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With the gradual accession of some Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) to the EU, international trade between EU and CEECs and the related environmental problems will definitely change because of the free trade and the mobility of production factors (labour and capital) within the EU. This paper investigates the consequences of the enlargement of the EU on trade and environment by general equilibrium modelling. A general equilibrium model with the sequential joint maximisation method is developed to examine the impacts under different environmental regimes. For illustrative purposes, the model is applied in a numerical example with two regions (EU and CEECs) and two goods (pollution intensive good A and clean good B). The model is also run for some important environmental policies. The result show that the 'coordinated policy in EU and CEECs' could be efficient to restrict the total emission level for uniformly mixing pollutants.

AbstractThe Mekong River Basin (MRB) is a trans-boundary river shared by six countries. The governance by the Mekong River Commission (MRC) of the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB) is weak. This study investigates the welfare effects in the year 2030 arising from strengthening the MRC's governance versus joint management of the entire MRB. Without joint management, strengthening the MRC's governance has a huge potential to achieve welfare gains and it requires that the interests of all stakeholders be equally balanced. A bargaining approach shows that the LMB has no incentive to negotiate with China and is better off strengthening the MRC's governance instead. If such strengthening could be realized, further welfare gains of joint management by a wider and stronger MRC, including China, would be very small.

AbstractOne of the key issues in collective action is whether stakeholders are able to realize commons governance through a trust‐based mode or control‐based mode. This paper, examines whether trust and control affect the commons governance for small‐scale irrigation facilities, and the moderating effects of group size on the relationship between trust and control and cooperative performance. The data were collected from 504 households who participated in the collective action for small‐scale irrigation facilities in Shaanxi, Gansu Province, and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region of Northwest China. The analysis was performed by Structural Equation modeling and hierarchical regression. The findings show that trust and control are contrasting forces that influence the participation degree and the cooperative performance, although their relationship is not of a simple supplementary character but could be moderated by the group size. Both trust‐based and control‐based modes of irrigation management are effective in small groups, whereas only a control‐based mode of management has an effect in big groups. The theoretical contribution of this paper clarifies the mechanisms through which the contrasting forces of group size are exerted on trust and control, directly and indirectly influences the participation degree and the cooperative performance in commons governance.

AbstractThis article examines whether relationships between social capital characteristics and the willingness of farmers to cooperate in collective action is moderated by the farmers' income level. We employed a structural equation model to analyze the influence of social capital components (social networks, interpersonal trust, social reciprocity, and social participation) on the willingness of farmers to cooperate in collective small‐scale irrigation in Guangling County, Shanxi Province of China. This analysis was complemented by a multigroup analysis to measure the potential variance effects across income groups. Our results show that low‐ and middle‐income farmers give more importance to the aspects of social networks, social reciprocity, and social participation, while high‐income farmers place emphasis on interpersonal trust and social participation. Accordingly, the willingness of farmers to cooperate for the different income groups was influenced in different ways in relation to the various social capital components. Therefore, social capital and income differences have complex effects on the willingness of farmers to cooperate. In this regard, our research provides an alternative way to understand the complex process involved in the formation of collective action under the presence of increasing economic heterogeneity in local communities.