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Surprisingly, exports and imports, tariffs and quotas, and trade deficits and surpluses are central to American foreign relations. Ever since Franklin D. Roosevelt took office during the Great Depression, the United States has linked trade to its long-term diplomatic objectives and national security. Washington, DC saw free trade as underscoring its international leadership and as instrumental to global prosperity, to winning wars and peace, and to shaping the liberal internationalist world order. Free trade, in short, was a cornerstone of an ideology of "capitalist peace." Covering nearly a century, Capitalist Peace provides the first chronologically sweeping look at the intersection of trade and diplomacy. This policy has been pursued oftentimes at a cost to US producers and workers, whose interests were sacrificed to serve the purpose of grand strategy. To be sure, capitalists sought a particular type of global trade, which harnessed the market through free trade. This liberal trade policy sought the common good as defined by the needs, aims, and strengths of the capitalist and democratic world. Leaders believed that free trade advanced private enterprise, which, in turn, promoted prosperity, democracy, security, and attendant by-products like development, cooperation, integration, and human rights. The capitalist peace took liberalization as integral to cooperation among nations and even to morality in global affairs. Drawing on new research from the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush presidential libraries, as well as business, industry and civic association archives, Thomas W. Zeiler narrates this history from the road to World War II, through the Cold War, to the resurgent protectionism of the Trump era and up to the present.

Abstract
The People's Republic of China has confronted the United States with diplomatic challenges ever since Washington recognized Beijing in January 1979. Basic to this engagement was and continues to be economics, and particularly trade, which elicited American responses ranging from enmity, fear, and uncertainty to cooperation, amity, and hope. Scholarship has not focused enough attention on the ideals and values that undergirded commercial relations as the principal American approach to China. Beginning with President Richard M. Nixon's opening to Beijing and ending with President Donald J. Trump's trade war (with touchstones in the Nixon, George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton, Barack Obama, and Trump years), this article analyzes how a bilateral trading relationship that so transformed the world evolved from recognition to rivalry. The answer to the wax and wane lies in the near-century long practice of American free-trade internationalism that followed the principles of the "capitalist peace" paradigm, long embraced by the United States as a pillar of its foreign policy.

The Kennedy Round of GATT was an opportunity for Australia and New Zealand to achieve their commercial interests of expanding agricultural exports and adjusting trade flows to the power of the United States, the loss of preferential markets in Britain and the new presence of the European Common Market. Both found commonalities with America, both managed to assert some of their concerns, but both also were decidedly junior and weaker partners to the free‐trading United States in the GATT regime. The issues explored in this article range from trade in commodities to the protests of the Third World.