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This paper addresses the question of the need for income tax harmonization in the context of regional integration. It analyses the international distortions and fiscal interdependence arising in the presence of tax rate differentials both under a theoretical and an empirical perspective, and with reference to actual experiences of harmonization attempts. Attention is also paid to the influence of the countries' size on the results, to the strategic behaviour of countries under different international taxations rules, and to the relationships with the countries excluded by the integration process. International tax uniformity does not appear to be the preferable solution, even if some form of concerted agreements might help in reducing inefficiencies deriving from taxation differentials. For instance, in the case of highly mobile factors, like financial capital, if the integrating countries apply the source principle and the interest rate is the same across them, the source‐based tax rate on non residents must equal the residence country tax rate on residents. Such a rule would allow the countries to set autonomously their tax rate and, at the same time, eliminate cross‐border effects. If there are more than two integrating countries, the tax rates on non residents should discriminate according to the internal tax rate of the residence country.(J.E.L.: H87, F20, H20).

Abstract
The link between technological change and income inequality is central to the Kuznets hypothesis. In a time of technological transition towards the digitization and intelligentization of manufacturing processes (the fourth industrial revolution), this paper investigates the relationship between economic development and income distribution through the implementation of both a system generalized method of moments (system-GMM) and a semiparametric fixed effects model approach. Based on a panel of 31 European-area countries over a period of 12 years (2007–2018), accounting for the endogeneity bias arising from the transitional dynamics of income inequality and per capita income, our main results confirm the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between income inequality and economic development. Moreover, our analysis shows that the change in the share of labour employed in high-tech sectors is the main driver of this evolutionary pattern.

We analyse the peculiarities of pre-commercial procurement (PCP) within the EU innovation policy kit, interpreting it as a risk-shifting mechanism. While most studies assume the point of view of the public procurer, we take the suppliers' one, with a focus on SMEs. We conclude that PCP, operating in the phase of the specification of technical requirements, has the peculiar role of favouring a better match between supply and demand as for innovative goods and can allow to exploit the competitive advantages that SMEs display in the early phases of the technological process, if interpreted as an innovation-leaking process.

Abstract
We test the welfare magnet hypothesis for Europe. We modify the existing theoretical frameworks assuming that: (a) welfare services, intended as the output of welfare expenditure, not the poor's income or social expenditure, enter the median voter's utility function; (b) preferences depend on the position of the median voter in the income distribution; and (c) the total amount of welfare services provided may differ from the amount needed to finance them, because of inefficiencies in the transfer process. We then test the welfare magnet hypothesis for 22 European countries by estimating a reaction function corresponding to the generic form adopted by the literature, but using the variables inspired by the model. We find evidence of a positive strategic interaction among countries, which suggests a downward bias in the choice of the protection level because of welfare competition. The level of social protection also positively depends on GDP, the redistributive attitudes of residents and their weight in the population, vis-à-vis the migrants' share, and the efficiency of social expenditure.

Abstract We test the welfare magnet hypothesis for Europe. We modify the existing theoretical frameworks assuming that: (a) welfare services, intended as the output of welfare expenditure, not the poor's income or social expenditure, enter the median voter's utility function; (b) preferences depend on the position of the median voter in the income distribution; and (c) the total amount of welfare services provided may differ from the amount needed to finance them, because of inefficiencies in the transfer process. We then test the welfare magnet hypothesis for 22 European countries by estimating a reaction function corresponding to the generic form adopted by the literature, but using the variables inspired by the model. We find evidence of a positive strategic interaction among countries, which suggests a downward bias in the choice of the protection level because of welfare competition. The level of social protection also positively depends on GDP, the redistributive attitudes of residents and their weight in the population, vis-à-vis the migrants' share, and the efficiency of social expenditure.

L'obiettivo di questo capitolo è testare l'ipotesi del magnete del welfare per l'Europa. A tal fine modifichiamo i framework teorici utilizzati in letteratura introducendo due nuove ipotesi: a) la funzione di utilità dell'elettore mediano dipende dai servizi di welfare, intesi come l'output della spesa pubblica, non dal reddito del percettore dei trasferimenti sociali o dall'ammontare della spesa; b) le preferenze dell'elettore mediano dipendono dalla sua posizione nella distribuzione del reddito; e c) l'ammontare complessivo dei servizi di welfare forniti può differire dall'ammontare necessario al loro finanziamento, a causa di inefficienze nel processo di trasferimento. Su questa base testiamo l'ipotesi del magnete del welfare per 22 paesi europei, stimando una funzione di reazione che corrisponde alla forma generalmente adottata in letteratura, ma usando variabili ispirate dal nostro modello. Troviamo evidenza dell'esistenza di spillover internazionali positivi, il che suggerisce l'esistenza di una distorsione al ribasso nella scelta del livello di protezione sociale. I risultati indicano anche che il livello di protezione sociale dipende dal PIL, dalle preferenze verso la redistribuzione dei residenti e dal loro peso nella popolazione, rispetto a quello dei migranti, e dall'efficienza della spesa sociale.

Abstract
Based on the construction of a composite index to assess the relative performance of welfare policies, we show that the variability of performances cannot be explained only by the amount of resources devoted to social policies, but also by its composition: countries with higher shares of social public expenditure, specifically aimed at reducing income concentration, obtain better results. This associates the traditional classification of the European welfare systems to the performance obtained in the social sector.