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The author compares the industrial policies in South Korea during the 1970s with those of China since 1989. He argues that one must go beyond the strong state explanation and examine specific relationships between the state and economy to understand different state capacities to carry out industrial policies. The author focuses on resource control and allocation in China and South Korea. (DÜI-Sen)

THIS ARTICLE USES AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENT ECONOMIC REFORM OUTCOMES IN THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA. IT STUDIES HOW THE DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL POSITIONS OF THE SOVIET AND CHINESE CENTRAL ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACIES GIVE THEM DIFFERENT POWER RESOURCES TO RESIST ECONOMIC REFORM POLITICS. THE ARTICLE SHOWS THAT CRUCIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO REGIMES IN HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATGIES, AND IDEOLOGIES ON BUREAUCRATIC RATIONALITY CREATED DIFFERENT LEVELS OF INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION BY THE TWO CENTRAL ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACIES IN STATE ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING, AND DIFFERENT ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES.

© 2019 Korean Securities Association An emerging stream of literature investigates the impact of political uncertainty on financial markets. In this survey, we review this line of literature from four perspectives, namely, asset prices, corporate policies, financial intermediaries, and economy and households, suggesting that political uncertainty generally increases market friction and as a result changes corporate behavior and adversely affects the economy. At the end of the survey, we discuss a few future directions worth being explored in view of the relationship between political uncertainty and finance.

Survey experiments often manipulate the description of attributes in a hypothetical scenario, with the goal of learning about those attributes' real-world effects. Such inferences rely on an underappreciated assumption: experimental conditions must be information equivalent (IE) with respect to background features of the scenario. IE is often violated because subjects, when presented with information about one attribute, update their beliefs about others too. Labeling a country "a democracy," for example, affects subjects' beliefs about the country's geographic location. When IE is violated, the effect of the manipulation need not correspond to the quantity of interest (the effect of beliefs about the focal attribute). We formally define the IE assumption, relating it to the exclusion restriction in instrumental-variable analysis. We show how to predict IE violations ex ante and diagnose them ex post with placebo tests. We evaluate three strategies for achieving IE. Abstract encouragement is ineffective. Specifying background details reduces imbalance on the specified details and highly correlated details, but not others. Embedding a natural experiment in the scenario can reduce imbalance on all background beliefs, but raises other issues. We illustrate with four survey experiments, focusing on an extension of a prominent study of the democratic peace.

China continues to deal with severe levels of water scarcity and water pollution. To help address this situation, the Chinese central government initiated urban water pricing reforms in 2002 that emphasized the adoption of increasing block rate (IBR) price structures in place of existing uniform rate structures. By combining urban water use records with microlevel data from the Chinese Urban Household Survey, this research investigates the effectiveness of this national policy reform. Specifically, we compare household water consumption in 28 cities that adopted IBR pricing structures during 2002–2009, with that of 110 cities that had not yet done so. Based on difference-in-differences models, our results show that the policy reform reduced annual residential water demand by 3–4% in the short run and 5% in the longer run. These relatively modest reductions are consistent with the generous nature of the IBR pricing structures that Chinese cities have typically chosen to implement. Our results imply that more efforts are needed to address China's persistent urban water scarcity challenges.

Addressing serious grassland degradation without exacerbating already low herder incomes is a major challenge for the Chinese government. In response, the Grassland Ecosystem Subsidy and Award Scheme (GESAS) was introduced in 2011 where herders receive payments if they comply with specified stocking rates set at more sustainable levels. However, compliance with GESAS, as well as low herder incomes in some years, is an ongoing issue. Using a stochastic, dynamic bioeconomic model of representative herder households in the desert steppe grasslands of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the opportunity costs for herders in meeting specified stocking rates under different states of nature are identified and compared with GESAS payments. In addition, the impacts on productivity and environmental services provided by herders operating within or outside of GESAS are identified. The results highlight states of nature under which no incentivising payments are needed for compliance or when the opportunity costs greatly exceed the GESAS payments, thereby increasing the risk of non-compliance. The study highlights the need to unbundle the environmental incentive and welfare components of GESAS if the twin objectives are to be achieved, and the need to define and understand the distribution of possible outcomes in designing grassland and ecocompensation policies.

Central governments face compliance problems when they rely on local governments to implement policy. In authoritarian political systems, these challenges are pronounced because local governments do not face citizens at the polls. In a national-scale, randomized field experiment in China, we test whether a public, non-governmental rating of municipal governments' compliance with central mandates to disclose information about the management of pollution increased compliance. We find significant and positive treatment effects on compliance after only one year that persist with reinforcement into a second post-treatment year. The public rating appears to decrease the costs of monitoring compliance for the central government without increasing public and media attention to pollution, highlighting when this mode of governance is likely to emerge. These results reveal important roles that nonstate actors can play in enhancing the accountability of local governments in authoritarian politicalsystems.

There is an increase of megaproject construction worldwide. At the same time, risks involved in megaprojects have also become a wide concern. Extending from the macrolevel of qualitative analysis focusing on complexity, politics, and morality, the research conducted the microscopic empirical analysis on twenty-two typical cases by adopting the quality comparative analysis (QCA) from the auditing perspective. Different from the traditional analysis method taking each causation as independent variable, the results in the study revealed that there was complex multiple concurrent causation among eight conditions; additionally, the configuration of those would be divided into six types, among which, the coverage of the three types, namely, project management risk, preliminary and construction risk, and tendering and contract management related risk, was almost eighty percent. Finally, megaproject risks in China were caused by complicated and changeable combination conditions, which would provide a new breakthrough for seeking analyzing megaproject risks through this quantitative analysis method, and indicate the researchers and practitioners to control the megaproject risks from a more systematic way.