Search results

Globally and locally, government support policies for green goods (like renewable energy) are much more popular internationally than raising the cost of bads (as through carbon taxes). These support policies may encourage downstream consumption (renewable energy deployment) or upstream development and manufacturing of those technologies. The use of subsidies—particularly upstream ones—is disciplined by World Trade Organization agreements, and its subsidies code lacks exceptions for transboundary externalities like human health or resource conservation, including those related to combating global climate change. The strategic trade literature has devoted little attention to the range of market failures related to green goods. This paper considers the market for a new environmental good that when consumed downstream may provide external benefits like reduced emissions. The technology is traded internationally but provided by a limited set of upstream suppliers that may operate in imperfect markets, such as with market power or external scale economies. We examine the national incentives and global rationales for offering production and consumption subsidies in producer countries, allowing that some of the downstream market may lie in nonregulating third-party countries. Although technology producer countries can benefit from restraints on upstream subsidies, global welfare is higher without them, and market failures imply that optimal subsidies are even higher. We supplement the analysis with numerical simulations of the case of renewable energy, exploring optimal subsidies for the major renewable energy producing and consuming regions and the cost of restrictions on upstream subsidies.

Industrial policy has long been criticized as subject to protectionist interests; accordingly, subsidies to domestic producers face disciplines under World Trade Organization agreements, without exceptions for environmental purposes. Now green industrial policy is gaining popularity as governments search for low-carbon solutions that also provide jobs at home. The strategic trade literature has largely ignored the issue of market failures related to green goods. I consider the market for a new environmental good (like low-carbon technology) whose downstream consumption provides external benefits (like reduced emissions). Governments may have some preference for supporting domestic production, such as by interest-group lobbying, introducing a political distortion in their objective function. I examine the national incentives and global rationales for offering production (upstream) and deployment (downstream) subsidies in producer countries, allowing that some of the downstream market may lie in nonregulating third-party countries. Restraints on upstream subsidies erode global welfare when environmental externalities are large enough relative to political distortions. Climate finance is an effective alternative if political distortions are large and governments do not undervalue carbon costs. Numerical simulations of the case of renewable energy indicate that a modest social cost of carbon can imply benefits from allowing upstream subsidies.

EU-Biodiesel (Indonesia) is the latest in two lines of cases. On the one hand, the case offers yet another example of the Dispute Settlement Body striking down creative interpretations of antidumping rules by developed countries. Applying the Appellate Body's decision in EU-Biodiesel (Argentina), the panel found that the EU could not use antidumping duties to counteract the effects of Indonesia's export tax on palm oil. On the other hand, the decision is another chapter in the battle over renewable energy markets. Both the EU and Indonesia had intervened in their markets to promote the development of domestic biodiesel industries. The panel's decision prevents the EU from using antidumping duties to preserve market opportunities created by its Renewable Energy Directive for its domestic biodiesel producers. The EU has responded in two ways. First, through regulations that disfavor palm-based biodiesel, but not biodiesel made from from other foodstocks, such as rapeseed oil commonly produced in the EU. Second, the EU has imposed countervailing duties on Indonesian biodiesel, finding that Indonesia's export tax on crude palm oil constitutes a subsidy to Indonesian biodiesel producers. The EU's apparently inelastic demand for protection raises two questions: First, when domestic political bargains rest on both protectionist and non-protectionist motives and policies have both protectionist and non-protectonist effects, what are the welfare consequences of restraining only overt protectionism? Second, under what circumstances may regulatory approaches be even less desirable than duties for addressing combined protectionist and environmental interests, and would the WTO have the right powers to discipline them in an environmentally sound way?

Several EU member states are exploring options for setting minimum domestic carbon prices within the EU Emission Trading System (ETS). First, a "TAX" policy would introduce a carbon tax equal to the difference between the prevailing ETS price and the targeted minimum price. Second, a national auction reserve price would "KILL" allowances by invalidating them until the ETS price equalled the national minimum price. Third, a government could require domestic overcompliance and "BILL" covered entities for extra allowances per ton of emissions, thereby increasing demand for allowances and pulling up the ETS price. We explore the implications of these policy options on national and ETS-wide carbon prices, revenues from emissions allowances, emissions, and economic welfare. We find that a national government's preferred unilateral policy will depend on the extent to which it values the fiscal benefits of revenues, which favor TAX or to a lesser degree BILL, versus climate benefits, which favor KILL and also BILL, particularly for jurisdictions with more emissions to leverage for overcompliance. Our analysis can be generalized to other multilateral cap-and-trade systems where participants pursue more stringent internal emission pricing through unilateral policies.

Several EU member states are exploring options for setting minimum domestic carbon prices within the EU Emission Trading System (ETS). First, a "TAX" policy would introduce a carbon tax equal to the difference between the prevailing ETS price and the targeted minimum price. Second, a national auction reserve price would "KILL" allowances by invalidating them until the ETS price equalled the national minimum price. Third, a government could require domestic overcompliance and "BILL" covered entities for extra allowances per ton of emissions, thereby increasing demand for allowances and pulling up the ETS price. We explore the implications of these policy options on national and ETS-wide carbon prices, revenues from emissions allowances, emissions, and economic welfare. We find that a national government's preferred unilateral policy will depend on the extent to which it values the fiscal benefits of revenues, which favor TAX or to a lesser degree BILL, versus climate benefits, which favor KILL and also BILL, particularly for jurisdictions with more emissions to leverage for overcompliance. Our analysis can be generalized to other multilateral cap-and-trade systems where participants pursue more stringent internal emission pricing through unilateral policies.