Search results

Islamic extremism in Southeast Asia has moved beyond a matter of local concern to one of global significance—as the events of the past decade have so clearly demonstrated. Drawing on intensive on-the-ground investigation and interviews with key militants, Zachary Abuza explains the emergence of radical Islamist groups in the region, examines Al-Qaida's role as organizational catalyst, and explores individual and multilateral state responses to the growing—and increasingly violent—Islamic political consciousness. Abuza also analyzes state strategies for combating, co-opting, or coping with militant Islamist groups. A key question here is whether state actors are trying to resolve the root causes of Muslim disaffection—or merely using the "war on terrorism" to suppress the symptoms

Introduction -- Case study 1: The Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) -- Case study 2: The Moro National Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front -- Case study 3: The Barisan Revolusi Nasional, PULO and other Malay militant groups -- Conclusion

Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia presents a penetrating new investigation of religious radicalism in the largest Muslim country in the world. Indonesia is a country long known for its diversity and tolerant brand of Islam. However, since the fall of Suharto, a more intolerant form of Islam has been growing, one whose adherents have carried out terrorist attacks, waged sectarian war, and voiced strident anti-Western rhetoric. Zachary Abuza's unique analysis of radical Islam draws upon primary documents such as Jemaah Islamiyah's operations manual, interviews, a.

executive summary: This essay examines relations between Malaysia and China since the 2018 election and finds that Malaysia has deepened economic relations with China but that tensions over trade and investment, maritime relations, and the treatment of Muslims still complicate the bilateral relationship. main argumentMalaysia has demonstrated a cautious hedging strategy that overall tends to acquiesce toward China, even in areas of tension. Despite initial fanfare that Mahathir Mohammad was going to defy China and cancel several marquee Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, Malaysia deepened its economic relations with China after the 2018 election. His Pakatan Harapan coalition government skillfully renegotiated BRI projects, embraced Huawei and its 5G network, and sought additional trade and investment. In the maritime domain, Malaysia has adopted a less publicly confrontational position toward China, while China has been less aggressive but continues to maintain a regular presence in Malaysia's exclusive economic zone. Though Malaysia has been outspoken regarding the plight of Muslim populations facing oppression elsewhere around the globe, the country has demurred on China's treatment of its own Muslim Uighur population. At the same time, however, Malaysia has selectively challenged China on certain principles, such as pursuing legal claims on its continental shelf, and maintained traditional U.S. ties. Malaysia serves as a bellwether state for understanding Chinese foreign diplomacy through BRI and thus on the whole provides evidence of China's ability to recalibrate and address local concerns and pushback. policy implications
• The new pro-Malay coalition government Perikatan Nasional, which replaced the Pakatan Harapan government in February–March 2020, is unlikely to change Malaysia's China policy. Indeed, the rapid spread of the Covid-19 virus in Malaysia will increase its dependence on China, which has quickly stepped in to provide medical assistance and economic aid. • Although ties with the U.S. remain strong, U.S. policy is perceived as being overly militarized and based primarily on conducting freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. Despite U.S. pressure, Malaysia is largely embracing China's institutions and regional development architecture. • Malaysia will continue to adopt a nuanced hedging strategy toward China, embracing investment, trade, and technology from China while pushing back on certain principles.

Profiles Indonesian Islamist terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah as it regroups after suffering setbacks in the face of a 2003 crackdown. After some historical background on the group, the theoretical basis for its revitalization is outlined, identifying its current strategy as a three-pronged effort of cell recruitment & expansion, member religious indoctrination & training, & instigation of sectarian conflict. Focus turns to Jemaah Islamiyah's "inverse triangle model" borrowed from Hezbollah wherein a network of charities & nongovernmental organizations support & provide cover for its terrorist mission. Attention is given to the Saudi-funded KOMPAK network & how Jemaah Islamiyah & its charities pushed their agenda during the 2004 tsunami & 2006 Java earthquake relief efforts. The lack of action on the part of the Indonesian government to put a stop to Jemaah Islamiyah's financial & social networks is noted, asserting that it has implications for US national security. Adapted from the source document.