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Why did a would-be recognized nuclear state oppose nonproliferation for two decades, but then change its position in 1984? Based on extensive fieldwork in Beijing where the author conducted 20 interviews with high-profile Chinese government and military officials, ambassadors of disarmament, and nuclear and astronautic scientists, this article argues that China openly opposed nonproliferation to give its nascent nuclear program time to achieve a retaliatory capability. Once this goal was fulfilled in the mid-1980s, China began accepting nonproliferation norms. While China's fervent opposition seemed ideological in a revolutionary era, it was indeed a rational behavior in pursuit of security interests. (Journal of Asian and African Studies / GIGA)

Why did a would-be recognized nuclear state oppose nonproliferation for two decades, but then change its position in 1984? Based on extensive fieldwork in Beijing where the author conducted 20 interviews with high-profile Chinese government and military officials, ambassadors of disarmament, and nuclear and astronautic scientists, this article argues that China openly opposed nonproliferation to give its nascent nuclear program time to achieve a retaliatory capability. Once this goal was fulfilled in the mid-1980s, China began accepting nonproliferation norms. While China's fervent opposition seemed ideological in a revolutionary era, it was indeed a rational behavior in pursuit of security interests.

China's performance regarding nuclear nonproliferation has experienced a tremendous change. From 1963 to the present, China dramatically moved from opponent of to proponent for nuclear nonproliferation. This literature only pays attention to this phenomenal change, without delineating the incremental stages in different phases that comprise the overall change. This article breaks down the overall change into four incremental shifts and specifically explains each of them. Close examination shows that these shifts were driven by different motives. The analysis leads to the conclusion that China's preferences in its nuclear nonproliferation decision making are driven by rational concerns.

This paper examines the grain marketing system reform by focusing on a case study of Nanfeng County of Jiangxi Province. The paper evaluates the current grain marketing system and analyses the impact of the new grain marketing policy on farmers, consumers and government grain agencies. The study reveals many problems existing in the current grain marketing system and arrangements, and argues for further reform in the grain marketing system and for opening the grain purchasing market.

Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) nuclear program has been a challenge to international security for three decades, the world still knows little about its nuclear intentions. A recently available dataset of Korean Central News Agency's English publications (1997–2018) provides a complete coverage of DPRK's nuclear activities in the time span. Our study employs the Louvain method of community detection in large networks to detect patterns and trends in North Korea's nuclear rhetoric. We have two findings: Pyongyang's primary objective is deterrence, although it also utilizes nuclear development to boost regime legitimacy. This secondary intention of legitimization is more prominent under Kim Jong-un than under Kim Jong-il, but still not as salient as deterrence. Our results suggest a policy approach of engagement and deterrence.