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De facto states, such as Somaliland (Somalia), are unrecognized separatist enclaves that display characteristics of statehood but lack an international legal status. To acquire domestic and external legitimacy, these actors engage in a wide range of governance practices: they set up military and police forces; executive, legislative, and judicial branches; hospitals; schools; banks; or social security networks. In spite of the obvious gains that can be accrued through the establishment of a complex governance architecture, de facto states exhibit great variation in the range of statelike institutions that they build: some, like Luhansk People's Republic (Ukraine), put together a rudimentary governance apparatus, while others, like Transnistria (Moldova), manage to construct a complex system of rule. What explains the variation in governance practices across these separatist enclaves? Using original data on governance institutions across all de facto states (1945–2016), this study offers an empirical examination of the key factors that shape separatists' incentives to supply governance. The findings reveal that de facto state separatists are less likely to provide governance when they have access to lootable mineral resources but are more likely to do so when they receive external military support, when peacekeepers are present, when they have access to relatively immobile assets, when they adopt a Marxist ideology, and when they control the territory for a long time. The findings help us better understand the conditions under which armed nonstate actors supplant sovereign states as de facto authorities and successfully institutionalize their rule.

De facto states, such as Somaliland (Somalia), are unrecognized separatist enclaves that display characteristics of statehood but lack an international legal status. To acquire domestic and external legitimacy, these actors engage in a wide range of governance practices: they set up military and police forces; executive, legislative, and judicial branches; hospitals; schools; banks; or social security networks. In spite of the obvious gains that can be accrued through the establishment of a complex governance architecture, de facto states exhibit great variation in the range of statelike institutions that they build: some, like Luhansk People's Republic (Ukraine), put together a rudimentary governance apparatus, while others, like Transnistria (Moldova), manage to construct a complex system of rule. What explains the variation in governance practices across these separatist enclaves? Using original data on governance institutions across all de facto states (1945–2016), this study offers an empirical examination of the key factors that shape separatists' incentives to supply governance. The findings reveal that de facto state separatists are less likely to provide governance when they have access to lootable mineral resources but are more likely to do so when they receive external military support, when peacekeepers are present, when they have access to relatively immobile assets, when they adopt a Marxist ideology, and when they control the territory for a long time. The findings help us better understand the conditions under which armed nonstate actors supplant sovereign states as de facto authorities and successfully institutionalize their rule.

De facto states—polities, such as Abkhazia (Georgia) or the Donetsk People's Republic (Ukraine), that appropriate many trappings of statehood without securing the status of full states—have been a constant presence in the postwar international order. Some de facto states, such as Northern Cyprus, survive for a long period of time. Others, including Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, are forcefully reintegrated into their parent states. Still others, such as Aceh in Indonesia, disappear as a result of peacemaking. A few, such as Eritrea, successfully transition to full statehood. What explains these very different outcomes? I argue that four factors account for much of this variation: the extent of military assistance that separatists receive from outside actors, the governance activities conducted by separatist insurgents, the fragmentation of the rebel movement, and the influence of government veto players. My analysis relies on an original dataset that includes all breakaway enclaves from 1945 to 2011. The findings enhance our understanding of separatist institutional outcomes, rebel governance, and the conditions that sustain nonstate territorial actors.

"Theories of Civil War Onset: Promises and Pitfalls" published on by Oxford University Press.

Sovereign states remain the primary units of analysis in conflict research. Yet, the empirical record suggests that the international system includes a wider range of actors whose behavior is relevant for conflict outcomes. This article introduces De Facto States in International Politics (1945-2011), a new data set dedicated to understanding the behavior of de facto states-separatist statelike entities such as Abkhazia. I begin by explaining why de facto states deserve attention. Further, I provide a definition of the de facto state that separates it from cognate phenomena. Thereafter, I offer an overview of the data set and illustrate its utility by demonstrating how it contributes to the literatures on war and state making, civil war, and rebel governance. (International Interactions (London)/ FUB)

A recent wave of civil conflict scholarship examines rebel governance, the process through which insurgent groups organize local affairs in areas under their control. While current research predominantly focuses on the supply side of rebel governance, the attention given to the demand side has been relatively limited. In this study, we take stock of recent scholarship on the dynamic relationship between rebels and civilians to theoretically explore the supply side of rebel governance and develop a new demand-side typology that captures the key factors influencing civilian preferences regarding the nature of rebel rule. Specifically, we argue that demand for rebel governance is mainly shaped by the interaction between civilians' perceptions of the state and civilian–rebel compatibility, which we define as civilians' perceptions of the compatibility of the rebel group with their own values, ideology, identity, and preferred modes of socio-political organization. To illustrate our main theoretical points, we draw upon insights gleaned from multiple insurgencies. Our study significantly enhances our understanding of how rebel–civilian interactions mold the fabric of political order in civil war environments.

Abstract
A recent wave of civil conflict scholarship examines rebel governance, the process through which insurgent groups organize local affairs in areas under their control. While current research predominantly focuses on the supply side of rebel governance, the attention given to the demand side has been relatively limited. In this study, we take stock of recent scholarship on the dynamic relationship between rebels and civilians to theoretically explore the supply side of rebel governance and develop a new demand-side typology that captures the key factors influencing civilian preferences regarding the nature of rebel rule. Specifically, we argue that demand for rebel governance is mainly shaped by the interaction between civilians' perceptions of the state and civilian–rebel compatibility, which we define as civilians' perceptions of the compatibility of the rebel group with their own values, ideology, identity, and preferred modes of socio-political organization. To illustrate our main theoretical points, we draw upon insights gleaned from multiple insurgencies. Our study significantly enhances our understanding of how rebel–civilian interactions mold the fabric of political order in civil war environments.

While research on interstate rivalries is abundant, scholarship examining nonstate rivalries remains limited. To address this shortcoming, in this article we introduce the Armed Nonstate Actor Rivalry Dataset (ANARD) – a dataset which captures dyadic rivalries and militarised disputes among armed nonstate actors in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) between 1993 and 2018. We begin by explaining why fine-grained data on militarised interactions between armed nonstate organisations are needed for a comprehensive understanding of conflict. We then provide details of the data collection process and coding practices. Finally, we identify the contributions that ANARD can make to conflict research

In this article, we examine the foreign policy implications of different types of investment flows. North–South investment is more sensitive to political risks (expropriation, default, civil war) than North–North investment. We argue that North–South investment flows create a constituency within the US financial sector that is likely to support stabilising intervention – military intervention aimed at reducing political risk abroad. Examining political action committee donations from Fortune 500 financial firms with a cross-sectional Tobit model, we find that US financial firms with greater exposure to the Global South are likely to favour congressional candidates with a record of voting for intervention in developing countries. This study contributes to the literature on economic interdependence and peace, proposes an original method for capturing the revealed preferences of political actors, and enhances our understanding of the sectoral underpinnings of foreign policy-making.