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The paper describes the key features that make OSCE conflict management different from the respective activities of other international organizations: strengthening democracy, protecting human rights, and intervening in internal security matters of the participating States. The paper looks into the OSCE's period of "rapid institutionalization" between 1992 and 1995 and arrives at the finding that since the Istanbul Summit in 1999 and the OSCE's operational peak in 2001, the cutback and depoliticization of the Organization have had direct implications for its shrinking capabilities in managing conflict, especially for its efforts in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. The second part of the paper analyses the pattern of conflict in Kyrgyzstan, and the OSCE's role during the events in the country in 2010. (IFSH/Pll)

The OSCE Summit in Astana in December 2010 was a novelty in several respects. It was the first OSCE Summit to be held for eleven years and the first to take place in a Central Asian state or a CIS member state. This paper examines what the most important OSCE actors expected from the Astana Summit, and analyses their assessment of the Summit's mixed results. On the one hand the OSCE States agreed on a visionary objective that goes beyond any declaration that had previously been negotiated within the CSCE/OSCE framework by formulating the goal of a "Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community". On the other hand the basic document of the conference, the Astana Framework for Action failed to win approval. (IFSH/Pll)

The 1992 Helsinki Document, "The Challenges of Change" provided the then CSCE with the political mandate to deploy peacekeeping operations (PKO), but no OSCE PKO has been mandated since the Organization adopted its norms in 1992. … On the other hand facing pressure to respond adequately to concrete crises, participating States of the CSCE/OSCE had been quite willing to establish field operations [OSCE missions] which, due to their nature as well as their functions, can be defined as PKOs. Following this line of reasoning, it could, thus, be argued that the OSCE is already playing a role in peacekeeping, albeit without officially declaring its activities as peacekeeping. (CORE WP/Pll)

Territorial conflicts in Southeastern Europe have hampered the implementation of international agreements on arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in disputed territories under the effective control of de facto regimes. (… ) At the same time, disputes over the status of de facto regimes and host nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces in disputed territories have also obstructed the development of all-European arms control mechanisms and produced spillover effects detrimental to security and stability. (… ) In the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) has access only to areas controlled by the Georgian government adjoining the two breakaway regions. (… ) Against this background, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs aim at enhancing sub-regional security in and around disputed territories and creating a peaceful and stable environment for talks. (…) (CORE_WP/Pll)

The workshop discussions started with the conclusion that "[t]he present state of affairs in conventional arms control (CAC) and confidence and security building measures in the OSCE gives little reason for enthusiasm. Our interlocking treaty regimes have come under severe stress. Their instruments scarcely meet modern security requirements" (…) It was mentioned that there was currently no platform dealing with CAC. Speakers explained that there were basically two options for how to proceed: Either the CFE States Parties [Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] would start the process and, at a later stage, invite others to join or, alternatively, an OSCE format could be chosen in which each participating State (with territory in the area of application) could participate. (…) Speakers also stressed the need to integrate conventional arms control into the broader political picture. More specifically and with respect to Ukraine, it was noted that it was necessary to identify deficits and modernization needs, also with respect to new types of (hybrid) warfare, as observed in Ukraine. (…) It was stated that arms control instruments can be useful for crisis management in certain phases of the conflict cycle, particularly in its early phases and in post-conflict periods. But the use of arms control instruments during the conflict was seen as less effective, if not counterproductive. (CORE/Pll)