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ObjectiveOne explanation for why voters' preferences are privileged by policymakers is that voters are likely to communicate their preferences through additional avenues as well. We examine this "communication hypothesis" by comparing the policy preferences of different types of political participators.MethodsWe analyze the National Annenberg Election Survey (2008) using latent class analysis to identify different types of political participators and multinomial logistic regression to compare the policy preferences of these participator types.ResultsVoters who also engage in additional online and/or offline political acts have policy preferences that differ in a number of meaningful ways from those who "only" vote.ConclusionThe findings indicate that prior research has overlooked important evidence on the connection between citizen participation and political outcomes due to a primary focus on the act of voting. This study suggests how future research can assess the impact of citizens' broader patterns of political participation.

In 2000, 2004, and 2008 the Annenberg Public Policy Center (APPC) utilized the rolling cross‐section National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) to analyze changes in self‐identified party affiliation across the course of the campaigns. Using APPC's Institutions of Democracy 2012 Political Knowledge 6‐wave telephone survey, conducted during the final two months of the campaign and immediately following the election, we compared shifts in party affiliation to comparable periods in those prior three elections. The analysis of the relatively shortened periods, examined as cross‐sections, show a more fixed affiliation. Nonetheless, there is variability from election to election especially among self‐identified Independents.

To examine the effects of the 2008 Obama campaign's targeted media effort aimed at Latino voters, we married 2008 campaign media data from multiple sources to survey data on registered Latino voters in Nevada and Arizona to examine the specific impact of advertisement buys on that population. In the presence of controls, Obama's media spending advantage over McCain had a significant and positive relationship with an Obama vote. When looking at local broadcast, cable and radio specifically, we find a significant relationship between spending differentials on local broadcast advertising and vote intention but not between spending differentials on radio and cable buys.

AbstractFor those at risk for Zika virus infection, prevention requires an approach that includes individual, interpersonal, and community‐level support for behavior change. In August 2016, the announcement of local Zika transmission in Florida provided an opportunity to determine whether Zika‐related knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors might be affected differentially in Florida compared to the rest of the nation. From August 8–October 3, 2016, we conducted nationally representative weekly surveys (N = 12,236), oversampling Florida residents, measuring Zika virus news exposure, knowledge about transmission and prevention of the infection, and attitudes and behaviors toward prevention. We tested two classes of models: those focused on individual Zika risk perceptions (e.g., protection motivation theory) and one focused on community action beyond those directly at risk (social consensus model). Analyses assessed differences between Florida and the rest of the nation by survey week. Consistent with both models, Floridians demonstrated significantly higher levels of perceived susceptibility and knowledge, more positive attitudes toward Zika virus prevention, and higher likelihood of engaging in protective behavior than non‐Floridians. Consistent with theories of individual risk perception, response was greater among respondents who saw themselves at risk of infection. However, consistent with the SCM, irrespective of personal risk, response was greater among Floridians. Nevertheless, more than half of the public took no direct action to prevent the spread of Zika. Communities at increased risk for a novel infection such as Zika may quickly acquire Zika‐related knowledge, attitudes, and behavior, but large‐scale community‐wide response might be difficult without further community‐level public education.

In this article, we profile the advertising activities and deception levels of the top 2012 spending independent expenditure groups that focused on the presidential contest. From December 1, 2011, through Election Day, November 6, 2012, independent expenditure groups spent more than $360 million on presidential television advertising, according to Kantar Media CMAG. More than a fifth of the dollars spent by the top groups purchased ads containing at least one claim judged as misleading by independent fact checkers. The proportion of dollars that these groups spent on ads containing at least one deception was much greater during the primaries than afterward. During the primaries, the pro-Romney super PAC "Restore Our Future" led the pack both in dollars spent on ads containing at least one deception and in the proportion of its ads found deceptive by the fact checkers. During the general election, in the post-primary period, the pro-Obama super PAC "Priorities USA Action" devoted the most dollars and greatest proportion of its total dollars to ads in which fact checkers found at least one deceptive claim. During some but not all of the 2012 election year, the percentage of third party ads containing at least one deceptive claim was higher among those groups not required to disclose their donors than it was among those required to do so.

Decades of research have confirmed that debates increase viewer knowledge about the issue stands of the candidates. However, the conditions under which viewers learn are less well understood. In this article, we examine how differences in the context of information in presidential debates affect both who learns from such debates and what they learn. Consistent with previous literature, we report that watching the debates increased knowledge of campaign issues and related matters discussed in the debates. We also found that knowledge based on accurate information that was uncontested in the debate was gained at a greater rate than knowledge based on information that was presented by one candidate but contested by the other. And consistent with confirmation bias, learning based on information that was contested in the debate was influenced by viewers' candidate preferences more often than not.

The new media environment raises two questions: Will campaign deceptions have traveled around the web before journalism has the fact-checking in place to ensnare them? And if diligent checking of claims does exist, will it fall on an audience too enmeshed in its own biases to see past them? This essay draws on evidence from the Annenberg Public Policy Center's 2012 Institutions of Democracy Political Knowledge Survey to argue that long-form political fact-checking can increase the accuracy of voters' perceptions of both candidate stands on issues and the background facts of the presidential race.

In May 2016, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) released the report "Genetically Engineered Crops: Experiences and Prospects," summarizing scientific consensus on genetically engineered crops and their implications. NASEM reports aim to give the public and policymakers information on socially relevant science issues. Their impact, however, is not well understood. This analysis combines national pre- and post-report survey data with a large-scale content analysis of Twitter discussion to examine the report's effect on public perceptions of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). We find that the report's release corresponded with reduced negativity in Twitter discourse and increased ambivalence in public risk and benefit perceptions of GMOs, mirroring the NASEM report's conclusions. Surprisingly, this change was most likely for individuals least trusting of scientific studies or university scientists. Our findings indicate that NASEM consensus reports can help shape public discourse, even in, or perhaps because of, the complex information landscape of traditional and social media.

Political interest is a key predictor of likelihood to vote. We argue that the political interest–vote intention relationship can be explained by well-established theories that predict behavior across domains (e.g., theory of reasoned action, theory of planned behavior). Relying on the integrated behavioral model, we propose a core mediation model with vote likelihood (i.e., behavioral intention) as the dependent variable. Two types of media use (conservative and liberal–moderate) are then assessed in relation to the core model. We explore the ways in which our results contribute to theory and outline a research agenda.