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AbstractPublic administrations increasingly try to find new ways to involve citizens in policy‐making. However, many democratic innovations draw in only a fraction of the public. Why? I hypothesize that we observe such low participation rates because there is often not enough at stake for citizens. I test this with a preregistered survey experiment on citizens' intentions to participate in participatory budgets in the Netherlands. I fielded the experiment among a sample of citizens that had just experienced a participatory budget (N = 225) and among a population‐based sample (N = 1369). I operationalized the stakes as the amount of public money about which citizens can decide. The results show that more money generally does not increase citizens' intention to participate. Supplementary analyses confirm the experimental findings and provide reasons how and why the stakes involved (do not) matter for citizens' involvement.

Public administrations increasingly try to find new ways to involve citizens in policy-making. However, many democratic innovations draw in only a fraction of the public. Why? I hypothesize that we observe such low participation rates because there is often not enough at stake for citizens. I test this with a pre-registered survey experiment on citizens' intentions to participate in participatory budgets in the Netherlands. I fielded the experiment among a sample of citizens that had just experienced a participatory budget (N = 225) and among a population-based sample (N = 1,369). I operationalized the stakes as the amount of public money about which citizens can decide. The results show that more money generally does not increase citizens' intention to participate. Supplementary analyses confirm the experimental findings and provide reasons how and why the stakes involved (do not) matter for citizens' involvement.

Public administrations increasingly try to find new ways to involve citizens in policy-making. However, many democratic innovations draw in only a fraction of the public. Why? I hypothesize that we observe such low participation rates because there is often not enough at stake for citizens. I test this with a pre-registered survey experiment on citizens' intentions to participate in participatory budgets in the Netherlands. I fielded the experiment among a sample of citizens that had just experienced a participatory budget (N = 225) and among a population-based sample (N = 1,369). I operationalized the stakes as the amount of public money about which citizens can decide. The results show that more money generally does not increase citizens' intention to participate. Supplementary analyses confirm the experimental findings and provide reasons how and why the stakes involved (do not) matter for citizens' involvement.

Deliberation among the public appears wanting, even in many of the world's established democracies. This apparent lack of mutually respectful conversation among citizens about politics involving a give-and-take of reasons is often ascribed to growing affective polarisation. The more the citizens come to think of each other as belonging to opposing groups, the less likely it allegedly becomes that they will show respect towards each other or exchange arguments while talking politics. However, the empirical support for this common supposition remains tentative, as prior research suffers from potential endogeneity problems and selection bias. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel experimental design involving an imagined conversation on refugee policy in Poland. Our experimental test shows that, on average, participants' inclination to deliberate did not significantly differ based on whether they imagined talking to someone from an ingroup or to someone from an outgroup instead. Our findings thereby suggest that the relationship between group identification and public deliberation might not be as straightforward as is often assumed. At least in some contexts, a lack of mutual group identification does not spell disaster for deliberation.

What makes politically dissatisfied citizens enthusiastic about deliberation? And what makes them hate it instead? Based on a picture task embedded in a series of focus groups conducted in Belgium, we argue that differences in sense-making help to explain why dissatisfied citizens (do not) support deliberation. We focus on two groups of dissatisfied citizens: non-partisan activists and politically disadvantaged citizens. For both groups, we find that when they thought of deliberation as low-key, informal discussion, they linked it to respectful communication and beneficial outcomes; when they thought of it as formalized, structured discussion, their appraisals became much more negative. For researchers of deliberation, our results make clear that we should be careful in asking citizens what they think about 'deliberation' without inquiring into the way they interpret it. For deliberation practitioners, our findings underline the relevance of integrating informal interactions into the design of deliberative institutions.

AbstractCitizens that tend to experience political exclusion are often more supportive of direct and participatory forms of decision-making. We empirically verify two competing explanatory logics for such high support: the "anti-establishment" logic, which expects politically excluded citizens to unconditionally express more support than their fellow citizens for democratic innovations (DIs); and the "instrumental" logic, which expects politically excluded citizens to only express more support for DIs than other citizens when these innovations offer procedural control and favorable outcomes. Based on a conjoint analysis of Dutch citizens' preferences for participatory budgeting, we find no support for the anti-establishment logic and partial support for the instrumental logic. We show how measures of citizens' own feelings of exclusion help to explain the results.

Deliberative minipublics are popular tools to address the current crisis in democracy. However, it remains ambiguous to what degree these small-scale forums matter for mass democracy. In this study, we ask the question to what extent minipublics have "spillover effects" on lay citizens—that is, long-term effects on participating citizens and effects on non-participating citizens. We answer this question by means of a systematic review of the empirical research on minipublics' spillover effects published before 2019. We identify 60 eligible studies published between 1999 and 2018 and provide a synthesis of the empirical results. We show that the evidence for most spillover effects remains tentative because the relevant body of empirical evidence is still small. Based on the review, we discuss the implications for democratic theory and outline several trajectories for future research.

Why do citizens (not) support democratic innovations? Existing research shows that citizens mostly support such new ways of involving citizens in policy-making for instrumental reasons: the more a democratic innovation leads to outcomes they favour, the more likely they are to express support for it. However, it remains ambiguous why citizens care so much about favourable outcomes. This study disentangles the effect of outcome favourability on support for democratic innovations by testing two mechanisms: self-interest and sociotropy. It relies on three survey experiments on Dutch citizens' support for a local democratic innovation (participatory budgeting) ( N = 2,491). The results confirm that outcome favourability is important in explaining citizens' support for participatory budgets (Study 1). We find evidence for both self-interest (Study 2) and sociotropy (Study 3) as drivers of the effect and present preliminary evidence that self-interest may trump sociotropy in citizens' evaluations of democratic innovations.

Deliberative minipublics are popular tools to address the current crisis in democracy. However, it remains ambiguous to what degree these small-scale forums matter for mass democracy. In this study, we ask the question to what extent minipublics have "spillover effects" on lay citizens—that is, long-term effects on participating citizens and effects on non-participating citizens. We answer this question by means of a systematic review of the empirical research on minipublics' spillover effects published before 2019. We identify 60 eligible studies published between 1999 and 2018 and provide a synthesis of the empirical results. We show that the evidence for most spillover effects remains tentative because the relevant body of empirical evidence is still small. Based on the review, we discuss the implications for democratic theory and outline several trajectories for future research.

How can online government platforms meet principles of inclusivity and deliberation? We reflect on this question based on a recent case of online participatory budgeting in a neighborhood of The Hague, the Netherlands (Duinoord Begroot). In terms of inclusivity, our findings suggest that sending out personal invitations and setting few voting requirements can contribute to online voting rates. Furthermore, the use of few participation criteria in the initial stages of the process can enhance the diversity of gathered ideas. In terms of deliberation, we discuss how the structure of an online platform may 'nudge' citizens towards deliberation. The results indicate that while the platform generated an equal distribution of arguments in favor of and against proposals, it did not engage citizens en masse in online discussions. We suggest that building incentives and feedback loops into the platform could address this limitation.

Why do citizens (not) support democratic innovations (DIs)? Existing research shows that citizens mostly support such new ways of involving citizens in policy-making for instrumental reasons: the more a DI leads to outcomes they favour, the more likely they are to express support for it. However, it remains ambiguous why citizens care so much about favourable outcomes. This study disentangles the effect of outcome favourability on support for DIs by testing two mechanisms: self-interest and sociotropy. It relies on three survey experiments on Dutch citizens' support for a local DI (participatory budgeting) (N = 2,491). The results confirm that outcome favourability is important in explaining citizens' support for participatory budgets (Study 1). We find evidence for both self-interest (Study 2) and sociotropy (Study 3) as drivers of the effect and present preliminary evidence that self-interest may trump sociotropy in citizens' evaluations of DIs.

How can online government platforms meet principles of inclusivity and deliberation? We reflect on this question based on a recent case of online participatory budgeting in a neighborhood of The Hague, the Netherlands (Duinoord Begroot). In terms of inclusivity, our findings suggest that sending out personal invitations and setting few voting requirements can contribute to online voting rates. Furthermore, the use of few participation criteria in the initial stages of the process can enhance the diversity of gathered ideas. In terms of deliberation, we discuss how the structure of an online platform may 'nudge' citizens towards deliberation. The results indicate that while the platform generated an equal distribution of arguments in favor of and against proposals, it did not engage citizens en masse in online discussions. We suggest that building incentives and feedback loops into the platform could address this limitation.