—that firms substitute for the market when markets fail. This theory has not been used to explain the existence of science. A complements theory postulates that many simultaneous institutional responses, including science, are necessary for creating an efficient and equitable economy. The economic function of science is to produce fundamental theoretical abstractions about our world. Scientific theories are public goods that would not likely be produced within the governance structures of commercial markets and firms. The aim is to complement but not supplant traditional philosophical answers that science exists to discover truth and knowledge.

In recent years, there have been multiple instances of misconduct in science, yet no coherent framework exists for characterizing this phenomenon. The thesis of this article is that economic analysis can provide such a framework. Economic analysis leads to two categories of misconduct: replication failure and fraud. Replication failure can be understood as the scientist making optimal use of time in a professional environment where innovation is emphasized rather than replication. Fraud can be depicted as a deliberate gamble under conditions of uncertainty: The scientist takes advantage of the complexity of science and undermines the integrity of science for personal gain or advancement.