Search results

Argues that, in spite of many close affinities, there are significant tensions between arguments for group representation & defenses of deliberative democracy. It is contended that defenders of deliberate democracy have not sufficiently considered the challenges social differences present to a deliberative conception of legitimacy. Contestations related to gender, race, ethnicity, class, or sexuality have the potential of undermining "notions of reasonableness upon which deliberative theory depends for its conception of legitimacy." The place of impartiality in various theories of deliberative democracy is explored, along with the contributions of marginalized group perspectives to democratic deliberation. Recent feminist critiques of deliberative democracy are extended to consider challenges to deliberative theory posed by a standard of reasonableness & social/political circumstances under which marginalized group perspectives are likely to influence the opinions of others. The implications are discussed in relation to general notions of the virtues/responsibilities of citizenship. A debate in the US Senate about the Confederate flag is highlighted to illustrate the uncertainty of reason-giving in public discourse. 1 Appendix. J. Lindroth

THE RECENT LITERATURE ON EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE EVINCES TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE TASK OF DEFINING JUSTICE IN A MANNER THAT IS RESPONSIVE TO SOCIAL DIFFERENCE. THE FIRST, THE JURIDICAL MODEL OF JUSTICE TOWARD GROUPS, ACCEPTS THE IDEA OF LIBERAL IMPARTIALITY. ON THE BASIS OF THAT IDEAL, THE JURIDICAL MODEL BEGINS WITH THE PREMISE THAT JUSTICE SHOULD BE DEFINED THROUGH A PROCESS OF REASONING THAT IS SHIELDED FROM THE TUG AND PULL OF PARTICULARIST POLITICAL INTERESTS. IN CONTRAST, THE POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENCE REJECTS THE NOTION THAT JUSTICE CAN BE DEFINED PRIOR TO POLITICS. INSTEAD, ITS ADVOCATES MAINTAIN THAT STANDARDS OFJUSTICE CAN ONLY AVOID REPRODUCING INEQUALITY IF THEY ARE DEFINED WITHIN A POLITICAL PROCESS THAT PROVIDES THE OPPORTUNITY FOR MARGINALIZED GROUPS' PERSPECTIVES TO BE EXPRESSED AND HEEDED. IN THIS ESSAY, THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT THE POLITICAL APPROACH TO DEFINING JUSTICE TOWARD GROUPS NOT ONLY HAS IMPORTANT ADVANTAGES OVER, BUT IS ACTUALLY IMPLICIT (ALTHOUGH UNDEVELOPED), IN THE JURIDICAL APPROACH. THE CLASH BETWEEN THE TWO APPROACHES TO RECONCILING EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE BRINGS TO LIGHT A PROFOUND NEED TO RECONCEIVE THE ASPIRATION TO IMPARTIAL JUSTICE AND, IN THE PROCESS, TO RECONSIDER THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL SPHERES WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES.