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On the fundamental distribution of power between states and nation, the record of the Rehnquist Court is mixed. While it has supported state prerogatives in selected areas such as criminal justice, the Court is much less sympathetic in threshold questions of federalism. Using the Commerce Clause, especially in its dormant or negative form, the Court continues to promote federal preemptive efforts. The strength of the ruling in Garcia intensifies almost by default as the Court fails to inquire systematically into the foundational principles of contemporary federalism. The protection of state interests remains in the national political process, not in the judiciary.

Distribution of power between national and subnational judiciaries is a significant yet often overlooked dimension of American federalism. Jurisdictional overlap between state and federal courts has long generated adminis trative and political tensions that strike at the heart of inter governmental viability. Acute questions of intersystem equi librium arise in the consideration of judicial federalism. The dual court configuration materially affects litigant behavior, judicial policy making, and court administration. Intersystem reconciliation assumes greater importance in light of modern demands of spiraling litigation. This article seeks to raise some of the myriad issues of judicial federalism.

Objective. The goal of the study is to empirically assess the extent of partisan and incumbent gerrymandering in the 2000 congressional redistricting. Critics of congressional redistricting have argued that recent partisan gerrymandering severely undermines electoral competitiveness to the point of violating constitutional equal protection standards.Method. We first analyze the legal precedents and arguments central to the contemporary redistricting debate. We then analyze district‐level data measuring the change in a congressional incumbent's presidential party vote share before and after the 2000 redistricting. We conduct regression analyses that test for partisan and incumbent gerrymandering effects with an eye toward noting implications for the Voting Rights Act, particularly majority‐minority districting.Results. We find that recent redistricting significantly contributed to a further decline in electoral competitiveness; however, most of this decline in competitiveness came through incumbency protection, not partisan gerrymandering. Majority‐minority districts lost about 5 percent incumbent party vote share, though only 3 percent in southern states.Conclusion. Given these results, we conclude that the logic of partisan gerrymandering is at variance with the mandate of racial redistricting. One effect of establishing a strict judicial standard limiting statewide partisan biases would be to restrict states' capacity to draw majority‐minority districts.

Objective. Recent studies of the impact of black elite electoral success on the system‐supporting attitudes of black citizens have yielded mixed, but generally unimpressive, empirical results. We extend this limited research by examining the effects of the presence of black judicial officials on public attitudes toward a state judicial system.Methods. We employ data from a telephone survey of citizens in Mississippi and develop multivariate models to test for the effects of black judges on citizens' evaluations of the fairness of judges, equity in sentences, and overall impartiality of the state judicial system.Results. We find no systematic evidence that the election of black judicial officials ameliorates the suspicions of the black public regarding the fairness of the state courts.Conclusions. Our findings are in line with other recent studies on the limited effects of black elite electoral success on the attitudes of the black public and generally support a "political reality" model of political trust rather than an "empowerment model."

Objective. Recent studies of the impact of black elite electoral success on the system-supporting attitudes of black citizens have yielded mixed, but generally unimpressive, empirical results. We extend this limited research by examining the effects of the presence of black judicial officials on public attitudes toward a state judicial system. Methods. We employ data from a telephone survey of citizens in Mississippi & develop multivariate models to test for the effects of black judges on citizens' evaluations of the fairness of judges, equity in sentences, & overall impartiality of the state judicial system. Results. We find no systematic evidence that the election of black judicial officials ameliorates the suspicions of the black public regarding the fairness of the state courts. Conclusions. Our findings are in line with other recent studies on the limited effects of black elite electoral success on the attitudes of the black public & generally support a "political reality" model of political trust rather than an "empowerment model.". 2 Tables, 43 References. Adapted from the source document.