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Northeast Asian steel industries have developed global production networks, but by spanning multiple national spaces, these networks unite many national economies while belonging exclusively to none. Who, therefore, is in control? Jeffrey D. Wilson examines how states and firms coordinate their activities to govern global production

In recent years, efforts to institutionalise resource security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region have intensified. Soaring world prices for minerals and energy have seen a range of resource security strategies launched-through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Plus Three, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the East Asia Summit-all of which aim to promote intergovernmental dialogue, policy coordination and the integration of regional resource markets. However, the practical achievements of these regional efforts have been limited, as none have advanced beyond dialogue activities to more formalised types of resource security cooperation. This article examines the dynamics of these abortive attempts to regionalise resource cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, arguing that economic nationalist resource policy preferences held by governments have acted as a major obstacle to cooperation. Through an analysis of national resource policy regimes and the outputs of recent cooperative efforts, it demonstrates how economic nationalism has encouraged inward-looking and sovereignty-conscious actions on the part of major resource players in the Asia-Pacific. As a result, intergovernmental resource cooperation has been limited to informal and voluntary 'soft-law' initiatives, which have not made a substantive contribution to the resource security of economies in the region. Adapted from the source document.

Surging world energy prices, increasing oil market volatility and a nascent 'energy transition' are posing major challenges for global energy governance. In response, there has been a proliferation in the number of multilateral bodies addressing energy issues in recent years, and a wide range of organisations now claim a role in facilitating intergovernmental energy cooperation. However, the practical achievements of these organisations have been very poor, with all suffering difficulties that have limited their ability to promote shared energy interests between states. This article examines the dynamics of multilateral energy organisations, arguing that the political economy features of energy - securitisation and attendant patterns of economic nationalism - explain why they have failed to develop more robust cooperative mechanisms. Ten global-level organisations are evaluated and found to suffer from membership, design or commitment issues that limit their effectiveness in global energy governance. These challenges are linked to the securitisation of energy, which has led governments to favour low-cost soft-law approaches over potentially more effective hard-law institutional designs. Moreover, the securitisation of energy poses limits for how far multilateral energy cooperation can proceed and means that contemporary efforts to strengthen these organisations are unlikely to succeed in coming years. Adapted from the source document.

RARE earth minerals (REMs) – a hitherto poorly known set of minerals – have recently stormed onto world headlines. Described by some analysts as the "next oil" in global geopolitics, rare earths have become a major new concern for global resource security due to increasingly restrictive supply policies. Rare earth prices have surged as a result, and the governments of major consuming states, such as Japan, South Korea, the European Union, and the US, have begun efforts to develop new, more secure sources of rare earths supply.