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On August 14, 2003, in a matter of minutes, the lights went out, affecting around fifty million people in the northeastern United States (allegedly most powerful nation on the planet), Ontario, and Quebec. This constituted the biggest blackout in North American history. Only a couple of weeks later, commuters in London (UK) were affected by a power outage in the underground. In September in Copenhagen and southern Sweden almost four million users were left in the dark. After alternative explanations were ruled out and the expected political game of passing the blaming around receded, many began attributing these all too common problems of brownouts and blackouts on systemic, underlying conditions. The processes of liberalization and privatization of the power sectors ended up under negative public scrutiny. This is the kind of time in which von-der-Fehr and Millan's book saw the light.

A government wants to exploit a renewable resource, yielding a time-varying flow of rent, by leasing it. Leasing contracts can be expropriated before expiration, albeit at a cost. To minimise transactions costs and avoid the 'resource trap' the government would prefer to enter into an infinitely long contract (i.e. sell the resource), if it could commit not to expropriate. However, with finite costs of expropriation credible commitment is impossible: the government either enters into finite contracts, expropriates with positive probability or does both. The value of the resource to the government is increasing in the cost of expropriation, but decreasing in the variability of the resource rent.

A government wants to exploit a renewable resource, yielding a timevarying flow of rent, by leasing it at a fixed rate. Leasing contracts can be expropriated before expiration, albeit at a cost. To minimise transactions costs and avoid the 'resource curse' the government would prefer to enter into an infinitely long contract (i.e. sell the resource), if it could commit not to expropriate. However, with finite costs of expropriation credible commitment is impossible: the government either enters into finite contracts, expropriates with positive probability or does both. The value of the resource to the government is increasing in the cost of expropriation, but decreasing in the variability of the resource rent.

We analyse retailer and household behaviour on the Norwegian electricity market, based on detailed information on prices and other market characteristics. We find that there exists a competitive market segment where a number of retailers compete fiercely for customers, with small margins on all products. However, we also find evidence of monopolistic behaviour, whereby retailers exploit the passivity of some of their customers. We discuss explanations for these results, as well as means to improve market performance.