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AbstractCompared to other affluent democracies, class conflict has not been very intense nor as much of an organizing principle in American politics. However, as wages stagnate for the working class and economic inequality grows, class conflict is becoming increasingly salient. Yet, reviewing recent political science studies, I argue that rather than politics becoming a clearer class "war" between the upper and lower classes, the growing class bias in political mobilization and participation, and the resulting overrepresentation of upper class actors, has prevented a clear articulation of lower class interests

Financial activity has become increasingly important in affluent economies in recent decades. Because this 'financialization' distributes costs and benefits unevenly across groups, politics and policy likely affect the process. Therefore, this article discusses how changes in the power of organizations representing the 'winners' and 'losers' of financialization affect its pace. An analysis of the United States from 1949–2005, shows that when unions are stronger, and when the Democratic Party is in power and is more reliant on the support of working-class voters, financialization is slower. In contrast, when the financial industry is more highly mobilized into politics, financialization is faster. The study also finds that financial deregulation was one policy translating the political power of these actors into economic outcomes.

ObjectiveTo understand how changes in the partisan control of the institutions of government may condition the effect of corporate political activities on bureaucratic decision making.MethodsI examine the variation in the effectiveness of corporate political expenditures in reducing workplace safety (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) violations across partisan contexts between 1981 and 2006 for a large number of corporations.ResultsCorporate expenditures have a greater suppressant effect on workplace safety violations (but not inspections) when the Republicans control the Congress or presidency.ConclusionsCorporations are able to influence bureaucratic decision making, but bureaucrats balance the demands of corporations against those of other party constituencies and their political principals. Thus, the partisan control of government importantly conditions corporate influence in the bureaucracy.

Recent research has taught us much about the effects of campaign finance laws, but we know little about why states adopt the regulations that they do. I address this question by examining why states increased the stringency of their campaign finance laws from 1993 to 2002. As is the case with other policies regulating the conduct of elected officials, the popular perception exists that politicians resist stringent campaign finance out of a concern for their own electoral self-interest. As a result, I test whether campaign finance policymaking results from the selfish electoral incentives that politicians allegedly have on this issue or decisions on this issue are influenced by factors that influence other types of policies. I find evidence to support both views. Specifically, the initiative option, a liberal government, strong good government groups, legislative professionalism, and scandal increase the likelihood of a state increasing the stringency of their regulations, while states with expensive legislative elections are less willing to do so. Adapted from the source document.

Recent research has taught us much about the effects of campaign finance laws, but we know little about why states adopt the regulations that they do. I address this question by examining why states increased the stringency of their campaign finance laws from 1993 to 2002. As is the case with other policies regulating the conduct of elected officials, the popular perception exists that politicians resist stringent campaign finance out of a concern for their own electoral self-interest. As a result, I test whether campaign finance policymaking results from the selfish electoral incentives that politicians allegedly have on this issue or decisions on this issue are influenced by factors that influence other types of policies. I find evidence to support both views. Specifically, the initiative option, a liberal government, strong good government groups, legislative professionalism, and scandal increase the likelihood of a state increasing the stringency of their regulations, while states with expensive legislative elections are less willing to do so.

Scholars have claimed that PAC influence on congressional behavior is more likely on certain types of issues. After considering both roll-call voting and committee participation, I argue that the conditions making PAC influence on voting most likely make influence on participation least likely, and vice versa. The analysis of 20 legislative proposals indicates that PACs are able to influence voting on non-ideological/non-visible issues, but are more likely to influence participation on ideological/visible issues. Unlike previous studies, these findings demonstrate that PACs can influence behavior across different contexts, but that the route to influence differs depending on the type of issue being considered.

AbstractScholars are beginning to consider how state campaign finance regulation influences political behavior and elections, but they lack the systematic measure of these regulations needed to do so. This article describes a simple measure of state campaign finance regulation stringency that is based on state statutes in 2002. Further, this article explains the construction of the measure and assesses its validity and reliability. The index generally confirms qualitative assessments of state campaign finance regulation, and it is correlated with measures of related aspects of state campaign finance regulation, campaign spending, and fundraising.