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The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) has been relatively neglected in the field of normative human rights theory. This book aims to bridge the gap between human rights theory and the practice of the ECHR. In order to do so, it tests the two overarching approaches in human rights theory literature: the ethical and the political, against the practice of the ECHR 'system'. The book also addresses the history of the ECHR and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as an international legal and political institution. The book offers a democratic defence of the authority of the ECtHR. It illustrates how a conception of democracy - more specifically, the egalitarian argument for democracy developed by Thomas Christiano on the domestic level - can illuminate the reasoning of the Court, including the allocation of the margin of appreciation on a significant number of issues. Alain Zysset argues that the justification of the authority of the ECtHR - its prominent status in the domestic legal orders - reinforces the democratic process within States Parties, thereby consolidating our status as political equals in those legal and political orders.

AbstractScholars of global constitutionalism have recently come to examine international criminal law (ICL) and its associated institutions, in particular the International Criminal Court (the ICC). This article prolongs these efforts by pointing to and remedying two deficits of that project with particular emphasis on the Rome Statute crimes. First, how does one account for the role of the international trial in global constitutionalist terms? Second, can global constitutionalism insightfully explain the content and scope of these crimes – that is, both their substantive definition and the predominant modes of liability developed by the ICC? This article answers both questions affirmatively and offers an account of their nexus. It first shows that the Rome Statute crimes are often perpetrated through a hierarchically organized apparatus of control, and interprets their global constitutional significance via the principle of constituent power. It then makes use of Antony Duff's relational account of criminal liability to offer an account of the international trial. In the international context, one can conceive of the trial as allowing state or state-like authorities to call each other to account, which renders justice to the core function of enabling and limiting political authority on which global constitutionalism centres.

AbstractIn this paper, I offer an analytical and normative framework to re-visit the question of whether state parties should derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in order to combat the COVID-19 pandemic via harsh 'lockdown' measures. It is three-pronged. First, I show that the predominant debate on the (non-)derogation question is informed by a textual approach to adjudication, which severely limits the analytical and evaluative horizon for addressing the issue. Most importantly, it cannot address one salient fact about the effects of lockdown measures, namely their highly disproportionate effects on vulnerable groups and minorities. Second, I argue that proportionality assessment should be the basis for determining whether state parties ought to derogate or not. This is because proportionality's very purpose is in part to track the effects of state interferences on minorities and vulnerable groups by measuring the disproportionate burden imposed on them. It is also because proportionality assessment has very different requirements between limitation clauses built into the relevant Convention articles (e.g. Article 5, Articles 8–11) and the derogation clause (Article 15) under the ECHR. Surprisingly, while the emerging literature almost always mentions proportionality as an important component of the analysis, it does not investigate the extent to which each regime (derogation or limitation) better performs it, and why. Third, I draw from the philosophical literature on the 'right to justification' to clarify the egalitarian and justificatory function of proportionality. Unlike derogation, limitation clauses have a much higher and systematic requirement of justification, which makes the case for non-derogation clearer and stronger.

It is widely acknowledged that human rights law (hereafter, HRL) and international criminal law (hereafter, ICL) share core normative features. Yet, the literature has not yet reconstructed this underlying basis in a systematic way. In this contribution, I lay down the basis of such an account. I first identify a similar tension between a "moral" and a "political" approach to the normative foundations of those norms and to the legitimate role of international courts (hereafter, ICs) and tribunals adjudicating those norms. With a view to bring the debate forward, I then turn to the practices of HRL and international criminal law (hereafter, ICL) to examine which of those approaches best illuminates some salient aspects of the adjudication of ICs. Finally, I argue that the political approach best explains the practice. While each preserves a distinct role, HRL and ICL both establish the basic conditions for the primary subject of international law (HRL and ICL, for the purpose of this article), namely the state, to legitimately govern its own subjects constructed as free and equal moral agents.

Abstract:In this article, I argue against the claim that the practice of the European Court of Human Rights cannot be reconciled with the democratic-procedural standards by which state parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, decide about the content and scope of human rights norms. First, I suggest drawing the attention to the neglected balancing exercise of the review process, in which the Court has to determine whether a violation is nevertheless 'necessary in a democratic society'. Second, I shed light on the role that 'pluralism' plays in the balancing (with particular emphasis on Articles 8–11). Third, I argue that Thomas Christiano's egalitarian argument for democracy can best illuminate the Court's reliance on pluralism.

Published online: 07 March 2016 ; In this article, I argue against the claim that the practice of the European Court of Human Rights cannot be reconciled with the democratic-procedural standards by which state parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, decide about the content and scope of human rights norms. First, I suggest drawing the attention to the neglected balancing exercise of the review process, in which the Court has to determine whether a violation is nevertheless 'necessary in a democratic society'. Second, I shed light on the role that 'pluralism' plays in the balancing (with particular emphasis on Articles 8–11). Third, I argue that Thomas Christiano's egalitarian argument for democracy can best illuminate the Court's reliance on pluralism.

Abstract
How does the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) understand the nature of human rights? The article develops a framework for the analysis of this question and shows how it can be applied. The first part identifies a gap at the intersection of doctrinal and philosophical approaches to human rights practice that leaves the ECtHR's understanding of the nature of rights unaccounted for. The second part develops an analytic and methodological framework based on the idea of grounds, content and scope of human rights to bridge this disciplinary divide and facilitate a more perspicuous analysis of the Court's conception of the nature of human rights. The third part tests this framework by examining the Court's doctrines in relation to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the right to free elections.

AbstractThe Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has a new mechanism to receive individual complaints and issue views, which makes the question of how the Committee should interpret the broad articles of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights more pressing than ever. Most commentators on the legitimacy of the CESCR's interpretation have argued that interpreters should make better use of Articles 31–33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) in order to improve the legitimacy of their findings. In this article, we argue conversely that the individual communication mechanism should be evaluated and reformed in terms of legitimate authority. In the context of the Committee's process of interpretation, we contend that proportionality is better suited than the various interpretive options of the VCLT to offer a consistent procedure that is able to generate legitimacy by attenuating the tension between personal and collective autonomy.

http://doc.rero.ch/record/32543?ln=fr ; International audience ; "Charakteristisch für den hier eingeschlagenen Weg ist nämlich eine spezifische Weise der Verknüpfung von Begründungsargumenten und historischer Reflexion , die sich so in den Geschichten der Menschenrechte oder in den philosophi-schen Ansätzen nicht findet und dort in der Regel auch gar nicht angestrebt wird. Die ehrgeizigen philosophischen Begründungsversuche kommen ohne Ge-schichte aus. Sie konstruieren ihre Argumente aus dem (angeblichen) Charakter der praktischen Vernunft und des moralischen Sollens, den Bedingungen eines Gedankenexperiments über die Einrichtung von Gemeinwesen oder den Grund-zügen eines idealisierten Diskurses heraus. Zur Geschichte stehen solche Kon-struktionen notwendig in einem merkwürdigen Spannungsverhältnis. Merk-würdig muss ja aus dieser Perspektive erscheinen, dass in der Geschichte der Menschheit zeitlos Gültiges nur so selten als solches erkannt wurde. [.] Die Geschichtsschreibung wiederum wird zwar häufig, bewusst oder unbe-wusst, von Vorstellungen über philosophische Begründung durchsetzt sein; [.]. Als Wissenschaft muss sie aber ihren Anspruch auf die empirische Ebene einer sachgemässen Rekonstruktion historischer Prozesse begrenzen. In ihrer Arbeits-teilung bekräftigen Geschichtswissenschaft und Philosophie damit die Unter-scheidung von Genesis und Geltung, die von vielen für eine Grundlage jeder rechtlichen Beschäftigung mit normativen Fragen gehalten wird. Entweder, so diese Denkweise, steht der Geltungsanspruch normativer Sätze zur Diskussion, oder wir interessieren uns für ihre geschichtliche Herkunft. Zur Entscheidung über den normativen Geltungsanspruch kann in dieser Perspektive geschichtli-ches Wissen nichts, jedenfalls nichts Ausschlaggebendes beitragen." Hans Joas, Die Sakralität der Person. Eine neue Genealogie der Menschen-rechte [2011], 12-13 I. The prima facie opposition between human rights theory and history The burgeoning of recent publications on human rights shows how fashionable an object of ...