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A contribution to a symposium on election forecasting argues that, although election forecasting is a legitimate & potentially important scientific undertaking, the unsatisfactory theoretical foundations of statistical forecasting models have led to disappointments. Theories of election results are examined & the claim that the core specification of forecasting models is based on "strong electoral theory" is challenged. An exploration of the implausibility of the functional specification of the core specifications of forecasting models points out the many reasons to reject any specification that imposes symmetrical effects. The theoretical scope of the forecasting tradition is discussed. It is noted that forecasting models originated in the context of US presidential elections, which focus on the allocation of executive power & usually involve a choice between just two candidates, conditions which do not apply in most of the world. In spite of their potential, it is concluded that forecasting models have failed to help in developing & evaluating theories about elections or election outcomes. 8 References. J. Lindroth

Abstract. A common form of electoral cycle theory asserts that support for government parties is dependent on the proportion of an inter‐election interval which has passed since the last national election. Weekly opinion poll data for the Netherlands are used to test whether or not such 'cyclical' patterns of change can be detected in the inter‐election periods of 1977–1981 and 1982–1986. The relative merits of two methods of analysis, polynomial regression and ARIMA, are discussed and demonstrated. The latter is shown to be the more suitable of the two; the former may yield misleading outcomes. The analyses reported do not display even a glimpse of empirical support for the alleged cyclical phenomenon. The ARIMA analyses can be used, however, to describe how processes and events in a society impinge on (noncyclical) developments in the electoral support for political parties.

A common form of electoral cycle theory asserts that support for government parties is dependent on the proportion of the interelection interval since the last national election. Weekly PO poll data for the Netherlands are used to test whether or not such cyclical patterns of change can be detected in the interelection periods of 1977-1981 & 1982-1986. The relative merits of two methods of analysis, polynomial regression (Reif, K. Ten European Elections, Aldershot: Gower, 1985) & ARIMA analysis (Box, G. E. D., & Jenkins, G. M., Time Series Analysis. Forcasting and Control, San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1970), are discussed & demonstrated. The latter is shown to be the more suitable of the two; the former may yield misleading outcomes. The analyses reported do not display even a glimpse of empirical support for the alleged cyclical phenomenon. The ARIMA analyses can be used, however, to describe how processes & events in a society impinge on noncyclical developments in the electoral support for political parties. 2 Tables, 2 Figures, 12 References. Modified HA

This article addresses a critical gap in the literature on winner–loser effects that consists of the lack of attention for highly contentious constitutional referenda. It uses unique multi-wave panel data of over 13,000 people that is unrivalled in size and richness. We estimate causal effects of the referendum on rarely studied but crucial public perceptions of the fairness of the way a referendum is conducted. These perceptions pertain to the highly contentious 2016 European Union (Brexit) referendum in the United Kingdom, which is an ideal-type example of a wider class of referenda for which similar outcomes can be expected. We use difference-in-differences methods and find winner–loser effects of a magnitude far greater than ever observed for general elections. Moreover, we find that these effects not only persist, but even grow over time. The findings have profound implications for the use of such referenda.

This paper addresses a critical gap in the literature on winner-loser effects that consists of the lack of attention for highly contentious constitutional referenda. It uses unique multi-wave panel data of over 13,000 people that is unrivalled in size and richness. We estimate causal effects of the referendum on rarely studied but crucial public perceptions of the fairness of the way a referendum is conducted. These perceptions pertain to the highly contentious 2016 EU (Brexit) referendum in the UK, which is an ideal-type example of a wider class of referenda for which similar outcomes can be expected. We use differences-in-differences methods and find winner-loser effects of a magnitude far greater than ever observed for general elections. Moreover, we find that these effects not only persist, but even grow over time. The findings have profound implications for the use of such referenda.

We compare measures of the tone of parties' campaigns in the 2015 General Election in England, based on, respectively, coverage of parties' campaigns in six national newspapers, citizens' perceptions, and expert judgments. It is the most extensive study of such measurements outside the United States and one of very few to include expert judgments. We find that citizen perceptions and expert judgments are heavily affected by partisan bias. We show how these biases can be eliminated with a regression-based procedure. After such adjustment, seven of the eight resulting measures of parties' campaign tone (five based on newspapers, one on citizen perceptions, and one on expert judgments) are strongly correlated. The eighth measure (based on one of the newspapers) depicts the tone of parties' campaigns very differently owing to different criteria of what to cover in a campaign. Each of the three kinds of empirical information is adequate as a basis for measuring parties' campaign tone, but adjustment for partisan biases is essential for perception and judgment data. Common apprehensions about the "subjectivity" of citizen perceptions are not justified, while expert judgments are equally useful, as long as sufficient information is available to eliminate their partisan bias.

Non-ipsative measures of party preference (preference ratings for each of the parties of a political system) have become common in election studies. They exist in different forms, such as thermometer ratings or feeling scores, likes and dislikes scores, or choice propensities. Usually only one of these is included in a single survey, which makes it difficult to assess the relative merits of each. The Irish National Election Study 2002 (INES2002) contained three different batteries of non-ipsative party preferences, a feature which allows a systematic comparison between them. This paper investigates some properties of these different indicators. We focus mainly on the relationship between non-ipsative preferences and actual choices. This relationship is particularly revealing in a STV electoral system that allows voters to cast multiple ordered votes for candidates from different parties. Additionally, we investigate the latent structure of each of the batteries of party preferences and the relationships between them.We conclude that the three instruments are not interchangeable, that they measure different kinds of preferences. If the purpose is to study electoral choice and the process leading up to electoral choice, then the propensity to vote for a party is to be preferred over thermometer or feeling scores, and over likes/dislikes scores.