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The article analyses modus operandi of perpetrators who carried out the bomb attack during the Boston Marathon on 15 April 2013. The author indicates the consequences of using this type of IED and explains how the location of the bombs affected the number of casualties. The article includes an analysis of the bombers' tactics and the course of action beginning with the detonation of the bombs and ending with the apprehension of the last perpetrator. Moreover, the analysed attack shows something which does not receive enough attention – that terrorists make errors and act in a chaotic manner. A detailed analysis of the bombers' preparation, behavior and modus operandi showed how poorly trained, insecure and chaotic the terrorists were. The slogan "Rely on Allah, not on your equipment", popular in the jihadist media, has proved to be deceptive

The purpose of the article is to analyse the modus operandi of the terrorists who on 22 March 2016 organised the bomb attacks in Brussels. The article characterises the targets of the attackers, analyses their operational tactics and the aftermath of their attacks. In addition, the consequences of the attacks are discussed – both economic and legal. Another issue analysed in the article is the perpetrators of the assassinations – their origin, path of radicalisation and network of contacts. The summary shows why returning foreign terrorist fighters are a threat to security in the EU countries, including Poland.

The article deals with three terrorist attacks of right-wing extremists: in Norway (2011), New Zealand (2019) and Germany (2019). First, the modus operandi of perpetrators was shown and the course of each attack was analyzed. It was indicated what tactics the attackers used and why it was or was not effective. Secondly, the ideological background and motivations of the perpetrators were shown. It was possible to analyze the manifestos that the perpetrators left, and thus their way of thinking, their ideologies, and the purposes of organizing the attacks. Thirdly, issues related to the publicizing of the attacks by the perpetrators were shown. The goal of the article is to show that radical ideology of right-wing extremists (expressed in manifestos) leads to tragedies. In analyzed cases radical appointment of the perpetrators caused three deadly attacks. The article shows that the radical actions are preceded by radical speech, expressions, manifestos. The second goal is to pay attention to hate speech (also expressed in manifestos), which is just as dangerous as bullets or improvised explosive devices. The third goal is to show how the attackers used acts of terror to spread the ideologies to which they were devoted.

The article deals with three terrorist attacks of right-wing extremists: in Norway (2011), New Zealand (2019) and Germany (2019). First, the modus operandi of perpetrators was shown and the course of each attack was analyzed. It was indicated what tactics the attackers used and why it was or was not effective. Secondly, the ideological background and motivations of the perpetrators were shown. It was possible to analyze the manifestos that the perpetrators left, and thus their way of thinking, their ideologies, and the purposes of organizing the attacks. Thirdly, issues related to the publicizing of the attacks by the perpetrators were shown. The goal of the article is to show that radical ideology of right-wing extremists (expressed in manifestos) leads to tragedies. In analyzed cases radical appointment of the perpetrators caused three deadly attacks. The article shows that the radical actions are preceded by radical speech, expressions, manifestos. The second goal is to pay attention to hate speech (also expressed in manifestos), which is just as dangerous as bullets or improvised explosive devices. The third goal is to show how the attackers used acts of terror to spread the ideologies to which they were devoted.

The goal of this paper is to analyse challenges related to protecting Polish critical infrastructure (CI) against air threats, such as
UAVs, as a case study in a wider discussion on protection of critical infrastructure worldwide. The Polish legal definition of critical
infrastructure and laws regarding the protection of such facilities are explained in the article in order to provide context. A review of scientific literature and open-source analysis of known air attacks on CI and the capabilities of air platforms are also included, with special attention being paid to unmanned systems. The threats themselves have been divided into two groups of scenarios: peacetime threats and crisis situations that have hybrid wartime scenarios. Depending on the scenario, the different capabilities of actors must be taken into account. Peacetime air threats include the use of commercially available drones. Those devices have limited capabilities, in terms of weaponisation, due to the limited weight of their cargo and the flight range. More advanced devices, including custom–built drones and military systems, can be supplied and used by state actors. Therefore, there are different requirements regarding protection systems. In peacetime, anti-drone systems are certainly recommended due to their capabilities and safety of use for bystanders. In more dangerous scenarios, typical military systems, including Very Short-Range Air Defence, Short-Range Air Defence and Medium Range Air Defence systems have to be employed or dedicated kinetic counter-drone systems deployed.

The goal of this paper is to analyse challenges related to protecting Polish critical infrastructure (CI) against air threats, such as UAVs, as a case study in a wider discussion on protection of critical infrastructure worldwide. The Polish legal definition of critical infrastructure and laws regarding the protection of such facilities are explained in the article in order to provide context. A review of scientific literature and open-source analysis of known air attacks on CI and the capabilities of air platforms are also included, with special attention being paid to unmanned systems. The threats themselves have been divided into two groups of scenarios: peacetime threats and crisis situations that have hybrid wartime scenarios. Depending on the scenario, the different capabilities of actors must be taken into account. Peacetime air threats include the use of commercially available drones. Those devices have limited capabilities, in terms of weaponisation, due to the limited weight of their cargo and the flight range. More advanced devices, including custom–built drones and military systems, can be supplied and used by state actors. Therefore, there are different requirements regarding protection systems. In peacetime, anti-drone systems are certainly recommended due to their capabilities and safety of use for bystanders. In more dangerous scenarios, typical military systems, including Very Short-Range Air Defence, Short-Range Air Defence and Medium Range Air Defence systems have to be employed or dedicated kinetic counter-drone systems deployed.

The article gives general characterisation of the ways in which these organizations use modern communication technologies. Currently, every major terrorist organisation maintain robust media wings, which focus on producing videos, publishing magazines and sharing them with the public via the Web. The empirical system of reference is based on the activity of al-Qaeda, her franchise AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) and ISIS (the so-called Islamic State). While analysing the media of terrorist organisations, the Lasswell model was applied. This formula is a standard research procedure used for investigating acts of communication by answering the questions: who, says what, in which channel, to whom, with what effect?. The author also present typology of videos produced by jihadist organisations, characterised the most important and active media actions of terrorist organisations and a typology of recipients of such messages. The article presents a number of reasons why the Internet has become such an important tool for terrorists.

The authors discuss Large Language Models in the context of the security risks associated with their functions and availability. Even though their applications seem to be similar to search engines and internet access, the true danger posed by Large Language Models lies in basic analytical and programming skills they provide to any criminal or terrorist. They assert that accessible Large Language Models not only diminish financial barriers to various criminal activities but also lower the expertise and commitment required by individuals or small groups to commit crimes, and acts of terror in particular. On the other hand, however, law enforcement agencies can also harness the capabilities of these models to stay ahead of emerging threats.

W artykule autorzy omawiają duże modele językowe (ang. Large Language Models, LLMs) w kontekście zagrożeń bezpieczeństwa wynikających z funkcji i dostępności tych modeli. Mimo że pod względem zastosowań LLMs wydają się podobne do wyszukiwarek internetowych, to generują nowe zagrożenia związane z dostarczaniem przez nie przestępcy i terroryście podstawowych umiejętności analitycznych i programistycznych. Autorzy dowodzą, że dostępne modele językowe nie tylko zmniejszają bariery finansowe dla rożnych działań przestępczych, lecz także obniżają poziom wiedzy specjalistycznej i zaangażowania wymagany od jednostek lub małych grup do popełniania przestępstw, w tym aktów terrorystycznych. Z drugiej strony możliwości tych modeli mogą wykorzystać również organy ścigania, aby być przygotowanymi na pojawiające się zagrożenia.